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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I look at the question of Taiwanese identity by focussing on characteristics 
that have come to be considered natural human identity attributes worldwide. I look at 
historical discourses that have depicted and constructed these attributes as essent ial to 
the nature of human beings. Biological theory, terminology, modes of classification, and 
conceptions of human being established in the natural sciences, and imported to the 
social sciences, have created a general international discursive regime that employs 
notions of blood relations, lineage, family, nation-ness, race, ethnicity an ongoing 
constructions and contestations of identity. The discourse on identity as a matter of 
heritage is echoed in the science of linguistics with the classification of languages into 
natural family groups. Linguistic group as an identity marker complicates and is 
complicated by the general discourse on identity also employing “family talk. I try to 
show that the human being conceived principally as a biological being, became the 
focus of techniques of population control and institutional reproduction of social 
subjects in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe, especially with mass education, 
and that this process was replicated in the industrialization and modernization of 
Taiwan. In Taiwan, as in Europe, techniques of what Michel Foucault calls “biopower” 
were deployed in the process of strengthening the productive powers of the nation state 
in the international struggle of the survival of the national fittest. For Foucault the 
spatial and temporal patterns of interaction these institutional processes employed 
created the kind of social subject that is a precondition for capitalist expansion.  
 
In addition to the implicit training that modern institutions employ, there are also 
explicit educational programs that are grounded in scientific and social theories that 
modern societies propagate in the curricula of public systems of education. The 
Taiwanese learned that their identities, as Chinese citizens, were determined by blood 
lineage, that is, by racial association.  I will explain that in China and Taiwan these 
positivistic, essentialist and biological ideas of identity, were picked up from the 
western biological and social sciences by Chinese intellectuals at the turn of the 
twentieth century. In combination with Confucian ideas on family these ideas were 
consciously selected by the Nationalist government in Taiwan and employed in the 
production of a specific form of Chinese citizenry in Taiwan. Reinforcing deeply 
entrenched discourses on race, long expressed in historical China, these biological and 
familial conceptions were deployed for political purposes in education programs 
designed to legitimise the right of the Nationalist government to rule China and  then 
Taiwan.  
 
Finally, the metaphor of biological family that was employed in an understanding of 
nation-ness in Taiwan has also come to determine thinking about the natural association 
between languages, nations and races. In the science of linguistics, languages are 
depicted as having evolved in the same way races do.  In these classifications, official 
national languages,  which historically are the dialects of dominant social groups, are 
determinative of socio-economic class reproduction, being considered the summit to 
which all speakers of all secondary dialects are compelled to aspire. The question of 
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language education for identity in Taiwan will be examined in light of these 
preconceptions, processes and programs.  
 
I show that language, nation and race have tended to be cast in discourse as naturally 
combined elements that determine identity. As a result of colonial educational processes 
these identity terms tend to be understood as both natural attributes and, as naturally 
adhering to each other. Nationalities, national or official languages, constructed races, 
and constructed ethnicities tend to be combined in a globalized discourse to produce 
dominant images of certain societie’s identities. The English language in Taiwan will be 
shown to be understood as “a  white” language. In colonial discourse  nations, races, 
ethnicities and language types have each been imbued with specific values and statuses. 
Therefore, dominant images that combine these attributes serve to create intra-national 
and international human hierarchies. In Taiwan, American English has the potential of 
raising the status of its learners in the national and international hierarchy toward the 
high point represented by America as the imperial centre.   
In Language and Symbolic Power (1991) Bourdieu describes attributes that 
distinguish groups as different forms of symbolic capital.  I want to hold that the 
nation/social space of Taiwan represents one node within a global network where 
capitalist forces continue to entrench privilege and power of national and international 
elites whose place in this hierarchy, whose opportunities for material and social 
advantages, are determined by the relative statuses of their nations, races, ethnicities and 
languages. “Black”, “brown”, “white” and “yellow” people, speakers of specific official 
languages,  or what are considered derivative dialects, are imbued with a matched set of 
symbolic forms of capital that have come to have specific social  values.  These help to 
determine specific life opportunities in different social settings. I focus on two related 
settings in Taiwan where expressions of different forms of symbolic capital have 
significance for Taiwanese identity. The first is the struggle between what have come to 
be understood as two ethnic groups in the latter half of the twentieth century that I will 
designate as mainlanders and islanders. The second is the context of English language 
teaching where certain accents and racial distinctions have come to play a part in the 
promotion of English as an important form of cultural capital. The struggle between the 
mainlanders and islanders will be shown to have affected relative opportunities for 
achieving English skills, to continue class stratification in Taiwan, and to further 
endanger traditional island cultures and languages. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Reason for Investigation 
 
 My interest in Taiwanese social identity stems from the eight years I lived and 
worked on the island as an English teacher and school administrator. Questions about 
social and national identity on the island have become a regular feature of public debate 
due, in part, to the insistence by the Chinese mainland that Taiwan be reunited with it 
politically. "Is Taiwan a Chinese society?" and "Are the Taiwanese Chinese?" have 
come to be seen as important questions for the island's people as well as interested 
foreign observers. I began to have interest in this debate because my work in private and 
public institutions meant that I was engaged in educational processes, especially the 
promotion of the English language, that potentially participate in, or influence the 
construction of social identity in Taiwan. It became more and more clear to me that such 
a responsibility should be accompanied by a commitment to critical reflection on the 
role I, and other foreign English teachers, were playing in helping determine the 
direction Taiwanese society was taking and what the implications of language education 
were for the question of social identity. It would seem clear that formal education is one 
of the main contributors to the general process of social identity construction. There are 
also many other major and minor factors that have a bearing on how the identity of a 
people is understood and expressed, and this thesis will attempt to understand how some 
of these factors, along with public education, play a part in that process in Taiwan.  
Reflecting on the question of Taiwanese identity, I began to understand the 
island to be one example of how the question of social identity is related to basic social, 
political and economic processes globally. Although my hope is that this work can fill 
out some areas of the debate about the island that will be of use to those interested in 
these issues, it should also serve as one kind of interpretation of the impact that 
globalism, capitalism, and neo-colonialism has on questions of social identity in one of 
its many contemporary guises. 
 
  
 
 
2 
Researcher’s Background and Perspective on Taiwan 
  
This study is a part of my attempt to understand my experiences in Taiwan and 
the meaning of my work there. The experience has given me a perspective on my own 
identity that I would not have otherwise achieved. The fate of Taiwan remains an 
ongoing concern for me as I believe,  given the time I spent there, that I can reasonably 
be considered to have taken up something of what it means to be Taiwanese into myself.  
Little did I know when I left Canada for a contract to teach English in Taiwan 
that I was beginning a decade long odyssey of learning about another country and 
people that would profoundly influence my understanding of what it means to be a 
Canadian national as well. I had been teaching in a junior high school in northern British 
Columbia when I received notice that my application to teach in Taichung, in the central 
region of Taiwan, had been accepted.   I spent three years as a teacher and administrator 
with the organization that recruited me. My time was divided between a high school in 
the countryside and a bushiban, or cram school, in the heart of Taichung city.   
Schooling in Taiwan is a national obsession. Where the real official competition 
for higher education in Canada starts in senior high school, in Taiwan, intense official 
academic competition begins with junior high school, and unofficially in primary 
school.1 
Our high school students came from various places around Taiwan and were 
drawn to the school for its English program. Many of them had done poorly on their 
senior high school entrance exams and could not get into the elite high schools that all 
families in Taiwan hope their children will gain access to. The high schools are tiered, 
and the best ones are conduits to prestigious post-secondary institutes and the best 
paying jobs. My students were able to take an alternate route through a private high 
school specializing in English instruction with half of their day spent with Canadian 
teachers. The certificate of graduation from a reputable English oriented school such as 
ours is a coveted asset in the educational market. If it didn’t get students into a good 
Taiwanese university, high TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language) scores 
                                                 
1 My own experiences with the early competitiveness of schooling in Taiwan are 
confirmed by Wang. (2001, p. 335)    
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would get them into a foreign university. 1 At least that was the sales pitch. Some of the 
families had to pay exorbitant fees for extra lessons during the high school period and 
after graduation, for their children to achieve passing grades. For those who could afford 
it this was deemed a worthwhile investment.  
The bushiban was for younger students, to the age of twelve, who lived in the 
city. After their regular school hours they were provided with bus service to our cram 
school where they spent an extra four hours per week studying English with Canadian 
teachers. In addition to this instruction many of them crammed on other evenings in 
math or other subjects. When children in Taiwan were not at school they were usually 
doing homework.  We were one of the more prestigious schools in the city. Our 
reputation was established on the basis of the bachelor of education qualifications of 
Canadian teachers, the owner’s Canadian affiliations and the buses provided citywide 
with our school name blazoned across them. The clientele at both schools was 
established or newly upper class Taiwanese families hoping to keep the edge for their 
children by getting them elite educations. We were just one of dozens of cram schools 
specializing in English city wide, and one of thousands country wide that continued to 
spring up at an accelerating rate during the time I lived there from the early to late 
nineties.  
We soon learned that image definitely outweighed substance when it came to 
elite education in Taiwan. There was no curriculum at either school and little guidance 
for what should be taught. The main criterion for success was if the students enjoyed the 
classes and liked the teacher. Without guidance, and without ESL training our staff 
groped their way to the semblance of a curriculum and sets of methods for teaching 
English. For the most part this effort was barely recognized by the Taiwanese 
administration whose goals were mainly image based and financial. The Taiwanese 
population was clamouring for English instruction with little understanding of what 
quality instruction entailed. They were easy targets for commercial exploitation by 
schools such as ours. As teachers we could only try to do our best to give instruction 
that would warrant the expense these families incurred for their children’s education. 
                                                 
1 For a statistical analysis of the stratified education system in Taiwan, see Wang 
(2001). 
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As many foreigners note after some time on the island, the image of quality often 
takes precedence over substance. Yet as Canadians, as other Western nationals have 
often confirmed to me as well, our treatment by the Taiwanese was exemplary.  In fact it 
soon became obvious that we were being given extraordinarily good treatment in 
comparison to that given to local teachers. White American, Canadian, Australian 
nationals were part of the image being sold as language education in “authentic” 
English. Although ads for teachers did not specifically request white teachers, applicants 
were often asked on the telephone about their race, or asked to send photos to verify the 
candidate’s race. A part of the presumption about hiring from certain countries was that 
teachers coming from them would be Caucasian. Here’s how two school owners put it: 
 
Parents who don’t understand English will believe the myth that 
white teachers can teach their kids better English. From a 
marketing standpoint, it’s understandable why schools would want 
to hire more white teachers. (Jan 2000,  p. 17) 
 
Most Taiwanese parents don’t care much about a teacher’s 
educational background, as long as they’re white and American. 
(ibid) 
 
In a comment that can be interpreted negatively or generously Jan relates one 
mother’s comments: “she likes her children to study with Caucasians to expose them to 
other people who look different from them.”  In this mother’s words: 
 
This will make them more at ease with foreigners and not just stare 
and stutter in front of them…They will learn about a new culture 
authentically. And their accents are more natural. (ibid) 
 
 Equally qualified and experienced non-Caucasian teachers who did not fit what 
was conceived to be the authentic Western standard found work more difficult to find 
and were passed over for less qualified white teachers. If they were hired they had to 
endure continuous scepticism about their authenticity as “native speakers of English” or 
found that their contracts were not renewed. They were often replaced by white teachers 
when these became available. An America born Chinese (called ABC’s in Taiwan) 
laments: 
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‘native foreign speakers’ infuriates me. I mean, what do they mean 
by ‘native’? I’m native, but I know someone like me is not who 
they are looking for. (ibid ) 
 
  Few schools bothered to tell families that many non-whites were born and lived 
in the preferred countries of origin for ‘native’ English speakers. The perception was 
that nations had associated races and languages. 
I soon learned that Taiwan had a population that was distinguished as two main 
groups, the wai shen ren, who arrived with the Kuomantang (KMT) in 1949 and ben 
shen ren, the majority  group on the island, most of whom had been there for three 
hundred years before the KMT arrived. These groups were both considered Chinese, or 
at least Asian, and therefore of the same race. The other groups on the island were the 
marginalized aboriginals (shan ren) who were considered racially distinct and not 
Chinese. When I wanted to discuss these “mountain people” most of my Taiwanese  
associates and students became embarrassed and laughed (a common reaction to 
embarrassment in Taiwan). In one of my young children’s classes, with five and six year 
olds, when the topic of aboriginals arose, they proclaimed in broken English, almost 
unanimously (and this was not easy to get them to do) that the mountain people were 
“very  very  bad”, obviously mimicking what they had heard from adults. I quickly 
learned that “us westerners” had not cornered the market on ethnic and racial prejudice 
completely. When pressed on the issue school owners usually expressed sympathy for 
non-white teachers but claimed they were only providing what the market wanted. For 
them, they claimed, it was just business and not racism. Capitalism, it appears, was 
preventing serious questioning of racializing in many cases. 
We reaped the benefits of being white. This was especially so in our schools 
where our salaries were around triple what the Taiwanese teachers were paid and where 
we received many other perks to go with the job. When we got to know those teachers 
they didn’t hide their bitterness about the discrepancy. Nonetheless they treated us as 
regular colleagues. On the other hand, we were treated like celebrities by our school 
owner, and in public we were a spectacle. Every day, at least a few people would try out 
their spoken English with us,  often with comic effect. Very few people in Taichung 
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could carry on an extended conversation but many people  were thrilled at the 
opportunity to speak to a live foreigner, which in the minds of many meant “a real 
American”. Most often Caucasians were called mei guo ren, (Americans) or wai guo 
ren, foreigners (literally: “out country person”) Generally there was an image of 
foreigners as being free, open and spontaneous. It was also a part of what was being sold 
in the schools. Learning with Canadian teachers would be more fun than the rote 
memorization practiced in Taiwanese schools.  As I would later learn, the history of 
Taiwan was one where the image of America, as a land that had attained its freedom and 
independence, had long been idealized. Compared with the extended history of 
repression, censorship, secrecy and subjugation in Taiwan, American history, popular 
movies and music provide an inticing  image of spontaneous expression and cultural 
freedom. Taiwanese people, especially the young, were ravenous for the experience of 
free America.   
 American iconography was everywhere. Along with American chain restaurants 
and retail outlets, American theme cafes, English slogans (often unintentionally 
comically expressed), T-shirts and jackets, emblazoned with English phrases, American 
insignia and brand names flash at you unrelentingly as you move down an urban 
Taiwanese street. “Merry Christmas”, lighted trees and decor adorn bar windows and 
interiors year round. Taiwan is now a capitalist and consumerist dreamland. Twenty-
four hour convenience stores are on every second street corner.  There is a curious mix 
of western popular culture and Chinese nationalistic images. Movies are preceded by the 
national anthem with associated images of industrial machinery transforming the earth 
into an urban paradise. The people’s industriousness is depicted as a pre-eminent 
national quality that seems almost like an apology for the destruction of the environment 
years of industrial indifference have wrought. There were no images of what remains of 
Taiwan’s incredible natural beauty. 1 Taiwan is at once a sad spectacle of the ravages of 
modernity and an example of a people struggling to find their way through the barrage 
of conflicting images to something that is the authentically Taiwanese. That struggle is 
                                                 
1 Taiwan was named “Ilha Formosa” or “beautiful island” by the early Dutch explorers. 
Eighty-five percent of the island is mountainous. The west coast lowlands have been 
decimated with industrial and urban sprawl.  
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something that I have come to believe we must all be engaged with, in “our own” 
societies on a continuous basis. The lessons of Taiwan, I hope to show, can be 
instructive in that regard.  We must all resist the kind of subjectification that I will show 
the Taiwanese have had to endure and at the same time refrain from objectifying  others, 
as  essential  others, that our subjectification so easily engenders.  
The forces of international capitalism are complicated by the way identities are 
constructed in local contexts. The accumulation of material and cultural capital in the 
hands of an elite minority is struggled against in a fight for self-determination by local 
populations such as Taiwan’s. These struggles that take place at every level of society, 
are largely determined by the enframement in language that produce representations of 
individuals’ identities,  and their corresponding “qualifications” for doing certain jobs. 
Therefore questions about appropriate language education need to include questions not 
only about which languages are learned, but also about the relationships between 
language  learning,  social identity, and socio-economic equity. These relationships 
should be made explicit both at the level of the creation of policy and for the language 
learners themselves.1 
  
A Preview of Identity Attributes and Issues: 
 
Looking at each of the attributes normally associated with social identity I offer 
the following definitions and observations. These are not put forward as working 
definitions but as a sample to express the range of contested meanings associated with 
these terms and the way these meanings are dispersed in discourse: 
 
1. Race:  
 
a) A race is a large population of individuals who have a significant 
proportion of their genes in common and can be distinguished from other 
races by their common gene pool. (my italics). . . Classifications by 
various authors differ somewhat in detail; subdivision into the three main 
                                                 
1 For example, Norman Fairclough (1989) advocates CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis) 
for ESL and other learners where they are taught to be able to see through the way 
discourse subjectively and ideologically positions them. ( Chapter   9 ) 
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races, Negroids, Mongoloids, and Caucasoids, is accepted by practically 
all of the observers.” (Vogel and Motulsky, 1986,  p. 62)  
 
       b) No serious biologist believes any more that humanity can be divided into 
distinct races. In recent years geneticists have shown that there is far 
greater genetic variation within what we consider to be a race, than there 
is between races. They have shown too that the distribution of one gene 
(say that for skin colour) is independent of that for another (say for blood 
group). As geneticist Steve Jones observes modern biology 'shows that 
there are no separate groups within humanity (although there are 
noticeable differences among the peoples of the world'. (Malik, 1996, p. 
3) 
 
c.)  Race is a pre-eminently sociohistorical concept. Racial categories and the 
meaning of race are given concrete expression by the specific historical 
relations and historical context in which they are embedded. Racial 
meanings have varied tremendously over time and between different 
societies. (Omni and Winant, 1998, p.15) 
 
1) Nationness: 
 
a)  In the modern world everyone can, should, will ‘have’ a nationality 
as he/she ‘has’ a gender. (Anderson, 1983, p. 5) 
 
b) Nationness is the most universally legitimate value of our time. 
(Anderson, 1983, p.3) 
 
c) It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will   
   never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of    
   them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their  
   communion. (Anderson, 1983, p. 6) 
 
2) Ethnicity:  
 
a)Ethnicity is a multifactorial concept including, but not limited to, 
cultural constructs, genetic background, ecological specialization, and 
self- identification.  (Crews and Bindon, 1991, p. 42) 
 
In other words anything that divides groups. 
 
c) The category of ethnicity is a form of social organization, an 
organizational vehicle which may take on different contents at 
different times and in various socio-cultural systems…The critical 
factor for defining the ethnic group therefore becomes the social 
boundary which defines the group with respect to other groups of the 
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same order, not the cultural reality within that border. (Schlesinger, 
1991, p.153)  
 
The boundary is whatever divides groups. 
 
d) In the Chinese world, cultural discourse constitutes an appropriate 
“space of dispersion”, in Michel Foucault’s terms, for understanding 
how ethnicity (as nationality) is constructed…The self effacing 
character of cultural discourse, in spite of its obvious authorial nature, 
is precisely what makes (ethnic) identity appear to be a value free 
construct, when in actually it is quite the opposite (Chun, 1996, page 
115) 
 
2. Culture:  
 
a) It (culture) is the integrated whole consisting of implements and  
consumer goods, of constitutional characters for various social 
groupings, of human ideas and crafts, beliefs and customs. (Branislaw 
Malinowski, 1944:36  Kroeber and Kluckhon, 1952:83. Cited in Prus, 
1997,  p.27) 
 
b) The most current images of culture imply totalising or integrating 
tendencies, which while seemingly innocent on the surface, nevertheless 
have served to discourage a more complete acceptance (and 
development) of a hermeneutic social science. (Prus,  1997, p. 27) 
 
c)  Adorno contends that…culture does not exist in a particular tendency, 
or in a totality, but in a dialectical structure that can only be unresolvable. 
He argues that ‘culture’ is an antagonistic concept, and to hold onto this 
truth the critic must sustain its untotalizable dialectic. (Young, 1995, p. 
30) 
 
3. Language: 
 
a) Saussure understood langue as something unitary and homogeneous 
throughout a society. But is there such a thing as ‘a language’ in this 
unitary and homogeneous sense? It is certainly the case that people 
talk and act as if there were. (Fairclough, 1989,  p. 21) 
 
b) a language has jokingly been defined as ‘a dialect with an army and 
navy’, but this is a joke with a serious undercurrent. Modern armies 
and navies are a feature of the nation state, and so too is the linguistic 
unification or ‘standardization’ of large politically defined territories 
which makes talk of ‘English’ or ‘German’ meaningful. (Fairclough 
1989, p. 14) 
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c) What these claims amount to is the transmutation of standard 
language into mythical national languages. (Fairclough, 1989,  p.14) 
 
What these definitions are meant to convey as a preview to the rest of this study 
are that these identity terms: 
  
1. have normative, or naturalized definitions and uses that posit real differences 
between people in the world independent of how they may be represented 
symbolically. 
 
2.  cannot  be adequately defined and their definitions, or their empirical 
manifestations are often irrevocably tied to other terms, or empirical forms, to 
ground their intelligibility. In Derrida’s terms, their definitions are referred and 
deferred (Derrida, 1978) to other identity terms. (eg. Mythical languages as 
national languages)  
 
3. tend to represent people who presumably ‘have’ these attributes as constituting 
large objectified and homogeneous groups. 
 
4. need to be re-theorized because they are used to ideologically determine and 
justify specific socio-political conditions and practices.    
 
  
. 
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CHAPTER ONE: A SHORT HISTORY OF TAIWAN 
 
 I offer this summary of the twentieth century history of Taiwan as a framework 
for understanding how the subjectification of its people occurred through education and 
how that subjectification has been resisted.  This historical summary, what I refer to as a 
mosaic approach, is offered in order contrast it to an understanding of identity, inspired 
by the work of Michel Foucault (AK, 1972) Pierre Bourdieu (1991), Norman Fairclough 
(1989), and Vivienne Burr (1995), that look at identity as a complex, dispersed and 
contested arena that reductionist sociology and history tend to efface.    
A simple approach to understanding the construction of social identity on 
Taiwan posits that the traditional mode of life on the island has come under the 
influence of three large cultural formations over the past century. These formations are 
of Japanese, Chinese, and Western, especially American, origin. Visitors to the island 
will no doubt encounter aspects of each of these cultures on the island while the exact 
genesis of  how they have come to configure Taiwanese society, to work together in the 
creation of what might be thought of as its social identity, may remain obscure. 
 The first kind of history is a classical or conservative account that views history 
as a continuum of linked events while the other is more radical and controversial, 
emphasizing discontinuity, irruptions of meaning, and unexpected associations of 
historical discourses from one area of social life to another. The first kind of history 
proceeds as though there is a single reality underlying the alternating appearances of a 
nation or society and holds that there is some continuous identity that remains 
unchanged from era to era.  This conception easily leads to the positing of an essence of 
a people, society or nation that distinguishes it from others. For Foucault such an 
underlying unity is an illusion. On the other hand as Foucault notes, with the logic of the 
nation state there are real activities and programs that are deployed, consciously and 
unconsciously, that work to normalize and homogenize people in accordance with some 
idealized image of what that society should be. Rather than assume some essential 
identity we are looking at ways in which social processes tend to impel populations 
toward an idealized and normalized understanding of what that society is, or should be.  
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1.1 The KMT: Colonialism in Official Nationalist Disguise 
 
 The modern history of Taiwan is often considered as two phases divided at the 
year 1949. It was at this point in time that two important social formations that might be 
thought important for understanding the development of Taiwanese identity came into 
intimate contact. On the one hand there was the socio-political complex brought to the 
island by the Nationalists under Chiang Kai Chek after his defeat by the communists on 
the mainland. This regime is referred to as the "Soong Dynasty" by Sterling Seagraves 
because of the autocratic role the Soong family played in the fate of China at the time. 
This elite group, most of whom were educated in America and referred to as “cultural 
hybrids" by Sterling Seagraves (1985, Chapter 3), manoeuvred its way to power by 
establishing high- level political and economic connections in the U. S., and successfully 
solicited military and financial support from America. 1 
With this background and these connections in place the Soongs were decisive in 
the introduction of what might be considered certain American, or at least Western, 
social and political elements onto the island. The specific socio-political elements 
introduced to Taiwan by the nationalists and the Soongs, and later, the socio-political 
direction the island took as a result of the Soong’s connections to America, including the 
direct military and economic cooperation between nationalists and powerful segments of 
American society, would seem to constitute a central socio-political thread, contributing 
a distinct American social climate to the island.  
The Soongs and many of the KMT were educated in America and they were 
deployed in the upper echelons of the social and political institutes of Taiwan. The 
knowledge and practices of those institutes were adapted from western and soviet 
models. The government itself was based on a Leninist model that considered the 
                                                 
1 Seagrave’s The Soong Dynasty (1985) describes patriarch, Charlie Soong’s, education 
at Trinity College and connections to industrialists such as Julian Carr of Durham 
Tobacco fame. Charlie was sent back to China as a missionary but became a 
revolutionary instead, helping to bring down the Qing and to found the Republic of 
China with Sun Yat Sen. His children were American educated and maintained high 
level connections in government and industry in the U.SA. (Chapter 1-4) 
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masses in need of a strong central authority to guide their economic and social 
development. The nationalists applied iron fisted control over Taiwanese society in 
politics, commerce, industry, law enforcement, media and education. Sterling Seagrave 
describes the initial brutality the regime under strongman Chiang Kai Chek displayed 
soon after their arrival:  
 
During decades of Japanese rule the island had become self-
reliant. But after World War II, the allies turned it over to Chiang 
as a part of a secret agreement made during the Cairo talks. Chiang 
forced Taiwan to heel. There were massacres; in the first, ten 
thousand Taiwanese were slain by KMT troops in riots in 
downtown Taipei. Twenty thousand more were put to death before 
Chiang was firmly established. Taiwanese leaders who were still 
alive went underground or slipped out to Tokyo. On an island of 
such moderate proportions, Chiang’s secret police and armed 
forces were effective in a way they had never been on the 
mainland (Seagrave, 1985, p. 442) 
 
These local Taiwanese leaders were protesting the confiscation of land, materials 
and produce and the denial of local participation in decision making. The KMT imposed 
a severe censorship of political dissent through the intimidation of non-aligned media, 
political and legal figures and organizations.1 The nationalists, employing the political 
and institutional apparatuses bequeathed to them by the Japanese, began the process of 
making national citizens of the Taiwanese in their own image. The image the KMT as 
the protector of authentic Chinese-ness in their war against the communists was 
cultivated in America with the added virtue of being compatible with Christianity. 2 
The Republican matriarch May-Ling Soong’s every word and sentiment were 
expounded by Henry Luce of Time magazine, and other media and political figures, who 
blithely swallowed this image while they ignored and rebuked everyone who tried draw 
their attention to the ongoing atrocities first in China, then in Taiwan: 
                                                 
1 An exemplary first-hand account of the political and social situation in post KMT 
Taiwan can be found in George Kerr’s Formosa Betrayed (1965). 
2 Certain Christian groups supported the KMT financ ially throughout their rule in China 
and Taiwan. Chiang himself converted to Christianity in what can easily be understood 
as a part of the creation of an acceptable image for American consumption (Seagrave, 
1985, p. 221) 
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Luce himself, the child of American missionaries in China, helped 
to keep the Soongs in power as vestiges of his own lost horizon, 
symbols of romantic China that had become a figment of his 
imagination. He provided the distorting lens through which many 
Americans came to see events in Asia. Scores of influential 
Americans fell under the Soong spell…(Seagrave, 1985,  p. 9)  
 
The KMT provides us with a blatant example of how discourse associated with 
social identity can be controlled by an authoritative body. Their authoritarian rule 
provides a limiting case where sheer coercion of one group over another establishes a 
general stratified framework in a society. While the Taiwanese were not exactly slaves 
of the Mainlanders, being allowed to pursue small-scale businesses relatively freely 
while the KMT monopolized the major industrial sectors, their socio-political status as 
local Taiwanese was severely limited. Wang’s statistical analysis of “ethnic” differences 
in socio-economic mobility concludes that in Taiwan: 
 
In general, educational opportunities correlate highly with family 
socio-economic background. In Taiwan…socio-economic 
background also related to ethnicity. Mainlanders tend to be more 
highly educated than Taiwanese, though this gap has been 
narrowing. This phenomenon has its roots in the political structure 
of the 1950’s that determined occupations and shaped the 
educational system. At that time most Taiwanese were farmers, 
and Mainlanders were given the jobs primarily in public offices or 
public enterprises, which offered greater economic benefits. The 
economic inequality consequent to the occupational differences 
between the groups in turn affected their children’s educational 
opportunities. (Wang,  2001, p.352) 
 
The economic disparity a result of unequal education was further magnified by a 
prejudiced education policy: 
 
In addition, unequal opportunity structure was reinforced by the 
government’s education policy. Economic planning led to tight 
controls on entrance into educational institutions, whose students 
were selected by a rigid system of examinations. The upper classes 
used their economic resources to help their children pass the 
examinations, and at the same time, the government heavily 
subsidised the education of the children of public servants. These 
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government policies disproportionately benefited Mainlanders. 
(ibid) 
 
Initially, establishing themselves through coercion and force, a legacy that later 
became a part of a counter hegemonic discourse on Taiwanese identity, the KMT with 
firm control of education and the media undertook a program of legitimising their rule 
by educating citizens in a manner that emphasized a common identity between 
mainlanders and islanders as racial and cultural Chinese.  KMT rule, as well as that of 
the Japanese prior to their arrival, could be considered a form of ‘official nationalism’, 
as described by Anderson. The KMT was a part of what Sterling Seagraves first called 
“The Soong Dynasty” as it represented a reactionary “official nationalism” that 
attempted to restore the classical stratification between a ruling elite and the general 
populace under the guise of an emancipatory nation state.1 Anderson (1983) describes 
the pattern established by such ‘official nationalism’ that was perfectly replicated in 
Taiwan.  Once established, official nationalism “began moving all the policy levers: 
compulsory state controlled primary education, state organized propaganda, official 
rewriting of history, militarism- and endless affirmations of the identity of the dynasty 
and nation.” (p. 101) Offering themselves as the guardians of an unquestionably 
valuable socio-cultural Chinese heritage, the Taiwanese were invited to partake of, 
educated for, and rewarded for partaking of this vision while being censored, killed, 
imprisoned, persecuted and punished for engaging in activities considered counter to 
that vision.  
Over the time frame being explored here, from 1949 to the present, there has 
been a movement within the authoritative structures of Taiwanese society from the use 
of direct or implied force on the population, the use of coercion, to the use of techniques 
for achieving popular consensus, or in Chomskian (Herman, 1994) phraselogy 
"manufactured consent", or in Gramsci’s (1985) terms, “hegemony”.  
                                                 
1 Anderson (1985) notes: “remember that it (official nationalism) developed after, and in 
reaction to, the popular nationalist movements proliferating in Europe since 1820. 
(p.86)  
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This program included mass education in Mandarin, a focused program of 
national civics, and the Confucian virtue of filial piety and respect for authority. 1 As 
Pierre Bourdieu notes, a common language is necessary for a hegemonic program 
because it allows the ruling class to conjoin peoples under a common categorical 
framework, providing the impression of unity and equality while maintaining a 
separation in life possibilities by establishing cultural norms that favour them against the 
dominated classes. (Bourdieu, 1991,  p. 168 ) 
Mainlanders constituted most of what Norman Fairclough (1989) calls the 
dominant bloc for the better part of fifty years.2Nonetheless, as will become apparent, 
the imposition of hegemony by this dominant bloc was, at least partly, effectively 
contested by the ‘native Taiwanese.’ 
 
1.2 Japanese Colonialism: The Logic of the Nation State  
 
Prior to the arrival of the KMT Taiwan was a colony of Japan whose colonial 
rule was modelled on examples from the newly established nations of Europe and the 
Americas. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983) describes how the 
project of colonization of Taiwan by the Japanese was modelled on the colonial exploits 
of the western powers. According to Anderson nations, once established in Europe and 
the west, supplied a blueprint for emulation in various other parts of the globe such as 
Indonesia, Japan and China: “the nation became something capable of being consciously 
aspired to from early on, rather than a slowly sharpening frame of vision.”(p. 67) The 
application of a western model of colonization, at least in part, was the first significant 
exposure of Taiwan to certain patterns of social interaction, nationalistic, imperialist and 
                                                 
1 The details of education in patriotism and filial piety in Taiwanese schools can be 
found in Chun (2000), Meyer (1988), and Roberta Martin (1982). 
2 The power of the capitalist class depends also on its ability to control the state: 
Contrary to the view of the state as standing neutrally ‘above’ classes…the state is a key 
element in maintaining the dominance of the capitalist class, and controlling the 
working class. This political power is typically not just exercised by capitalists but by an 
alliance of capitalists and others who see their interests as tied to capital-many 
professional workers for instance. We can call this the dominant bloc. (Fairclough, 1989 
p. 32) 
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industrial, that had their origins outside Asia. Although this period can be considered to 
have put a uniquely Japanese stamp on the process of colonizing Taiwan, the 
enculturation of the Taiwanese by the Japanese was also the first conduit for standards 
of economic, political and social development of “western” origin to influence the 
island. 
 Japan's project of making Japanese citizens of the Taiwanese was partly 
successful through public education including instruction in Japanese. The presumption 
of the inculcation of Japaneseness would later make the KMT, who understood the 
Japanese to be their natural enemies, suspicious of the Taiwanese. 1However, because of 
the limitated opportunities for the Taiwanese to participate at high levels within the 
social and political structures, an example easily seen as a certain ethnic or racial 
prejudice practiced by the Japanese against their colonial subjects, the latent sentiments 
of resistance to rule from afar continued to be fuelled. As Dr. Shih (SDTC) points out 
the common Japanese language, and Japanese domination of the Hokklo and Hakka 
groups, who were linguistically distinct, served to unite them into a single group.  (p. 9)2 
In light of this, Taiwanese, although picking up some Japanese cultural characteristics, 
maintained a distinct identity as a subordinated colonial subjects.  From the perspective 
of the mosaic model of identity construction, we might be led to see Taiwan as partly 
Japanese, through education, and partly Western, as a colony of a newly created nation 
modelled on the European and American blueprints. 
The identity of one group, the Taiwanese, is being defined, in part, by virtue of 
presumed to be well-defined characteristics of another group, the Japanese. Remaining 
at this level creates many problems such as; how western had the Japanese become? 
How Japanese were the Japanese? To what degree did Japan exemplify Chinese cultural 
characteristics as suggested by its Confucian heritage and use of Chinese script? ..and so 
on. As Foucault (1972) notes, however, the concept of “influence” required by such a 
model is very imprecise, and of questionable value. It limits us to understanding 
societies as a great continuous surface of passively interacting elements. It would be 
                                                 
1Mainlanders tended to treat Taiwanese as Japanese subjects and mistrusted them. This 
is confirmed by the expression that “Taiwanese brains have been poisoned by the 
Japanese and therefore need to be re-educated”  (Shih, SDTC,  p.12) 
2 Of course they still understood themselves as distinctly Hakka and Hokklo as well.  
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superfluous to say that this view is wrong.  Its serves as distraction rather than an insight 
into how power is distributed by processes and discourses associated with identity. With 
Bourdieu, although understanding that a social trait, an institutional procedure, a 
custom, a linguistic homology, or some such detail originated in another cultural milieu, 
may be interesting, these tendencies need to be seen as signs that are symbolically 
represented as forms of social prestige, vulgarity, or social difference, in a contested 
cultural space, and not just as politically neutral and inconsequential transformations.  
 
1.3 The Islanders: The Tradition of Resistance 
 
With the defeat of the Japanese the KMT began to have its influence on Taiwan 
with the military, industrial and social infrastructure left in place by the Japanese. (It 
seems) the social environment on the island was primed for both the continued 
application of western models of development begun by the Japanese, which the 
Nationalists had already internalised on the one hand, and alternatively for a more 
complete awakening of desire for autonomy on the part of the local Taiwanese. As 
Benedict Anderson points out, models of local nationalism established around the world 
were available for the Taiwanese to consider emulating. 1 These models could then be 
engaged to the legacy of local Taiwanese resistance to foreign rule. One model often 
evoked for the creation of national independence in Taiwan was that of  America. This 
is ironic because it was American neglect that left the Taiwanese to suffer the brutality 
of the Nationalist regime under Chiang Kai Chek.2  
The control of the discursive and institutional environment of Taiwan by the 
KMT would seem to be crucial for how Taiwanese social identity developed, not only 
because it limited the socio-cultural resources that such an identity could be configured 
from but also because it became the bulwark against which dissenting voices formed 
their resistance. This resistance has been described as arising out of the cultural 
formation that was already geographically centred on the island when the nationalists 
                                                 
1 Dr. Shih (SDTC, p.15) points out that it was not Chinese nationalist designs but 
Korean independence movement, Woodrow Wilson’s doctrine of independence and 
Irish home rule that were inspirations for the creation of an indigenously ruled Taiwan.  
2 This is one major theme of Kerr’s Formosa Betrayed. 
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retreated there in 1949. For the sake of simplicity it can be designated as "traditional 
Taiwanese" society.  
 Traditional Taiwanese society, with historical roots on the mainland, shared 
many traditional Chinese religious, kinship, and social customs, and a dialect related to 
those on the mainland. This society has a history of resistance to consecutive foreign 
intruders with political and economic designs on their beloved island.  Dr. Shih (SDTC)  
a policy analyst in Taiwan, understands love of land as the main factor for how 
mainlanders and Islanders became distinguished.  
 
The major demarcation between Mainlanders and Taiwanese is 
actually not based on linguistic difference but on their attachment 
to the island. The Taiwanese identity was developed in the process 
of reclamation of the frontier land and in the common experience 
of subordination to discrimination imposed by subsequent waves 
of alien rulers.  ( p. 10  )1 
 
Although language difference may not have been the reason for making the distinction, 
as Dr. Shih (SDTC) points out in this article, it was certainly an essential marker of this 
difference. Furthermore, differences in language competency served to separate the two 
groups by economic and professional class and should not be understood as only having 
a symbolic relevance but also as having material consequences.  Language would 
continue to determine difference by the division of labour it created between the two 
groups. The administration, and running of large monopolies of the country were carried 
out by mainlanders, who were adept in official Mandarin, and private business and 
industry was pursued by the Islanders whose competency was in a local language and 
not in Mandarin. Wang notes how the original disadvantages of the Taiwanese were 
eventually narrowed: 
 
                                                 
1 Dr. Shih (SDTC) helps us to understand one aspect of the identity of the 
society of Taiwan with reference to the differentiation between the islanders and 
ruling groups, but this explanation only helps us to see the separation and not the 
simultaneous process of homogenisation of the people of Taiwan under a single 
national umbrella. 
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The strategy by the less educated was to try to escape their class 
milieu, where possible, and the best path of upward mobility open 
to them was to become their own boss. These workers in Taiwan 
lacked other options for two main reasons: the general public 
widely accepted the educational system successfully distinguished 
the “capable” from the “incapable”, and the state-controlled labour 
regime blocked a labour movement from emerging. With these 
mechanisms in place, the only redress possible for those 
dissatisfied with unstable employment, low wages, and long 
working hours is to leave wage employment. As Hill Gates 
(1987:286) has noted, capitalism “offered a social model of 
upward mobility based directly on wealth rather than on 
connections through the state…”….The booming world economy 
in the 1960’s gave entrepreneurial blue-collar workers, mainly 
ethnic Taiwanese, a chance to make this move succeed. (Wang, 
2001, p. 353) 
 
The real difference between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, Shih (SDTC) says, is 
the difference the between their relationships to the island. The mainlanders are 
characterized in his article as using the island as a means to an end, as a stopover. It was 
a source of economic advancement and a military base from which the retaking of China 
would take place. The islanders, on the other hand, are depicted as being a cultural 
extension of the physical environment, having lived and worked there for centuries and 
having no other objective than to develop the local economy and society, and therefore 
should be more legitimately considered  the true citizens of the islands. Many of those 
who have family that lived on the island before the KMT arrived in 1949 consider 
themselves to be a living part of the continuing legacy of the political refugees who 
rejected the rule of the Qing Dynasty and who retreated to form an agriculturally based 
community in Taiwan over a period of three centuries. Although written historical 
records of resistance to foreign rule would not have been available to the following 
generations of Taiwanese, a rich oral tradition can account for their continuing 
identification as a group. This solidarit y has helped them to resist foreign invasion for 
centuries  and they continue to resist foreign designs on the island. 
The descendants of these political and economic refugees came under Japanese 
colonial control in 1895 when the Qing, who had possession of the island for only a 
short time, granted Taiwan to the Japanese in perpetuity after the Japan-Sino war. This 
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was an internationally legal agreement that, as of today, has not been replaced by any 
other legal international consensus despite the departure of the Japanese, the insistence 
by the mainland that Taiwan is a Chinese province, and American ambivalence.1  Those 
advocating independence for Taiwan point out this and other international legal 
agreements and declarations as support for their claim. Despite the strong legal case, 
other geopolitical factors conspire to prevent a national identity for Taiwan becoming a 
reality. 2  
Although speaking Taiwanese was forbidden in official public gatherings and  
public schools by the KMT, it continued to be spoken in the family and Taiwanese-run 
work places. Open and published dissent was out of the question but a narrative of 
resistance continued privately. For those who identified themselves as local Taiwanese,  
continuing the narrative of local resistance to foreign occupation,  the KMT became 
seen as one more authoritative shackle to be removed in the march toward social and 
political freedom.3 Belinda Chang (1997) notes how Taiwanese folk arts and theatre4,  
aspects of which were used to criticise the Japanese colonialists. These were denigrated 
as low class artistic endeavours and banned by the KMT, became associated with a 
rising Taiwanese consciousness in the 1980’s and are now blossoming. This 
consciousness represented a desire to reclaim a lost island heritage long suppressed by 
the two colonial masters. This is a part of what Chang claims is the use of culture:  
 
to fulfil political aims. Culturalism hand- in-hand with nationalism, 
always invokes culture to create collective consciousness. And in 
the process of invoking it there emerges a “cultural 
                                                 
1 See Kerr’s Formosa Betrayed (1965) for America’s changing and ambiguous stance 
on the political fate of Taiwan during this period. 
1See Carolan (2000) for an interpretation of the legal case for Taiwanese independence.  
3 The KMT was fittingly referred to as “The Soong Dynasty” by Sterling Seagraves as it 
represented a reactionary “official nationalism” that attempted to restore the classical 
stratification between a ruling elite and the general populace under the guise of an 
emancipatory nation state. Anderson notes “remember that it (official nationalism) 
developed after, and in reaction to, the popular nationalist movements proliferating in 
Europe since 1820. (1985, p.86)  
4 Chang’s (1997) focus is on the history of local Taiwanese theatre form called gezaixi 
that has proven to be a cultural symbol of Taiwaneseness against the rising tide of 
“Chineseness” imposed on the islanders by the KMT.  
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objectification”(Virginia Domiquez (1992)) in which culture is 
imagined, concretized, then circulated as a symbol of the nation. 
(Chang,  p.119) 
 
 The success of the native Taiwanese DPP (Democratic Progressive  Party) in the 
recent elections for the presidency and legislature can be seen as at least a temporary 
victory adding to the glory of the legacy of resistance. And, in this light, the demands of 
the CPP on the mainland, with its missiles squarely aimed at Taiwan, constitute the 
latest chapter in this narrative of the struggle against outside oppressing forces.  The 
success of these stands against regimes with far more military might are in part due to 
military and political events extrinsic to the island but can also easily be construed as a 
result of the internal cohesion shown by the group I am provisionally designating as 
traditional Taiwanese. How clearly this group has been able to distinguish itself from 
others who make claims of inclusion, as colonial subjects or ethnic comrades, takes on 
political significance.  Over the centuries the legacy of resistance has itself become one 
of the criteria of this identification and differentiation.  
 
1.4 Global Capitalism: The Modern Problem 
 
Taiwan’s economy has rapidly gone from being one based on production, during 
its colonial period under the Japanese and the early KMT occupation, to being based on 
consumption, in the past twenty years. This is to follow the trend established with the 
developed nations.  The Ta iwanese, largely excluded from political participation until 
recently, had concentrated on economic gain and their industriousness resulted in the 
rapid transformation of the economy as they attained relatively substantial disposable 
incomes. The arrival of modern media meant the Taiwanese were soon subject to an 
onslaught of advertising that positioned them as consumers. The purchase of expensive 
cars as a status symbol became commonplace. Mercedes Benz’s are ubiquitous in 
Taiwan. Many Taiwanese fly to Hong Kong and Thailand on conspicuous shopping 
sprees. Shopping in Taiwan has become a national pastime. As Fairclough notes this 
process comes with a price:  
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Capitalism in the process of industrialization and urbanization has 
fractured traditional cultural ties associated with the extended 
family, the local or regional or ethnic community, religion and so 
forth. These ties have been replaced (in some cases) by ties 
generated by people in their new urban and industrial 
environments, notably ties of class. (Fairclough, 1989, p. 200) 
 
The nuclear family unit remains strong in Taiwan but new and varied 
associations are developing in urban settings and the influence of the extended family 
has waned.  Many people bemoan the lack of traditional morality and the increasing 
suicide and homicide rates. Television watching, especially game shows, soap operas, 
gossip talk shows, Hong Kong action, American movies, and explicitly sensational news 
broadcasts have become commonplace. All of this is punctuated by advertising marked 
with the slick conventions mastered in North America and Europe.  Fairclough notes 
that:  
 
It is on the basis of sheer quantity that advertising is able to 
achieve its most significant qualitative effects: the constitution of 
cultural communities to replace those that capitalism has 
destroyed, and which provide people with needs and values. They 
displace rather than replace: ersatz communities are offered as 
alternatives to real ones. These communities are called 
consumption communities. The unprecedented degree of 
impingement of the economy in people’s lives…consists in this. 
(Fairclough, 1989, p. 201) 
 
As elsewhere in the developed world, large numbers of Taiwanese students study 
business and economics, many travelling abroad to America, England and Australia to 
get their degrees. According to Shih (STDC) the majority of these “parachute kids” 
continue to be from mainlander families (p. 8).  
Mandarin Chinese has served the business community well in their investments 
in projects on the mainland. Some Taiwanese analysts warn of the dangers of the 
growing intimacy of the two economies and the potential for economic manipulation on 
the part of the People’s Republic of China for political ends. The movement of people 
and goods on and off the island has reached frantic proportions, including the 
importation of English teachers, especially from Canada, the U.S., and Britain as 
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Taiwan becomes more fully committed to the process of international trade and 
capitalism. Traditional Taiwanese language and culture is confronted by the accelerating 
trend of economic dependencies on foreign trade where Mandarin and the English 
language, and the inrush of American and Japanese cultural influences, continue to  
saturate the social environment. It is difficult not to see that the meaning of Taiwanese 
identity hangs in the balance. 
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CHAPTER 2: LANGUAGE, IDENTITY, DISCOURSE AND POWER 
 
2.1 Foucault’s Philosophy of History Applied to Social Identity 
 
In order to begin thinking about how a society’s identity I will begin by looking 
at Foucault’s general philosophical position on the nature of history in the Archaeology 
of Knowledge. I will follow this discussion with Foucault’s alternative to conceptions of 
essential identities, his non-essentialist perspective, where social forces are seen to 
subjectivize individuals through discursive and non-discursive means. For Foucault 
social change is only possible by disclosing these subjectivizing processes. In order to 
do this all notions of a sovereign subject with a stable, core identity must be set aside. 
Just as with the individual, modern society as a whole does not have some distinctive 
identity but is a complex of institutional practices that subjectivize citizens in various 
ways. To determine relations of power and open possibilities for social change, these 
processes must be identified.   
I believe it can be shown that implicit in Foucault’s philosophical perspective is 
a specific position on the question of social identity. That is, although Foucault does not 
explicitly describe it as such, I believe The Archaeology  of  Knowledge (1972) itself can 
be read as a sustained critique of conservative notions about the meaning of social and 
historical identity.  Foucault’s philosophy of history distinguishes  ‘totalizing histories’ 
from the kind of history he claims to be pursuing, “a general history” with the following 
points:  
 
He says a totalizing history:  
 
seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a civilization, the principal 
-material or spiritual- of a society, the significance common to all 
the phenomena of a period, the law that accounts for their 
cohesion- what is metaphorically called the ‘face’ of a period. 
Such a project is linked to two or three hypotheses; it is supposed 
that between all the events of a well defined spatio-temporal area, 
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between all the phenomena of which traces have been found, it 
must be possible to establish a system of homogeneous relations: a 
network of causality that makes it possible to derive each of them 
relations of analogy that show how they symbolize one another or 
how they all express one and the same central core; it is supposed 
that one and the same historicity operates on economic structures, 
social institutions, and customs, the inertia of mental attitudes, 
technical practices, political behaviour, and subjects them all to the 
same transformation; lastly history itself may be articulated into 
great units –stages or phases- which contain within themselves 
their principal of cohesion. (Foucault, 1972, p. 9) 
 
The ‘face’ Foucault refers to in this passage, I believe, is nothing less than what is 
usually meant by the term “social identity” in reference to a specific spatio-temporal 
region such as modern Taiwan. Discourse analysis, as Foucault means it, seeks to 
disclose the mechanisms of power produced in, by, and through discourse that are 
masked by such ‘totalizing histories’. The implications for those seeking to define the 
identity of Taiwan in a similar way should be clear. These accounts, ideologically 
oriented, because they depict as natural that which is constructed, serve to mask the way 
power is exercised, under the guise of historical or social description. The idea that 
Taiwanese identity is a product of the confluence of the processes of specific historical 
phases, the pre-modern, Japanese, and KMT periods, is a description of what Foucault 
wants to avoid. And yet, how do we manage to begin understanding Taiwan without 
reference to those phases? With Foucault I believe that such chronological accounts 
“cannot be rejected  definitely”. However, they must have their “aura of truth”, and 
“virtual self-evidence”  dispelled. (AK, p.25) We shouldn’t assume that once such a 
history is told that the situation of a spatio-temporal region such as Taiwan has been 
understood completely.  
I am further confirmed in my claim that Foucault’s philosophical perspective itself is 
a rejection of the commonplace notion of how a social identity is created and described 
with  Foucault’s critique of the discipline of the history of ideas. He says : 
 
It is as if it was particularly difficult, in the history of which men 
retrace their own ideas and their own knowledge, to formulate a 
general theory of discontinuity, of series, of limits, unities, specific 
orders, and differentiated autonomies and dependencies. As if 
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origins, try pushing back further and further the line of antecedents 
to reconstitute traditions, to follow evolutionary curves, to 
projecting teleologies…we felt a particular repugnance to 
conceiving of difference, to describing separations and 
dispersions, the dissociating of the reassuring form of the 
Identical. (Foucault’s capital, my italics) (AK, 1972, p.12)  
 
I want to ask if it isn’t the case that this aversion to Otherness, also extends to 
the maintenance of some clear and distinct idea of social identity, as that which must in 
some way be understood as self- identical? The insistence on attaining a coherent idea, 
both of what social identity is theoretically, and how it manifests itself within a specific 
spatio-temporal context, of determining once and for all the natural lines of separation 
between in-groups and other groups, and the passion with which such research is 
pursued in academic circles and in the public media, seems symptomatic of the same 
inability to shift attention to how our common understandings are simplifications of 
complicated processes where nothing is as it seems, where identities are in fact, 
refracted, dispersed, and contradictory. As Foucault says, emphasizing the diachronic 
register: “It is as if we were afraid to conceive of the Other in the time of our own 
thought” (AK, p.12) I want to add, in the synchronic register: it is as if we are afraid to 
conceive of the Other in the composition of our social selves.  
  
Foucault claims to be aware of the source of this repugnance for the Other of our 
time. He says:  
 
If the history of thought could remain within the locus of 
uninterrupted continuities, if it could endlessly forge connexions 
that no analysis could undo without abstraction, if it could weave 
around everything that men say or do prepare him, and lead him 
endlessly toward his future, it would provide a privileged 
shelter(my italics), for the sovereignty of consciousness. 
Continuous history is the correlative of the founding function of 
the subject, (my italics)the guarantee that everything eluded him 
will be restored to him, the certainty that time will dispense 
nothing without restoring it to a reconstituted unity, to provide that 
one day the subject (my italics) in the form of a historical 
consciousness- will once again be able to appropriate, to bring 
back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by 
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difference- and find them in what might be called his abode. ( AK, 
1972, p.13 ) 
 
Does the desire for determining a fixed social identity stem from the same source 
as the desire for maintaining this privileged space of the subject? Doesn’t this account 
for the efficacy of the campaigns for instilling horizontal affiliations between groups 
within the established political norm of the nation state. Everyone belongs somewhere, 
within the boundaries of a well-defined fraternity. The clear definition of the social 
identity of nation or society, no less than, and in conjunction with, the clearly defined 
identity of the social individual, is considered necessary to assure them their place 
within the cosmological scheme and an ability to share in its redemptive powers.  
Benedict Anderson’s point about how the nation state has filled the void left with the 
decline of religions for creating an association of the ind ividual with the eternal, with 
the nation/family which preceded one’s birth and continues after one’s death, is 
supported here.1 (Anderson, 1983, p. 11) The Chinese myth of the Yellow Emperor, 
according to Dikotter (CRN, 1996), the claim that there exists an ethnic continuity for 
the Han Chinese from archaic times to the present was promoted by the PRC as an 
objective fact in support for the  Chinese nation to be conceived as a racial family, is 
also consistent with this view.  (p.3-5)  
 
2.2 Problematizing Culture  
 
I will begin with a criticism of Foucault, albeit a minor one.  Foucault, in the same 
section that he is cautioning against the unreflective use of certain synthetic categories 
for historical research such as ‘tradition’ and ‘origin’, resorts to (what I want to claim) 
                                                 
1 Anderson (1983) says: “Disintegration of paradise: nothing makes another style of 
continuity more necessary. What then was required was a secular transformation of 
fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning…few things were (are) better suited 
to this end than an idea of a nation. If nation-states are widely conceded to be ‘new’ and 
‘historical’, the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an 
immemorial past and, still more important glide into a limitless future.” (p.11) 
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are the synthetic categories of “civilization” and “culture”1 These terms need to be 
problematized, especially if the object of analysis is social identity. Foucault is at pains 
to advocate the rejection of, or least severe critique of, the application of specific ideas 
used, unassumingly and reflexively,  in much historical and social research.  When 
attempting to describe Taiwan’s social identity in terms of the origin of a cultural or 
social trait, idea, or system and how it combines with, influences, or is influenced by 
other social, political or cultural regimes, we are at cross purposes with Foucault’s kind 
of research and our conclusions will constitute a different order of meaning, more easily 
grasped but less politically potent than those attained by adhering to a Foucauldian form 
of discourse analysis.  
 My criticism of Foucault speaks to the extreme discipline required for, and the 
difficulty of adhering to, the suspension of all of these categories of thought 
simultaneously. However, and he only makes this point after a persistent caution against 
relying on any of these ideas, he says: 
 
 all these syntheses that are accepted without question….They must 
not be rejected definitely (italics mine) of course, but the 
tranquillity with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we 
must show that they do not come about of themselves, but are 
always the result of a construction the rules of which must be 
known, and the justification of which must be scrutinized. We 
must define in what conditions and view of which analysis certain 
of them are legitimate; and we must indicate which of them can 
never be accepted in any circumstances….what we must do, in fact 
is to tear away from them their virtual self-evidence, and to free 
the problems they pose; to recognize that they are not the tranquil 
locus on the basis of which other questions (concerning their 
structure, coherence, systematicity, transformations….(AK, 1972, 
p.26) 
 
Rather than assume we know what nation, race, ethnicity, and, culture mean we need to 
ask: 
 
….(What are they? How can they be defined or limited? What 
distinct type of laws do they obey? What articulations are they 
capable of? What subgroups do they give rise to? What 
                                                 
1 The different historical associations and transformations of these terms in  Europe are 
mapped out in Robert Young. (1995,  Chapter 2) 
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phenomena do they reveal in the field of discourse? We must 
realize, in the end, that they may not be, in the last resort, be what 
they seem to be at first sight. In short that they require a theory, 
and that this theory cannot be constructed unless the field of the 
facts of discourse on the basis of which tho se facts are built up 
appears in its non-synthetic purity. (ibid) 
 
 In this same section, as Foucault is bringing into question the “virtual self 
evidence” of the modern distinctions between genres of writing, he says: 
 
 after all, ‘literature’ and ‘politics’ are recent categories, which can 
be applied to medieval culture, or even classical culture, only by a 
retrospective hypothesis, and by the interplay of formal analogies 
or semantic resemblances…these divisions -whether our own, or 
contemporary with the discourse under examination- are always 
themselves reflexive categories, principles of classification,  
normative rules, institutionalised types; they in turn, are facts of 
discourse that deserve to be analysed beside others; of course they 
have complex relations with each other, but they are not intrinsic, 
autochthonous and universally recognizable characteristics.” (AK, 
1972, p.22)  
 
In this case, Foucault at once questions a reflexive categorization, that of 
accepted genres, and employs another categorization with clearly discernable shifts of 
meaning within historical discourse, that of culture. To talk of a civilization or a culture, 
in an unqualified way, is to evoke a discursive object that has been created in the 
discourses of history, sociology and anthropology as a device to delimit a certain 
framework for investigation, where in fact, as Foucault has noted in the case of history, 
there is a dispersed and discontinuous variation of social events and kinds of people. It 
is “the tranquillity” of the categorizations implied in the word ‘culture’ this work is 
trying to disturb. It is my contention that the term “culture” is one part of a complex of 
identity terms that is often employed as an unproblematized given, as some quality that 
a social group possesses and that defines it in some essential way. In fact a part of the 
way people are subjectivized is through the deployment of discourse that refers to 
culture as though it were a static and well-understood aspect of their being. The reason, I 
believe my criticism is a minor one, is the practical impossibility of holding all such 
categories in suspension simultaneously in a sustained fashion. At the limits of language 
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it seems some categories must be considered as givens for us to make sensible claims 
about the dynamic relations of other categories.  
The seemingly factual existence of nations makes the idea of nation-ness appear 
unproblematic, but I believe the material reality of the nation doesn’t make it any more 
real (or unreal) than the reality of culture or race, it conforms to a different but related 
rational complex. As Anderson notes, nations exist because we believe they do and the 
reason we believe they do is because we are subjected to the institutional and discursive 
processes that subtly force that reality upon us.1 I want to show that these “realities” 
mutually support each other in discourse and practice and that by analysing them 
together the aura of their realities can be dispelled. 
A part of what I want to show is that the contested understanding of Taiwanese 
identity is easily constrained by the force of presumed reality imputed to the categories 
of race, ethnicity, nation and language as natural and unproblematic. I believe, the 
meanings of these words needs to be understood, not as refe rring to well defined 
concepts or phenomenon, but as initially arising out of discourses and institutional 
practices associated with specific socio-historical conditions, especially with 
Enlightenment rationality and Imperial colonialism. In this rationality, in nineteenth 
century scientific discourse, their meanings were codified as referring to natural human 
divisions. However, with a Foucauldian critique that undercuts all claims to objective 
categorization, the meanings of these terms should be seen as dispersed amongst the 
multitude of different ways they are used within specific types of discourse. They are 
human divisions that have become naturalized and associated in specific ways that have 
implications for the stratification of people nationally and internationally. I hope to be 
able to trace some of the ways they have been employed in discourse to get a sense of 
their ideological uses. The different ways they are associated and dissociated are reason 
to suspect that they function to cover over the way dominant groups, defined in each of 
these categories, maintain their social advantages 
  I want to disrupt the sense of naturalness afforded to the fundamental categories 
associated with the identity of a society: nationality,  culture,  ethnicity,  language group 
                                                 
1 In the case of nation-ness in Europe Anderson (1983) points out the important role of 
universities and schools in the propagation of this “reality”. (p. 71) 
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and race, by asking  of each the kinds of questions Foucault wants to ask of terms 
associated with the object of “madness” for instance:  
 
What one must characterize and individualize is the coexistence of 
these dispersed and heterogeneous statements (on the object of 
madness); the system  that governs their division, the degree to 
which they depend upon one another, the way they interlock and 
exclude one another, the transformation that they undergo, and the 
play of their location, arrangement and replacement. (AK, 1972,  
p.34) 
  
Describing how an object of discourse is determined (social identity is an object 
of discourse for this thesis), Foucault, referring to the example of “madness”,  says: “we 
must map the first surfaces of their emergence: show where these individual differences, 
which, according to the degrees of rationalization, conceptual codes, and types of 
disease…may emerge., and then be designated or analysed.” (AK, 1972, p. 34) An 
analysis of social identity, using Foucault’s analysis of “madness” as provisional guide, 
should map the surface of emergence of the different types of differentiation that are 
associated with it. The differentiations this paper focuses on are: nationality, culture, 
ethnicity, race and language group Importantly, for the question of Taiwan at hand, 
Foucault (AK) continues: “These surfaces of emergence are not the same for different 
societies, at different times, and in different forms of discourse.” (p. 42) 
In the same way that “madness” is diffracted in the discourses connected with 
various kinds of mental disorders and behaviours in different periods of history, the 
discursive space for the object of social identity will be defined by the way these terms 
are deployed, especially in scientific and academic discourse in the history of Taiwan.  
Social identity, like madness, I am saying, is a general placeholder that different 
discursive and institutional processes can become associated with.  As Foucault (AK, 
1972, p.44) notes, various forms of madness have filled out that abstract object in 
different ways in the history of its use in different institutional settings.  
The presumed attributes of nation, race and so on, emerge in different ways, in 
different theoretical modes, with different relations to institutional practice, from society 
to society, time to time, and discourse type to discourse type. Therefore considering 
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discourse on identity in the case of Taiwan, mapping the use of categories associated 
with social identity is a very different proposition than if it were done in another societal 
location. Nonetheless, some of the modes of discourse will be nearly identical with 
those of other societies because the discursive orders can partially overlap from place to 
place. For example, the institution of the nation and its supporting modes of discourse 
are fairly homogeneous from society to society. According to Anderson (1983) 
internationally nation-ness arose rather abruptly and was quickly emulated in a 
wholesale fashion around the world.1 
The common point of emergence of nationality, as an international standard, 
came into a relationship with other identity characteristics such as race, and ethnicity in 
different social contexts in very different ways. For example, Frank Dikotter (DMC, 
1992) describes how the category of race emerged and was transformed in China 
throughout its history. 2 That discursive field, originally developed in isolation from the 
discourse on race in Europe, was reinterpreted with the appearance of the social sciences 
in early twentieth century China. Therefore, the relationship between the discourse on 
nation and the discourse on race in China and Taiwan is constituted in a different 
manner than in the West.3 When one considers how social identity in Taiwan is thought 
about, the distinctions between the geneses of the discourses, the patterns of interaction, 
interference, substitution and repetition for the discourses in each of these different 
social contexts must be kept in mind.  
I want to avoid thinking of the distinctions between these different sets of 
interactions as strictly cultural. Designating a discursive complex as Chinese, or 
American, is too imprecise, draws the discussion into a particular discursive arena that I 
want to maintain a critical distance from.  Because institutional authorities apply 
schemas borrowed from different times, places and other authoritative sources that are 
impossible to associate with a single cultural origin. Although those authorities may 
                                                 
1 Anderson (1983) says: “In effect, by the second decade of the nineteenth century, if 
not earlier, a ‘model’ of ‘the’ independent national state was available for pirating…but 
precisely because it was by a known model, it imposed certain ‘standards’ from which 
too-marked deviations were impermissible”. (p.81) 
 
3 See Dikotter (CRN, 1996) for a detailed discussion of the relationship between race 
and nation in China and Taiwan.  
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reside within what is reflexively called a single culture or alternatively reside in two or 
more of such cultures, the cultural distinction can serve to mask the way these 
interacting discourses, which includes the use of the idea of cultural differentiation 
itself,  are used to differentiate groups. I want to claim that discourse, as Foucault 
describes it, at least partly, transcends culture, because culture itself is a particular kind 
of differentiation produced through western scientific discursive practices. Only 
retrospectively, once the distinctions made in discourse become common-place, are 
naturalized, and used within a specific social context in a consistent way, do they 
(unreflectively) come be considered to be associated with a specific culture. From the 
perspective I am taking here such a distinction must draw on criteria that are always 
already caught up in a web of differentiating categories such as race, ethnicity, culture 
and language.  Robert Young (1995) describes the paradoxical nature of the concept of 
culture historically: 
 
What is noticeable here is the historical movement whereby the 
externality of the category against which culture is defined (eg. 
nature, civilization, low culture, subculture, alternative culture)  is 
gradually turned inwards and becomes a part of culture itself. 
External or internal, this division into same and other is less a site 
of contradiction and conflict than culture’s founding possibility; 
like gender, class and race, its willing accomplices, culture’s 
categories are never essentialist, even when they aspire to be so. 
This is because culture is always a dialectical process, inscribing 
and expelling its own alterity…it constantly reform(s) itself around 
conflictual divisions, participating in, and always part of, a 
complex, hybridised economy that is never at ease with itself. 
(p.30) 
 
The idea that Taiwan’s identity can be understood as a product of the interaction 
of three cultures becomes rather unintelligible in light of the contradictory nature of the 
concept of culture itself. In the case of Taiwan the task of determining sources for the 
way identity is constructed is particularly complex because the statements that define 
the discursive space within which identity is contested, are made within and between 
what are might be considered three cultural domains, western, Chinese and Taiwanese. 
However, because the lines between these domains have been formed within the very 
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discourse on identity defined by statements associated with such terms as “culture”, and 
“linguistic group” and associated concepts such as “Western”, “Chinese” and 
“Taiwanese” I will attempt to suspend these distinctions, using them only provisionally 
to facilitate the analysis and not as foundations upon which analysis is able to make 
progress. 1 
In the short term, and within a limited social framework, positing an essence of a 
particular group’s identity may help to improve the material and social status of the 
particular group. However, by reversing the stratification of dominant/dominated 
groups, this strategy ultimately continues the predominant mode of how identity itself is 
understood as something fixed and determinate. Identity continues to be understood 
uncritically in an essentialist manner. An understanding of the differences between 
groups, produced out of social, historical, political and economic practices and 
processes, continues to function as conceptions of natural and objective distinctions  
rather than as strategic or pragmatic ones. In the case of Taiwan, should the Islanders 
who were subjugated by the Japanese and KMT, and who now have risen to political 
prominence, proclaim themselves to be essentially different from the mainlanders on the 
basis of language, culture or ethnicity, I believe they are succumbing to this danger.  
Chun  (DHGI, 2000) explains why an essentialized identity promoted as an alternative 
to a historically dominant one, in the case of Taiwan, is problematic: 
 
The call for ethnic consciousness as a basis of national solidarity, 
eventually leading to independence, is a dangerous solution to the 
                                                 
1 It is the very naturalness of the use of such terms, their apparent facticity that I want to 
bring into question in this paper by showing how this naturalness has been created, 
maintained and transformed through discursive and institutional practice.  Furthermore, 
although these distinctions are used in the most off-hand way in both academic and 
popular circles, when clear definitions are sought for these terms various contradictions 
and gaps in meaning appear. I hope to show that the enigma of social identity, the 
struggle to give a definitive answer to the question of social identity, is a function of the 
fact that the statements associated with these terms create a space of dispersion 
irreducible to concise definitions and unexplainable by specific historical references. 
The historical or linguistic contexts, the elucidation of which we might consider 
sufficient to give precision to the meanings of such terms, always rely on the naturalness 
with which these terms are used in order to gain a rational foothold.  
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process of democratisation which runs the risk of creating its own 
factionalism, each dependent upon the fermenting of “primordial 
sentiments” for its very survival. While invoking Taiwanese ethnic 
consciousness is, in one respect, an admirable effort to call 
attention to the repression of the populace and the need to 
demystify a past generation of “collective misrepresentation” as 
Corrigan and Sayer (1985:8) put it, in order to reclaim lost, 
dormant and suppressed histories and cultural traditions, this 
passion to “rectify” historical truth also creates an unending 
pattern of internal colonialism…(p. 19) 
 
In this view, what the Taiwanese should do is to look at how these designations have 
been used against them and, rather than simply reversing this process, attempt to create 
a discursive space where identities can be re-evaluated without recourse to objectified 
divisions.  A Foucauldian perspective on identity undercuts all claims to identities based 
on such purported objective criteria.  It does not try to find a more reasonable way of 
dividing up the world, or making distinctions between individuals or groups, but only 
attempts to lay bare a level of interaction that can account for the appearance, 
transformation and dissolution of such categorizations. Those who take his perspective 
cannot return to the safe ground of understanding themselves under the umbrella of a 
particular or stable social identity, something that is no doubt empowering within 
specific social contexts, both psychologically and politically, and therefore not likely to 
be easily relinquished.  Alternatively, Foucault’s critique of identity enhances the 
possibility of finding common ground on other issues. For example, Chun (DHGI, 
2000) says: 
 
demand for just representation invoked by a resurgence of 
Taiwanese ethnic solidarity can only be a provisional measure to 
call attention to the actual existence of Taiwan as a nation 
(regardless of its official designation) and a point of departure for 
developing other consensus  on more important national issues 
such as economic development, urban congestion and industrial 
pollution, which transcend resolution along ethnic lines. (AK,  
1972, p. 19) 
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2.3 The Authoritative Creation and Reproduction of Discourse on Identity:  
 
For Foucault the decisive factor for delineating the contours of a specific discursive 
formation we need to focus on the different institutional authorities1 that create, 
reproduce and distribute different discourses in spoken and written texts and that 
coordinate social practices associated with them. It is through the production and 
distribution of different kinds of discourse, associated with different institutional 
practices, that identity differences and associations are created, maintained and 
contested. In this thesis I will especially focus on educational institutes in the discussion 
of Taiwanese identity.  
In the case of Taiwanese identity, what should be sought are the texts and textual 
types that have played a role, that can be understood to have established statements, that 
have contributed to the emergence and transformation of conceptions of social identity 
in that context. However, the context of Taiwan is only a focal point within a much 
wider range of authoritative bodies producing texts, and social practices, related to 
divisions between individuals and groups that may play a part in how the discourse on 
identity is configured. Of course government authority, the representative of the nation 
state, is the most obvious modern institutional body to have an influence on how groups 
become defined. Later I rely on Allen Chun’s work to show how the KMT government 
was decisive for identity construction in Taiwan through the institutional program of 
Sinicization of the Taiwanese populace. However, this program that served to link 
national to cultural identity developed in coordination with discourses that preceded 
their dissemination, and with discourses that entered into the general discursive field on 
an ongoing basis and these also need to be considered. I will focus on what can loosely 
be considered two discursive complexes in that regard. One is the scientific and 
positivistic discourse that Chinese intellectuals deployed in Taiwan, and the other is the 
historical discourse on race in China.  
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2.4 Identity, Subject Position and Power 
 
 An important concept associated with the question of social authority in 
Foucault’s works is that of subject position. For Foucault the crucial site of 
understanding how social forces are maintained or transformed is neither the individual 
person, nor the socially defined group but rather the subject position the producer of a 
text necessarily occupies in relation to institutional practices and their associated 
discourses.  Any one individual occupies more than one subject position, and according 
to Foucault their identity, rather than being unitary, “is dispersed” between those subject 
positions. For Fairclough, Foucault, and Burr subject positions are the sites of the real 
production of social power. Fairclough (1989) describes the teacher/student relation in 
these terms: 
 
the teacher and pupil are what they do. The discourse types of the 
classroom set up subject positions for teachers and pupils, and it is 
only by ‘occupying these positions that one becomes a teacher and 
pupil. Occupying a subject position is essentially a matter of doing 
or not doing certain things in line with the discoursal rights and 
obligations of teacher and pupil. (p. 38) 
 
Since the power exercised on one individual by another is constrained by 
normative practices, power must be understood as being produced and deployed 
structurally  rather than personally. Individuals are constrained by normative discursive 
practices when one takes the dominant role over others. Therefore, challenges to 
domination have to attack the discursive forms through which subject positions are 
created and maintained. Discourse types and discursive practice are in a dialectical 
relationship according to Fairclough (1989): “discourse types determine discourse 
practice, which reproduces discourse types.” (p 39) Transformation comes through 
challenging the way a discourse type is set up. For example, I believe racial, ethnic, 
national and linguistic categories are employed in national international discourses to 
position individuals and groups in that discursive arena and it is with these 
categorizations that I want to focus a critique.  When people ask what Taiwan’s identity 
is, they are designating a particular discursive arena within which that kind of a question 
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is answered in a normatively configured international debate.  Race, nation, ethnicity 
and language are employed in those debates that position different social groups in 
certain ways. In order to understand those positionings, it is necessary to understand the 
socio-historical conditions that produced the discourse, to define those positions, and 
that have naturalized  them. Identity is a product and not an essence. We need to 
investigate the processes and practices by which identities are achieved, how they are 
transformed, the purposes they serve, and who benefits from those constructions.  
The way people are positioned by these categories is revealed when an 
individual occupies two subject positions that are normally held to be mutually 
exclusive. These examples give us a hint at how these subject positions have become 
naturalized. This is indicative of deep-seated assumptions about who can be what 
without straining the rational underpinnings of how distinctions are made. For example 
a Caucasian, no matter how deeply involved in Chinese language and culture will, with 
few exceptions, still be considered a foreigner in China and Taiwan. This is a function 
of the discourse on race and its relationship to culture in those places. Another example 
is that many people are naturally considered to be “Chinese” by themselves and others, 
as long as they are understood to have ancestry from China, and  have what are 
considered Chinese physical features, despite the fact that they speak no Chinese dialect, 
have never been to China and have never practiced what are considered to be Chinese 
customs. Unlike a Canadian with a Ukrainian background, for instance, a “Canadian 
Chinese” will often be asked: “Where do you come from originally?” The pressure for 
these individuals to understand themselves as belonging to the group designated as 
Chinese is enforced by a general conception that distinguishes such individuals by 
physical features. We have here a preview of the lines of interaction and interference 
that occur between culture, race and nation in the discourse on social identity during 
particular types of social interaction. It is the specific kind of interaction that determines 
the subject positions that are occupied.   
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2.5  Individual and Group Identity: 
 
What does it mean to talk about the identity of a collective such as a society or 
nation? Vivien Burr’s (1995) Social Constructivism is concerned with the way the 
identities of individuals are built up through their dialectic relationship with discourses 
that position them in specific ways in particular contexts. For Burr our identities are 
dispersed amongst these various subject positions that are defined by the types of 
discourse we engage in.  But what of the identity of a society? Responding to the 
question of whether the primacy for determining individual identity lies with the subject 
positions discourse defines for individuals, or alternatively, rests at the level of society 
itself to which the individual conforms, Burr (1995) drawing on Jacques Derrida’s work, 
claims that the individual/society pair are logically inseparable, the one implicitly 
requiring the unconscious negation of the other to be intelligible as a separate entity.  
 
Rather than thinking of the individual or the society as forming 
opposite sides of a dichotomy, we should instead think of them as 
inseparable components of a system, neither of which makes sense 
without the other…the individual/society system is therefore a unit 
of study, as neither term refers to something which of itself can be 
properly understood. (Burr, p .109)  
 
The individual is largely a product of the society he/she has been constructed within, 
and a society is the effect of the individuals that collectively make it up.  Neither is 
entirely determinative of the other but neither is entirely free of the discursive activities 
that take place with the other.  
  
 
 
41 
Burr (1995) continues: 
 
…the individual /society dichotomy can be thought about as a 
construction, one way of thinking about the world, but not 
necessarily a way we have to be committed to. (p.105) 
 
Burr is saying that we conventionally think of  individuals as inherently separate self-
contained beings but the meanings of our social selves are mediated by the ongoing 
relations we have with others and the language forms that circulate in ‘our societies’ that 
characterize those relations.  
Schlesinger (1991) notes that attributing identity to a collectivity is often claimed 
to be a reification or a hypostatisation that tends to depict the individual as entirely 
constrained by  societal processes. His paper attempts to show how a more dynamic and 
dialectical understanding of the relationship between collectivities and individuals can 
be expressed. (p.1) If the collectivity and its individuals are understood as dialectically 
interacting and mutually defining through the symbolic mediation of different forms of 
discourse then this problem does not arise. Normative forms of discourse constrain the 
way language is used,  but not absolutely. Agency is constrained by how one has been 
socialized.  Society is a part of who we are and we are not entirely free of its effects. 
However, in any individual exchange, in the actual use of language, conventions can be 
challenged. There is a degree of freedom as well. If these conventions are challenged 
demonstratively or cumulatively, they can be transformed. Therefore, potentially 
institutional practices and the lines of domination and subjection can be transformed as 
well.     
 
2.6 Dominant Discourse as the Normalization of a Specific Style.  
 
Dominant discourses build up a dominant representation or image of the society 
as a whole, while contesting discourses challenge the dominant ones to one degree or 
another. The dominant images of the society conform most closely to the self- images of 
the individuals who consciously or unconsciously control it, while the subordinated ones 
are ones that attempt to edge out that image by replacing it with an alternative that 
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conforms more closely to the images of those individuals (or subgroups) who contest 
them.  In a sense these can be thought of as conflicts of style. Styles of life slowly 
inculcated through informal and formal education are referred to as a person or groups 
habitus  by  Bourdieu. 1 Citing Gellner, Schlesinger (1991) tells us that: 
 
the term ‘culture’ is to be used in an ‘anthropological, not a 
normative sense’ to mean ‘the distinctive style of conduct and 
communication of a given community’ (1983: 92). The basic 
assumption is the modal form of contemporary society is a nation-
state that acts as a ‘political roof’ (legitimator and defender) of its 
own high culture- meaning literacy in a given language sustained 
by, in particular, a national education program. (p.6) 
 
 
What’s missing and needs to be inserted here is that the high style of the nation-
state, which needs to be expanded to include the idea of the dominant bloc referred to 
earlier, is often, or usually, contested by alternative styles. The range of contesting styles 
varies from society to society, with some being more homogeneous and others more 
heterogeneous,  depending on their specific histories, especially the degree of control 
and tolerance exercised by dominant groups. The history of Taiwan is one in which 
alternative visions of society have been severely repressed and therefore a cultural 
homogeneity became established. However, as its political life has become more 
democratic Taiwan has become increasingly subject to competing visions of what kind 
of society it should become. However, it is my contention that Taiwan is in danger of 
succumbing to global capitalism as another homogenizing cultural force, equally as 
powerful, or even more so, than the totalitarian regimes they have suffered under in the 
twentieth century.  
                                                 
1 Thompson, in the introduction to Bourdieu (1991) tells us that: “linguistic utterances 
or expressions are forms of practice and as such, can be understood as the relation 
between a linguistic habitus and a linguistic market. The linguistic habitus is a subset of 
the dispositions that comprise the habitus: it is that sub-set of dispositions acquired in 
the course of learning to speak in particular contexts (the family, the peer group, the 
school etc. (p. 17) 
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2.7 Group Formation: Representation and Misrecognization 
 
The establishment of an image of a society implicitly excludes or marginalizes 
those who do not conform to that image. When the KMT included the Taiwanese, as 
Chinese citizens, and then made themselves the sole arbitrators of what that meant, the 
islanders at once became  lesser Chinese because of their linguistic and cultural distance 
from the dominant norm insisted on by the Mainlanders. Therefore these categorizations 
privilege the group that talks and acts like the established dominant image. But how 
does this dominant image get established? Why isn’t it simply rejected by those 
disadvantaged by it?   
For an analysis of the relationship between group formation, discourse and 
power I turn to Pierre Bourdieu’s Language and Symbolic Power. For Bourdieu (1991), 
following Foucault, the establishment of groups that create social hierarchies only 
involves power if the group formations are not coerced. The use of force, in this view, is 
indicative of a lack of power.  For one group to subordinate another without coercion 
the subordinated group must come to accept the norms advocated by the dominating 
group as social goods that have been achieved by the dominant class and to be striven 
for. Because the dominating group has been historically immersed in the cultural and 
linguistic norms that it promotes as universally beneficial values, it is it therefore in a de 
facto position of advantage if the entire society is convinced of the validity of that image 
or style. The creation of this conviction is hegemony and for Bourdieu the key institutes 
for establishing it are the family and the school. For Bourdieu group differences are not 
based on natural differences but are based on the mental representations that groups 
develop that have been consecrated by an authority powerful enough to exploit a 
common unarticulated sentiment. Such an authority can ritually “make or unmake 
groups” in a struggle of representations. For example, Hakka and Hokklo Taiwanese, 
who were ostensibly two culturally and linguistically distinct groups, have come to be 
considered as “ethnic Taiwanese” because of common adversaries, the Japanese and the 
mainlander Chinese. In Bourdieu’s view it could not have occurred without the 
articulation of commonness by a respected Taiwanese elite,  although exactly who can 
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be elite perhaps needs to be addressed.  This oppressive social and political climate in 
Taiwan created  sentiments that were seized upon by those able to articulate them in a 
way that is intuitively grasped by the group. The inaugural creation of this group is 
subsequently forgotten and the group is naturalized, as if it had always been. The KMT, 
either consciously or intuitively understanding the role of intellectuals in this process, 
murdered many of the elite Taiwanese with the first signs of unrest and then went about 
trying to convince the islanders of their common natures. Bourdieu (1991) says: 
 
struggles over ethnic or regional identity- in other words, over the 
properties (stigmata or emblems) linked with the origin through 
the place of origin and its associated durable marks, such as 
accent- are a particular case of struggles over classifications, 
struggles over the monopoly of power to make people see and 
believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the 
legitimate definition of the divisions of the world, and thereby, to 
make and unmake groups. (p. 221)  
 
The other side of this struggle is the program undertaken by the KMT, as a state 
authority controlling the major social institutes, to make Chinese citizens out of those 
who created the new identity of native Taiwanese as a distinct group.  As I will try to 
show,  both of these groups employ terms inherited from the natural and social sciences 
to make claims and counterclaims about the true identities of the island’s people. 
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 CHAPTER THREE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF CHINESENESS 
 
I have chosen Taiwan as the object of this investigation partly because I noted the 
urgency in the question about social identity there. The fact that Taiwan has functioned 
as a locally governed territory for 50 years (being a colony of Japan before that), that it 
seems to meet all of the criteria usually associated with a nation, and that it yet 
continues to have the designation of nation-ness denied to it by the majority of nations 
of the world, make it an interesting test case for the question of social identity. The word 
Chinese is commonly associated with nation, race, ethnicity, culture and language and I 
will focus on this designation in each of these categories separately while at the same 
time showing how institutional practices and discourses have associated them in 
different ways. That is,  I will try to give some sense of the genealogical construction of 
Chineseness via its various associations in discourse and practice with these different 
identity attributes. 
 
3.1 Nation-ness: Political Rationality 
3.1.1  Governmentality 
 
The colonization of Taiwan came late in its history. When Japan wrested control of 
Taiwan it was a new nation rapidly industrialising. The Japanese applied techniques 
long practiced by the European colonists to the new colony of Taiwan. It was the 
population’s first exposure to an intense program of national governance, to the 
deployment of a rigorous bureaucratic apparatus, to the mass education of its children, 
and to the idea of belonging to a national entity.  To use Walter Benjamin’s phrase, 
borrowed by Benedict Anderson (1983) as a description of the form of temporality 
associated with the modern nation state, they were thrown headlong into the 
“homogeneous empty time” of modernity. 1  
                                                 
1 It is reasonable to ask what form of temporal consciousness this replaced. Anderson 
notes that Europe previously was subject to “Messianic Time”(another phrase coined by 
Benjamin) where eternity was immanent.  One might say Taiwanese temporality was 
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For the exact spatial and temporal arrangements created in the institutional practices 
of modern national societies in “the west” constitutes a crucial force that objectified the 
human body and determined the way people were subjectivised.  At a preconscious and 
pre-critical level, in the routines set out by institutional practices, people physically 
come to reflect the knowledge that is employed in arranging and monitoring their 
movements and behaviours.  Foucault understands the modern state to have a type of 
rationality that was “reflective and perfectly aware of its specificity” in the doctrines of 
the reason of the state and the theory of the police. (FR, p.73)  In the former case,  in 
accordance with desire to compete with other states, “Knowledge is necessary; precise, 
and measured knowledge as to the state’s strength…It’s government’s aim is to increase 
this strength within an extensive and competitive framework.”(FR, p.76). He describes 
the second function of the modern state, policing, as concerned with all aspects of the 
citizen’s life, in making the citizen happy and productive, in order to harness him/her 
toward the goal of the nation state’s increased competitiveness.  
The identity of the Taiwanese people must be understood to have developed 
under this form of rationality, first with the Japanese colonists, then with the KMT. As 
Paul Ricoeur (1965) notes:  
 
Not underestimating the importance of (different) political 
regimes, one may say that there is the unfolding of a single 
experience of mankind and even a unique political technique. The 
modern State qua State has a universal structure. (p. 273) 
 
 In this sense the differences between East and West need to be set aside. I 
believe the following statement by Foucault (FR, 1984) needs to be applied to every 
modern nation state:  
   
Political rationality has grown and imposed itself all throughout 
the history of Western societies…its inevitable effects are both 
individualization and totalization. Liberation can only come from 
attacking, not just one of these two effects, but political 
rationality’s very roots.  (p. 85) 
                                                                                                                                               
tied to the cosmological temporality of ancient China, (hierarchical) the cyclical 
temporality of Buddhism, and the natural rhythms of the land and sea.  
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In other words we can’t just look to particular institutions or social practices to be free 
of the imposition of subjectivities by the state apparatus but must also see how state 
discourse works to produce those subjectivities as well. I will show later that nation state 
rationality in Taiwan, the improvement of the individual to serve the national ends, was 
applied in the form of a program that aimed to impose a specific ideal of a Chinese 
cultural identity on the Taiwanese population by the KMT through educational and 
other means.  This overarching state rationality is one level or dimension of identity that 
I want to single out in the investigation into what Taiwanese identity could consist in. 
 
3.1.2 Schooling: in service of state rationality 
  
Language learning represents an explicit force for the transformation of social 
identity and cannot be ignored if we are interested in Taiwanese identity, and I will look 
at its effects later on.  On the other hand, the very process of having children follow the 
schedules and institutional practices of public school is a hidden force in the production 
of social identity. In Discipline and Punish Michel Foucault looks at the way 
institutional practice works to subjectivize individuals and manage populations. This 
process is linked to capitalism in that it unleashed the productive forces of the 
population: 
 
Disciplinary control…is unquestionably linked to the rise of 
capitalism….’Each makes the other possible and necessary; each 
provides a model for the other’…without the availability of 
techniques for subjecting subjects to discipline, including the 
spatial arrangements necessary and appropriate to the task, the new 
demands on capitalism would have been stymied. (FR, 1984, p.18) 
 
By precisely controlling the arrangement of bodies in space, by dividing groups 
into ages, and levels, by establishing certain seating arrangements, setting time-tables, 
the school, just as other institutes do, creates an environment “where distribution and 
analysis, supervision and intelligibility are inextricably bound up” (FR, 1984, p.19).  
Individuals subjected to these regimes, as they are normalized into the routines, 
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eventually become self-regulating, only needing cues to respond appropriately, and thus 
tending toward docility. For Foucault, with these modern institutions, the body became 
a site upon which new forms of knowledge could be applied. For Foucault, the 
sovereign power over life and death of pre-national political rulers is replaced by the 
intensive and intrusive fo rces designed to extract the maximum efficiency from the 
human body for the development of the strength of the state: 
 
this formidable power of death…now presents itself as the 
counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that 
endeavours to administer, optimise, and multiply it, subjecting it to 
precise controls and comprehensive regulations. (FR,1984,  p.259) 
 
The science of biology had established a new view of human beings as an object 
of physical investigation. Institutional practice, rather than being an explicit scientific 
theoretical program, extended this understanding in the deployment of a multitude of 
techniques that served to isolate the body as a unit of social understanding that needed to 
be harnessed to the ends of social stability and predictability. These knowledges sought 
to deploy the potentiality of the individual in the most efficient way possible. In Taiwan, 
as elsewhere, children are divided into grades, and levels. Under a generally military 
inspired regime, they march in the mornings, sing the anthem and watch the flag raised.  
They sit in rows and are monitored for correct behaviour. As Sterling Seagraves  notes, 
the discipline of Chinese society was a passionate goal of Chiang Kai Chek’s: 
 
Like Mussolini, Chiang was determined to scrub his nation clean, 
teach the peasants not to spit, and make the trains run on time. 
Like Hitler, he was determined to get rid of all social and political 
perverts, and discipline the citizens, even if it took a few severe 
beatings, Chiang believed that fascism stood on three legs-  
nationalism, absolute faith in the Maximum leader, and the 
Spartan militarization of the citizens. (Seagrave, 1985,  p. 292) 
 
 Taiwanese students wear identical school uniforms and chant phrases in unison as they 
learn their lessons that until recently were standardized for age levels across the island. 
As Rabinow (FR, 1984) says of western institutional practices in general: 
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using diverse procedures, and with highly visible efficiency in 
each case, the ‘subject is objectified by a process of division either 
within himself or from others’ In this process of social 
objectification and categorization, human beings are given both 
social and personal identity. (p. 8) 
 
One of the dividing practices Foucault refers to is the process of examinations. 
Taiwanese education has been intensely examination oriented. Regular weekly and 
monthly examinations until recently led up to middle school and high school entrance 
exams that determine placements in the next school and that put the students under 
extreme stress. Parents’ expectations heighten this anxiety. Foucault notes that in 
Europe examinations became “increasingly a comparison of each and all that made it 
possible to both measure and judge…the school marked the beginning of a pedagogy 
that functions as a science. (FR, 1984,  p. 198) 
The minds, and thus what were taken to be the inherent aptitudes and abilities of 
the pupils, became objects of study through the examination system as a disciplinary 
tool for separation and distinction of human types. Although corporal punishment is 
officially illegal now, many Taiwanese told me they were physically punished for their 
poor exam results. In one story there was one blow to the hand for each place below the 
top-scoring student the students achieved. The body is directly disciplined toward 
normalization in this case.  Speaking of military academies in 1763, Foucault (1984) 
summarizes the effects of the disciplinary functions of the school this way:  
 
The hierarchizing penalty had a double effect. It distributed pupils 
according to their aptitudes and conduct, that is, according to the 
use that could be made of them when they left school; it exercised 
over them a constant pressure to conform to the same model so 
that they might all be subjected to the ‘subordination’ docility, 
attention to studies and the exercising of correct practice of duties 
and all the parts of discipline’ so they might all be like one 
another. (FR, p. 82) 
 
It is a stereotype that Asian students are group oriented rather than individualistic. 
With my own high school students it was difficult at first to get them to take risks in the 
use of their English, the fear of mistake or embarrassment being highly pronounced. In 
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fact, with time, their increasing spontane ity was clear proof that this stereotype arose out 
of the conditioning processes of the school system rather than anything to do with being 
Chinese or Taiwanese. These disciplinary regimes, outside the content of their lessons, 
must be seen as formative of the Taiwanese sense of self and other, and supply 
understanding of an important dimension of social identity for the island’s people.  
 
3.2 Colonialism and Taiwan 
 
The general institutional management of the population of Taiwan is one aspect, 
a largely implicit force, that can be seen as important for how Taiwanese social identity, 
conceptions of self-hood have developed. The content of what was learned in that 
schooling process is also important. Here, I want to consider classification as a mode of 
ident ity construction. I believe the rigidity with which certain classifications are applied 
in the definition of  human types is an impediment to the reinterpretation of Taiwanese 
culture. The self-evidence of those classifications needs to be disrupted for those new 
interpretations to arise.  
 
3.2.1   Scientific Thinking in Categorizing Humans 
 
The real differences between individuals and groups, if we consider their 
biologies, histories, languages and dialects and so on are likely far too numerous to list. 
When investigating how differences are understood and expressed, then, we are engaged 
in looking at systems of classification based on a relatively small number of criteria. We 
pick out those differences that are deemed to be the most important for determining 
which category to place a person or group within. We pick out differences somehow 
deemed to make a difference. We learn to perceive certain differences and ignore others.  
Our minds apply systems of classification unconsciously, or semi-consciously. The 
distinctions we perceive are a result of certain regimes of knowledge that inhere in the 
discursive practices we have been engaged with on an ongoing basis since childhood.   
Once a distinction or set of distinctions has been established in discourse it can 
become a representation of difference that can be connected to other orders of discourse, 
  
 
 
51 
other systems of categorization. For example, conceptions of who can be intelligent, 
although they may not merit this evaluation or who cannot be, although they do. In this 
way different systems of categorization link up with one another, building up to a 
complete representation of the world. Who we perceive ourselves and others to be is a 
part of that representation because some of the systematic categorization we instantiate 
is about human beings and therefore reflects back onto us, providing us with a sense of 
“place” within that represented universe 
  Because representations of the world are absorbed relatively uniformly, and are 
produced in language we are able to communicate with each other.  Where our 
respective representations do not correspond with each other there is a potential for 
disagreement for relatively small differences, and outright misunderstanding in other 
cases. Cultural misunderstandings, for instance, can be defined as a function of 
differences in these representations. Yet even between cultures these representations are 
sufficiently similar for a great deal of effective communication to happen.  
With the rising prestige of modern western scient ific thinking, building on the 
notion that the world can be described objectively, classification systems were devised 
with the presumption that the divisions formulated corresponded to the way the world, 
in itself, was naturally organized. The divisions made within those systems of 
classification were deemed  approximations of the natural lines of distinction between 
objects and events “out there”. This regime of knowledge only found its way to 
Taiwanese society in the twentieth century, first with the Japanese colonists, and then in 
a more concerted way with western educated Chinese intellectuals associated with the 
Nationalists who fled to Taiwan from the mainland in the mid twentieth century. 
The presumed objective description of the natural world worked well and 
facilitated more and more refined systems of classification within the natural sciences 
that allowed scientists to perceive a wondrous number of interacting systems and 
subsystems. These were considered to be the real world processes while common 
understandings were deemed inferior because they did not see through appearances to 
the underlying structure of the world. 
The creation of these knowledges was applied to technological problems with 
enormous success. They required an extensive learning program on the part of initiates 
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who became adept in the languages of their fields. Their talk became unintelligible to 
the uninitiated. 
 An aura of truth became attached to their investigations and interpreters were 
required to explain their work to the uninitiated masses. Mass education in Europe was 
an interpretative enterprise.  Popular discourse came to employ the terminology of the 
new priesthood in ways that, although not really matching the technical expertise the 
adepts attained, propagated the systems of categorization that these experts had 
discovered (created).  The power of scientific inquiry gave the systems of classification 
they expressed the status of an immutable truth.   
 Although the objectivity of scientific discoveries has been challenged 
increasingly over the past century, its systems of human categorization have been able 
to persist largely because of service these categorizations render to the maintenance of 
the social status quo. As I will try to show, the entire structure of the social world, both 
in the minds of social citizens, the institutional structures and the distribution of material 
wealth, depends on the maintenance of distinctions that are considered natural. These 
categorizations persist despite the challenge to these conceptions in contemporary social 
academic discourse. 1  
                                                 
1 .  Stephen J. Gould (1981)is one voice among a growing chorus who would like to 
change the perception of the ability of science to disclose objective truth. 
 
I believe that science must be understood as a social phenomenon, a gutsy, 
human enterprise, not the work of robots programmed to collect pure 
information. I also present this view as an upbeat for science, not as a gloomy 
epitaph for a noble hope sacrificed on the altar of human limitations.  
Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded activity. It 
progresses by hunch, vision, and intuition. Much of its change through time 
does not record a closer approach to absolute truth, but the alteration of 
cultural contexts that influence it so strongly. Facts are not pure and 
unsullied bits of information; culture also influences what we see and how 
we see it. Theories, moreover, are not inexorable inductions from facts. The 
most creative theories are often imaginative visions imposed upon facts; the 
source of imagination is also strongly cultural. This argument, although still 
anathema to many practicing scientists, would, I think, be accepted by nearly 
every historian of science. (p.37) 
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When the natural sciences turned their gaze to human beings the same positivist 
assumptions about categorization were carried over from the investigation of the natural 
world. This sentiment is expressed by Hans Georg Gadamer (1975)  in the opening lines 
of Truth and Method  this way: 
 
The logical self-reflection that accompanied the development of 
the human sciences in the 19th Century is wholly governed by the 
model of the natural sciences…The human sciences 
(Geisteswissenshaften) so obviously understand themselves by 
analogy to the natural sciences that the idealistic echo implied in 
the idea of Geist ( “spirit”) and of a science of Geist fades into the 
background…..Human science too is concerned with the 
establishment of similarities, regularities, and conformity to law 
which would make it possible to predict individual phenomenon 
and processes. (p. 3 )   
 
For natural laws to work they require the categorization of phenomena in a stable 
and unchanging fashion and this presumption was used to categorize human beings in 
order to work out regularities in the functioning of societies. The categories of nation, 
race, ethnicity, and language were routinely employed in the education of national 
citizens worldwide in a way that made them seem natural and unchallengeable and that 
purported to explain socio-economic differences.   
 
3.2.2 Dividing the World: Human Differentiation as a Global Discourse 
 
The sciences of anthropology, sociology and linguistics, and geography 
attempted to replicate the precision and decisiveness of categorization established in the 
natural sciences. At the same time European explorers and traders continued to 
encounter societies with people whose appearance and lifestyle appeared to them as 
very different from their own. These societies offered the curious new opportunities for 
classification- in this case the classification of human beings. The pretence to objectivity 
was applied reflexively to new data available in the study of human groups, and natural 
systems of racial and ethnic classification were developed. Willinsky (1998) for one 
thinks these historical processes need to be revisited 
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We need to learn again how five centuries of study, classifying, 
and ordering humanity within an imperial context gave rise to 
peculiar and powerful ideas of race, culture, and nation that were, 
in effect, conceptual instruments that the West used both to divide 
up, and educate the world.  (p. 3) 
 
In the case of China these knowledges were sought after and not imposed by an 
Imperial power. Rather, they were sought after by the Chinese elite and later imposed on 
the Chinese populaces because they were presumed to be the key to technological and 
social advancement. With the decline of the Qing dynasty near the turn of the 19h 
Century, Chinese intellectuals began to look at the western natural and social sciences as 
the key to a reorientation of Chinese society that would sweep away what they 
considered to be the worn out traditions that had led to its technological and social 
decline. The western scientific pretence for the objective classification of the natural and 
human worlds found its way to the Middle Kingdom with Western educated Chinese 
intellectuals such as Sun Yat Sen who became an advocate for Western regimes of 
learning and politics. For Sun, America provided the most appropriate models for social 
and political reform in China, and western science constituted the method for the social 
and material advancement of the new Chinese nation.  With the support of Charlie 
Soong’s printing expertise learned in America, and funding from the American religious 
and industrial sectors, Charlie and Sun printed and distributed cheap western scientific 
texts, along with bibles, in an attempt to reform Chinese society on the American model. 
(Seagrave, 1985, p. 60) Their enterprise came to an end with the defeat of the 
Nationalists, by the communists but it re-emerged with the cultural education of the 
Taiwanese through mass education on the island of Taiwan.  
Foremost the populace learned that they were subjects, whose best interests were 
to participate in the imperialist designs of their masters.  The content of their learning, 
first in the Japanese language, and then in Mandarin Chinese, was designed to remake 
them into cultural Japanese and Chinese respectively. These educational regimes were 
the standard forms of cultural assimilation that colonial and nationalist masters had been 
employing around the globe with the emergence of new nation states.  The concepts of 
race, culture, ethnicity and language constituted crucial elements of these educational 
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assimilations.  The Taiwanese were learning who they were in the same fashion that 
different national populations around the globe had done, and they were learning that 
who they were was scientifically valid.1 For Hannah Arendt (1951) ideological thinking 
such as the idea of fixed races  is parasitic upon the scientificity. She says: “Ideologies 
are known for their scientific character….” (p. 468) However, those who advocate this 
perspective are not really interested in doing authentic science. Echoing Foucault’s 
understanding of totalising histories, she says: 
 
Ideologies are never interested in the miracle of being. 
They are historical, concerned with becoming and 
perishing, with the rise and fall of cultures, even if they try 
to explain history by some “law of nature.” The word 
“race” in “racism” does not signify any curiosity about 
human races as a field of scientific exploration, but it is the 
“idea” by which the movement of history is explained as 
one consistent process. (p.469) 
 
As European colonial power extended across the globe along with the education 
of members of local elites such as Sun Yat Sen, European knowledge established itself 
as the most important knowledge regime for the social advancements of emerging 
nations states and the one that should be emulated.  One of the first systems of the 
                                                 
1 An understanding of the Taiwanese population as group state passively undergoing 
cultural reconfiguration should neither be overestimated nor underestimated. The 
island’s people had a strong reputation for resistance to foreign rule and no new master 
could take their compliance for granted. A strong narrative of resistance continues to 
play an important part in the contestation of identity in Taiwan in the contemporary 
debate. Nonetheless, the daily routine of rote memorization of the curricula devised by 
the KMT, in the children’s second language, and thus at an unconscious level, must be 
seen as determinative of what came to be understood as normal and natural 
categorizations of the natural and human worlds. They learned that they belonged to the 
national community of Taiwan, that nations were the natural modern expression of the 
destiny of a people and culture, that they were racially, and culturally Chinese, and that 
they were the legitimate inheritors of a historical legacy that was five thousand years 
old. They also learned that the communist regime across the Taiwan Strait ruled there 
illegitimately and was actively undermining the spirit of Chinese civilization to which 
they belonged.   All of this for a population of fishing and farming communities who 
had though out there time on the island before the arrival of the Japanese, wanted only 
to be left to themselves.  
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classification of human beings in this knowledge regime was classification by race that 
carried with it this ideological presupposition.  
 
3.3  Discourses on Race: East and West 
 
Race became natural history’s great contribution to naming human 
difference. In the eighteenth century Lineaus had used race to 
divide up humanity in his grand taxonomy. …by the tenth edition 
of his Systema Naturae, published in 1758, the number of races 
had grown to six. (Willinsky, 1998,  p.163)    
 
 The concept of race, despite a continuous decline in its legitimacy as a valid 
scientific concept, continues to play a key role for questions of human differentiation 
globally. Its persistence as a mode of differentiation of human beings in the case of 
China is a result of the ease with which traditional Chinese elite and folk conceptions of 
race found support in the scientifically validated conceptions of racial difference 
adopted by the Chinese elite from European theories. The concept of race had been 
employed in the west in its colonizing efforts externally and internally and these 
intellectuals saw it as a potential tool for a program to politically unify the diverse 
peoples across the dynastic realm.  
 
3.3.1  Racial Difference in the Service of Ideology 
 
Race is associated with biological determinism that depicts groups as having 
certain fixed physical, social and intellectual features. Stephen J. Gould (1981) suggests 
why the idea that there are specific inherent and fixed qualities associated with ones 
biological constitution persists: 
 
Since biological determinism possesses such evident utility for 
groups in power, one might be excused for suspecting that it also 
arises in a political context, despite the denials…(of this fact). 
After all, if the status quo is an extension of nature, then any major 
change, if possible at all, must inflict an enormous cost 
‹psychological for individuals, or economic for society ‹in forcing 
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people into unnatural arrangements. In other words scientific 
explanations of human beings are potentially ideological. (p. 39 ) 
 
If the idea of fixed differences based on biology were simply circulated as opinions 
without a substantial theoretical underpinning they would not likely have any major 
sociological or political importance.  Speaking of racism in Europe, Hannah Arendt  
(1951) explains the difference between individual opinions and ideological frameworks 
that employ supposed natural distinctions this way: 
 
An ideology differs from an opinion in that it claims to have the 
key to history, or the solution for all the “riddles of the universe”, 
or the intimate knowledge of the hidden laws which are supposed 
to rule nature and man. Few ideologies have won enough 
prominence to survive the hard competitive struggle of persuasion, 
and only two have come out on top and essentially defeated all 
others, the ideology that interprets history as the an economic 
struggle of the classes, and the other that interprets history as a 
natural fight of the races. (p. 159)  
 
These ideologically loaded assumptions are not confined to the intellectual elite but find 
themselves embedded in what is taken to be the common sense of the common man:  
 
The appeal of both to large masses was so strong that they were 
able to enlist state support and establish themselves as official 
national doctrines. But far beyond the boundaries within which 
race-thinking and class-thinking has developed into obligatory 
patterns of thought, free public opinion has adopted them to such 
an extent that not only intellectuals but great masses of people will 
no longer accept the presentation of past or present facts that is not 
in agreement with either of these views…..every full fledged 
ideology has been created,  continued, and improved as a political 
weapon and not as a theoretical doctrine. (ibid) 
 
Arendt’s  view on ideology roughly corresponds with Bourdieu’s. For ideology 
to work it has to function in naturalized everyday discourse and not as a theory.  
Bourdieu (1991) describes the ideological nature of making divisions slightly 
differently than Arendt’s more universal definition: 
 
ideologies serve particular interests which they tend to present as 
universal interests, shared by the group as a whole. The dominant 
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culture contributes to the real integration of the dominant class (by 
facilitating the communication between all of its members and by 
distinguishing them from other classes); it also contributes to the 
fictitious integration of society as a whole; and thus to apathy 
(false consciousness) of the dominated classes; and finally it 
contributes to the legitimation of the established order by 
establishing distinctions (hierarchies) and legitimating these 
distinctions. The dominant culture produces this ideological effect 
by concealing the function of division beneath the function of 
communication: the culture which unifies (the medium of 
communication) is also the culture which separates (the instrument 
of distinction) and which legitimates distinctions by forcing all 
other cultures (designated as sub-cultures) to define themselves by 
their distance from the dominant culture. (Bourdieu, 1991,  p.167) 
 
The distinctions being made have to be understood as plausible by those being 
indoctrinated and they need to be legitimized by some authority. In the case of race, its 
naturalness had been established in both Chinese and European discourse and it was 
given the stamp of endorsement at the turn of the century by biology and anthropology.  
The KMT, by including the Taiwanese in the same racial category and teaching them a 
common language created the illusion of unity when there was in fact division and 
hierarchy.  
The fact that race was finally shown to be a weak scientific classification 
could not possibly diminish the political momentum it had attained in discourse by 
those attempting to unify populations under an intelligible category. With little else 
to draw upon to give a sense of unity to the diverse numbers of people in the vast 
regions defined in the time of the Chinese Dynasties, race, already established in 
Europe as a founding political principal, was an obvious choice for both the 
nationalists and the CCP in twentieth century China. Dikotter (CRN, 2000) says:  
The nation race “was seen by many nationalists in China as the only concept of 
transcending gender, class and region to integrate the nation’s subjects into a 
powerful community.” (p.6)  
 The application of discourse for ideological ends cannot be completely 
arbitrary and must employ a multitude of rhetorical devices that connect them up to 
the general understandings in a plausible way.  As Arendt (1951) says, “persuasion 
is not possible without appeal to either experiences or desires, in other words to 
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immediate political needs.” (p.159) At the turn of the century, China was in turmoil. 
Something, or anything that could provide a sense of unity and harmony, in those 
conditions, would have been attributed a high social value. Race, with the 
endorsement of the most powerful intellectual episteme in the modern world, 
science, was an easy choice.1 Race’s continued use as a legitimate form of human 
differentiation in China can be attributed to the ideological force that the CCP 
leadership has applied with its control of education and media and the lack of 
alternative narratives of identity in the context of China. In Taiwan, as should 
become apparent, the idea of racial difference is also strong because of the similar 
control of discourse the KMT was able to maintain.  
 I want to designate the use of race to distinguish groups as racializing rather 
than racist. I say this because even societies who do not as overtly use race to stratify 
groups often racialize and employ racist discourse that continues relatively 
unchallenged. There is general discourse on human differentiation that has been and 
continues to be promoted across the globe through education and the media.  In 
Taiwan, where racial struggles have been less pronounced than in America, for 
instance, and where the population has almost uniformly been considered to belong 
to one race, these presumed natural hierarchies are not considered a problem as in 
America.  Of course, for the Aboriginals of Taiwan they are a problem, but it is one 
that has been kept out of the minds of the rest of the population quite effectively. 
Turning the gaze back to the role race plays in western education  Willlinsky (1998) 
says:  
                                                 
1 Stephen J. Gould (1981) points out that once differences are established as natural 
there is a strong tendency to rank them from best to worst or highest to lowest. The 
history of race as a result is also the history of racism. While racial hierarchies in the 
west are often held as private opinions in Taiwan they are unselfconsciously expressed. 
In informal surveys of my high school students in Taiwan, I asked if they thought 
peoples from different countries were better or worse than others. Without hesitation I 
was informed several times that Japanese, Westerners and Chinese were better than 
Thais, Filipinos and Africans (or blacks) socially and intellectually. There was some 
variation in the rankings but generally the classification followed a general pattern with 
certain nationalities/races at the top and others near the bottom. In another survey 
women were routinely depicted as less intelligent and capable then men, even by the 
high school girls in my class. 
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What I found in looking back at today’s biology classes is that the 
presence of the scientific study of race is both obscured and 
present. It is obscured by a curriculum that fails to acknowledge 
science’s part in making race a fixed point of human difference, 
even as the weight of those distinctions to which science once lent 
such credence are still present in the lives of students. (p.163) 
 
Comparing the two societies, what we see is not simply a common racism in 
each but different forms of racism. In our rush to distance ourselves from the 
horrendous injustices our societies perpetuated under presumptions of racial 
difference we continue to obscure the ways these presumptions continue to exist. 
Willinsky (1998) effectively argues that despite thorough debunking of the whole 
project of racial classification by Stephen J. Gould in the 1980’s that “ha(d) the 
effect of redeeming science as a whole.” that “Gould’s critique was not to signal the 
end of a mismeasured race science.” (p. 170) According to Willinsky the discourse 
on race continues in Western academic discourse largely unnoticed, not as an open 
acceptance of racial differences corresponding to natural categories but, in this case, 
as a historical deletion of how race functioned as one of the cornerstones of modern 
science and one of the main justifications for the excesses of colonial expansion.  
 
3.  3. 2  Discourses on Race in China and Taiwan 
 
Frank Dikotter has taken the question of the construction of race in China head 
on and his analysis is directly relevant to the case of Taiwan because the PRC justifies 
including Taiwan in the Chinese nation, in part, because its population is deemed to be 
of the same race. How race is constructed in discourse on Taiwan is therefore important 
for how the debate is framed. Dikotter (CRN, 2000) identifies three kinds of 
nationalism: civic nationalism which is  based on the conscious intentions of a society to 
pursue their goals collectively, cultural nationalism,wherethere is a presumed traditional 
history that constitutes a binding force that justifies the collective pursuit of goals, and 
finally,  racial nationalism. Of the latter he says:   
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Although racial nationalists also represent the nation as a unique 
entity endowed by cosmology with a particular history and culture 
they portray it above all as a pseudo-biological entity united by 
ties of blood. In the conflation of race and culture, racial 
nationalists represent cultural features as secondary to and 
derivative of an imagined biological specificity. The individual is 
first ascribed a membership to the community by virtue of a real or 
imagined congenital endowment, and only secondarily on the basis 
of cultural features; national culture is perceived to be a product of 
racial essence…Cultural nationalists seek to integrate and 
harmonize notions of tradition and modernity in an evolutionary 
vision of the community. In contrast, the positing of an immutable 
biological essence, based on patrilineal lines of descent, allows 
racial nationalists to explicitly reject tradition and culture and 
embrace a vision of modernity in an iconoclastic attack on the past 
while preserving a sense of national uniqueness. ….These three 
strategies of nationalism can overlap considerably and even 
alternate from one to the other …however cultural and racial 
nationalism have very much dominated the cultural and political 
domains in China. ( p.2  )  
 
 Given this description both mainland China and Taiwan could be considered to 
tend toward racial nationalism.  This thesis is supported by the fact that, even through 
marriage, those deemed non-Chinese cannot become a citizen of either China or 
Taiwan, although they may become permanent residents.  One’s race is the final arbiter 
of the possibility of national inclusion. One must necessarily be of the Chinese race to 
be a Chinese or Taiwanese citizen.  
China uses the idea that the two societies are of the same race as part of the 
justification for Taiwan’s inclusion in greater China. Those advocating Taiwanese 
independence, rather than deny the notion of common race point to Singapore as an 
example where a population with the same racial background as China’s is an 
independent country, or that the white races have distinct countries. (Shih, SDTC, p.17) 
In other words, race is considered a legitimate human category of differentiation but is 
deemed irrelevant by those who want to deny mainland claims to the island.  The 
glaring omission of a critique of the legitimacy of race as a form of categorization in 
discourse on identity in Taiwan, when such critique has been readily available for some 
time, is curious and telling. It means that race can function behind the scenes in the 
debate. It is curious because the denial of any reality to the notion of race, as Stephen J. 
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Gould’s work has established, would also allow those who wished to be independent of 
mainland China in Taiwan to undermine one of the major rhetorical strategies China 
uses for including Taiwan under its national umbrella. Yet this point is never made. This 
suggests that the reality of racial distinctions is accepted by most politicians and 
academics and is considered a valid point. We are left wondering what strategic role 
race plays for those advocating Taiwanese independence. The answer, I suggest has to 
do with how Taiwanese see themselves in relation to other, non-Chinese Asians on the 
one hand, and to aboriginal peoples on the other.  
One explicit indication that race has played a part in the way social identity came to 
be understood in Taiwan occurs in this excerpt from Sun Yat Sen’s Three Principles of 
the People-  required memorization for all Taiwanese students: 
 
Mankind is divided into five races. The yellow and white races are 
relatively strong and intelligent. Because the other races are feeble 
and stupid, they are being exterminated by the white race. Only the 
yellow race competes with the white race. This so called 
evolution…Among the contemporary races that could be called 
superior, there are only the yellow and white races. China (ie. 
belongs to)  the yellow race. (cited in CRN, 2000, p. 591) 
 
The other races, it should be noted include the brown, black and red races and 
they include those in southern Asia, aboriginal peoples, Indians, and Africans. Dikotter 
(CRN, 2000) points out that Chinese discourse on race is not simply a derivative 
discourse gleaned from western racializing texts but is part of a continuous and long 
history of racializing in China that went through several modifications:  
 
Far from being a mere copy or a ‘derivative discourse’ of a more 
‘authentic’ form of nationalism in the West, narratives of blood 
and descent in China have always been based on the active 
reconfiguration of indigenous modes of representation. National 
identity has been actively reconstructed and endowed with 
indigenous meanings that are specific to China. Modernizing 
intellectuals in China drew inspiration from foreign cultural 
repertoires, appropriated the language of nationalism, invested 
new ideas with native meanings and nuances, reinterpreted modern 
political ideologies, reconstructed their cultural heritage, and 
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finally reinvented their own versions of identity and modernity 1 
(p. 592) 
 
 
The idea of racial difference already long established in China received a 
renewed objective vigour with the science of anthropology Chinese intellectuals 
borrowed from Europe. The idea of the patriarchal kinship relation was extended to an 
imagined racia l family with the aid of a semantic shift and the scientific endorsement of 
race as a sealed concept of racial difference:  
 
The transition from lineage to this conception of race as a 
community united by blood ties was enabled by the common 
semantic source, the signifier zu, which referred to the descent 
group and also to race or kind (a term also of greatest importance 
to Wang Fuzhi in the 17th century (Dikotter, 291). Republican 
revolutionaries like Chen Tianhua, Zou Rang and Song Jiaoren 
were able to manoeuvre within the play of this signifier and, 
hence, with the emotions it evoked such as filiality. Thus Chen 
Tianhua pronounced: "The Han race is one big family. The 
[mythic] Yellow Emperor is the great ancestor, all those who are 
not of the Han race are not the descendants of the Yellow 
Emperor, they are exterior families. One should definitely not 
assist them" (cited in Dikotter, 1994, p. 495) (Duara, 1999, p. 13) 
 
This direct relation between nation and race appears shocking to westerners.  Our 
response, may result, in part, from what we understand to be the irrational belief in 
racial rankings of superiority and inferiority. However, according to Bourdieu, this 
results from a mental reflex that posits the way social differentiations occur in 
naturalistic terms. If we want to understand how perceived differences come about 
we need to attend to the way they enter into the representations of the world, often 
through discourses endorsed by specific authorities, that people come to accept as 
appropriate and accurate:  
 
                                                 
1 Looking at Chinese terminology Chun (CRN, 2000) tells us: “The conflation of “race”, 
descent and nation has been expressed throughout the twentieth century by the term 
minzu (most often translated as nation-race), signifying both a descent group and 
cultural community. (p. 595) 
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One can understand the particular form of struggle over 
classifications that is constituted by the struggle over the definition 
of ‘regional’ or ‘ethnic’ identity only if one transcends the 
opposition that science, in order to break away from the 
preconceptions of spontaneous sociology, must first establish 
between representation and reality, and only if one includes in the 
reality, the representation of the reality, or, more precisely, the 
struggle over representations, in the sense of mental images, but 
also of social demonstrations whose aim it is to manipulate the 
mental images (and even in the sense of delegations responsible 
for organizing the demonstrations that are necessary to modify 
mental representations). (Bourdieu, 1991 p.221) 
 
In other words if we want to understand what identity in Taiwan is all about, 
we should resist the temptation to base any of our conclusions on the distinction 
between those attributes that are real and those that are imagined.  Imagined 
distinctions, and the struggle itself, become aspects of the representations that are 
employed in discourses to create social effects, to stake out political territory, which 
in the case of Taiwan, includes the matter of national territory.  For Bourdieu mental 
representations and the supporting material manifestations of those differences are 
able to consolidate differences that in scientific terms cannot be grounded. The 
common use of Chinese script, emblems, and images, narratives, public ceremonies, 
flags and monuments partic ipate in the reaffirmation of Chinese racial unity. They 
constitute a unique style of display that those considering themselves Chinese, in 
this case, have come to be able to identify with.   
 
3 3.3  Race and Nation 
 
 I believe a case can be made that the application of heredity, in a metaphorical 
way, has the potential for all nations to be considered virtual racial nations. That is, the 
discourse on national identity employs familial notions that serve to essentialize 
nationness and to associate certain races with those nationalities. Canada for instance is 
widely considered internationally to be a “white” country. In Foucault’s terms, national 
differentiation is able to be a substitute in discourse for the idea of race.  In this view, 
the imagined nationa l family can play the exact role internationally, as has the of idea  
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biological race historically, and the superiority/inferiority scale that historically 
functioned within the latter categorization is able to  continue to function with the 
former.  Once again, I am not talking about the reality of the situation but the way things 
are represented in discourse, the way they are objectified and further employed in 
discourse. At least in Taiwan, Canada, America, Australia and England are widely 
considered to be English and white countries. People who live in those countires, who 
speak other languages and are of other ‘races’, are considered to be virtual and not 
authentic Canadians etc. This is not simply a product of discourses in Taiwan, however, 
but is a part of a global discourse that has been inherited from Imperialist history.   
The emigration of foreign nationals to different countries would seem to suggest 
this view could not be correct. However, the experience of many new nationals is that 
they can only nominally be considered Americans or Canadians and that true 
Americanism and Canadianism, the essence of those designations, is reserved for native-
born citizens with particular physical characteristics. The term African American is 
acknowledgement of this fact in a form of self- identification. According to Willinsky 
(1998), when asked to describe themselves, many of his students felt compelled to 
respond  “I’m Chinese” even though they were born in Canada. Willinsky (1998) says: 
 
To identify oneself as having been born in Canada while remaining 
parenthetically Chinese echoes a colonial history that determined 
whose home Canada was to be, even as imperialism engaged the 
Chinese of the Diaspora in the business of Empire; it speaks to the 
barriers imperialism constructed between East and West out of a 
compound of race, ethnicity, and nationality…(p. 6 ) 
 
 
 As noted above the firm association of racial and ethnic categories with 
nationness is not only a western imperial legacy but articulated historically with the 
essentializing of race in China as well. Important for the case of Taiwan, Chineseness as 
an essential quality has been reaffirmed in both East and West and its deconstruction in 
common sense is not likely to be easily accomplished. Yet, with Willinsky, I believe it 
should be a part of the goal of effective and socially conscious education everywhere.   
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3. 3.4    All in the Racial Family 
 
 The metaphorical association of nations with biological heritage and  family are 
captured in the phrases fatherland, motherland and homeland denoting ‘something to 
which we are naturally tied.” (Anderson, 1983, p.6)  Anderson goes on to note:  
 
in everything natural there is something unchosen…precisely 
because such ties are not chosen, they have about them the halo of 
disinterestedness….the family has traditionally been conceived of 
as the domain of disinterested love and solidarity. So too, if 
historians, diplomats, and social scientists are quite at ease with 
the idea of ‘national interest’ , for most ordinary people of 
whatever class the whole point of the nation is that it is 
interestless. Just for that reason it can ask for sacrifices. (p.14) 
 
 
The idea of the nation race as an extension of the family was promoted in KMT 
governed education in Taiwan. Dikotter (CRN)  points out that the discourse on race in 
China has been articulated with the patrilineal discourse of Confucianism. This 
articulation was also made with the Taiwanese nation in public education.  As Meyer 
(1982) points out, in  his study of Middle school language texts in Taiwan, the moral 
value of filial piety in Confucianism occupied a dominant place in the curriculum. 
(p.227) Unlike in mainland China, ancestor worship was re-established in Taiwan with 
the departure of the Japanese,  and the arrival of the KMT.  Shrines for departed, but 
ever-present ancestors, are prominently situated in many family households, and the 
burning of “ghost money” for their use in the afterlife is still widely practiced.  
The most intense educational efforts were for instilling the virtue of filial piety, 
followed by that of patriotism. Martin (1982) did a comparison of primary school texts 
in the study of the socialization of children in Taiwan and China: 
 
The predominant feature of the texts in Taiwan is their emphasis 
on filial piety- a concept completely absent in the Chinese texts. 
Model individuals in the Taiwanese texts are defined by their 
fulfilment of duty to their parents. Patriotism and diligent study are 
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also heavily emphasized, but they are presented as manifestations 
of filial piety, the ultimate virtue. (p. 139) 
 
Taiwanese often call close friends or distant relatives mother, sister, brother, father, 
uncle. The idea of kinship and blood relations goes deep on the island. Chun (FC) tells 
about how Confucianism was taught in the KMT program for the establishment of a 
Chinese culture in Taiwan:  
 
Confucianism was invoked here not as a system in itself but as a 
set of stripped-down ethical values which had a particular role in 
the service of the state. As a generalized moral philosophy or a 
kind of social ethics that could easily be translated into secular 
action, Confucianism here meant for the most part a devotion to 
filial piety, respect for social authority, and etiquette in everyday 
behaviour…thus recourse to Confucian tradition, especially its 
emphasis on filial piety, was actually an attempt to extend 
feelings of family solidarity to the level of the nation. (p. 6)1 
 
Yet in Dikotter’s (CRN, 1996) final assessment he holds out more hope for Taiwan 
than for China, to be able shake off the essentialist cloak, as I am claiming should be 
done everywhere:  
 
In contrast, multiple identities, free choice of ethnicity, ambiguity 
in group membership are not likely to appear as viable alternatives 
to more essentialist models of group definition. National identity, 
it should be stressed, has often led to the rejection of hybridity, 
fluidity, and heterogeneity in contemporary China. Racial and 
                                                 
1 Mainland China represents a strongly racial nationalism. In this case race 
represents an invitation to territories that are presumably racially homogeneous with 
it. The open invitation will appear more tempting as other reasons for unification 
appear. The lack of a denial of the significance of race suggests that the Taiwanese 
while perhaps not wanting to unite with mainland China, nonetheless feel compelled 
to understand themselves as distinguished from other Asian and non-Asian 
communities under their presumed racial Chineseness. I believe this is a function of 
the discourse in China and Asia of presumed superiority of Chineseness.  Raciality 
is largely associated with the extensive power Chinese culture has had historically 
within the contexts other Asian ‘races’. For example, many Thais are quick to 
comment that they have “Chinese blood”, that presumably means they participate in 
this cultural superiority.  
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cultural nationalism, can nonetheless alternate and even lead to 
new forms of civic nationalism, as may be the case with Taiwan 
today. (p. 5)   
 
  
Without ignoring the fact that race may be a widely accepted categorization in 
Taiwan and China, to label those societies as ‘racist’ probably obscures more than it 
reveals. It is to simplify a more complex situation. Without ignoring the force 
racializing has in those societies, we are in danger of essentializing them once again, 
this time not as being of a particular race, but as being of a particular kind of nation, 
one that racializes. It is quite easy for us to understand these classifications in terms 
of  our own history of racializing, which would to be mistaken. Furthermore, this 
classification obscures the way race continues to function in our own societies and 
the discursive struggles that continue to evolve in China and Taiwan.  It is too easy, 
given an overt moral stand against racism in the western liberal nations to say that 
those countries that don’t racialize overtly are better than those that do. Rather, I 
would claim we too continue to racialize, but for historical reasons, we do it 
differently. I am arguing that the foundations of nationness, while not explicitly 
racially defined, have a racial dimension that has not been eradicated.  It would be 
presumptuous to claim that my own country of citizenship, Canada, is any closer to 
being a non-racist society than China or Taiwan is.  
What we call racial and ethnic difference have been associated with violence 
and prejudice throughout the history of Taiwan as elsewhere. The early racial 
discourse on the mainland may have played a role in the emigrating islanders poor 
treatment of the indigenous people of the island when they had arrived in the 1600’s. 
The Japanese considered themselves racially and culturally superior to their colonial 
Taiwanese subjects. The Taiwanese considered the retreating mainlanders to be of 
the same general kinship group as themselves and anticipated an equal social and 
political exchange to take place upon their arrival. The decision not to make Taiwan 
an American protectorate was taken by America because,  after all, the Taiwanese 
were “their (the KMT’s) people”.  When Kerr (1965) suggested that America take 
Taiwan on as a temporary protectorate he was firmly rebuffed:  
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It was as if I had suggested withholding food from starving 
children. The ultimate argument turned on the point of population 
statistics. The Formosans were of Chinese descent. There were 
only five million of them. Therefore, no matter what their views 
might be, they were a very small minority among the total 
hundreds of millions of Chinese on the mainland. (p. 455) 
 The expectations of political liberation with the departure of the Japanese and the 
arrival of those they, and the Americans, considered their natural kin was shattered 
soon after the KMT took control of the island and began the slaughter of the 
Taiwanese elite and the repression of the Taiwanese people. Since race was not an 
available mode of differentiation between the two groups the term ethnicity came to 
be applied as a term that differentiated the mainlanders and Taiwanese. Some exiled 
Taiwanese countered the claim of Chineseness by denying their blood relations:  
One theme used by the exiled group especially angered the 
Chinese at Taipei, and one suspects that not all Formosans were 
happy about it. This was the argument that Formosans are not pure 
Chinese but are a mixed race. Although Nationalist leaders might 
call the Formosans a "degraded people" when addressing them in 
anger, for world propaganda purposes the Nationalist claim to 
"instant reversion" rested on the assertion that the Formosans were 
Chinese in blood, language, and social institutions. They were 
members of the Han Race. It was unthinkable that the Formosans 
should now claim to have Indonesian, Malay, Spanish, Dutch, 
British, French, and Japanese blood flowing in their veins. Taipei 
would admit only to the presence of some aborigines of Malay or 
Indonesian extraction - a mere 150,000 of them - a primitive 
minority to which the mainland Chinese were bringing cultural 
salvation. ( Kerr, 1965, p. 457) 
The idea of mixed race, or ethnic difference as a reason for political distinction 
was to play on the same epistemological turf as the mainlanders did. The differences 
between the mainlanders and Taiwanese was decreed by the KMT, to make a 
difference. The differential was an opportunity to remain the elite class in a new 
land. The application the term ethnicity served to instantiate a difference that was 
originally grounded in the subjugation of the Taiwanese.  
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3. 4  Ethnic China: Which one? 
 
The origin of the term “ethnicity” resides in its uses in the social sciences 
and it is from the scientificity of this term that the presumption of its validity is 
sustained.  This, despite the fact that there is little agreement about what the term 
refers to. Bourdieu (1991) calls ethnicity a euphemism for race.   This is because the 
term “ethnicity” at once removes the discourse employing it from the biological 
realm into the cultural, while surreptitiously letting biology, and the sense of 
objective difference in the back door. Racial discourse is a prototype (as is discourse 
on sexual difference) which all other essentializing discourses activate as they make 
claims for the natural divisions between individuals and groups. If we can imagine a 
scale of differences from the most overtly biological at the base to the least 
explicitly biological, and most social or cultural, at top, the concept of ethnicity is 
just above that of race. It means something like: a biologically homogeneous group 
(or presumed biologically homogeneous group) sharing some sufficient other 
number of other characteristics including: language, custom, lifestyle, and region, 
to naturally distinguish them.  Once a group is distinguished ethnically, once the 
difference is naturalized, the representation of the presumed difference between this 
group and others can be employed in various discourses for political ends.  This 
point is made with the category of ethnicity by Schlesinger (1991) this way: 
 
The category of ethnicity is a form of social organization, an 
organizational vehicle which may take on different contents at 
different times and in various sociocultural systems…The critical 
factor for defining the ethnic group therefore becomes the social 
boundary which defines the group with respect to other groups of 
the same order, not the cultural reality within that border. (p. 153) 
  
 Although this analysis attempts to antiessentialize the concept of ethnicity - an 
attempt to denaturalise it and rescue it for continued use in the social sciences, the term 
continues to function in many forms of discourse as a reference to an enduring essence. 
Theoretical reorientations do not imply socio-political ones. I would rather make the 
claim that the distinctions of race and ethnicity, to begin with, are difficult to employ 
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without ideological implications.  The presumption of their scientific validity weighs 
them down with semantic connotations that make their use as real distinctions 
dangerous.  I am not suggesting we stop referring to how the term have been employed 
historically. In fact analysis of the historical use of these terms is absolutely necessary 
for determining the way they have been used as tools to entrench the power of one 
group over another or to understand how subordinated groups have resisted the status 
quo. However, to use them as terms that truly distinguish human groups, without 
qualification, should no longer be considered legitimate.   
In the case of Taiwan there are two main ethnic categories that are employed in 
politicized discourse: Chinese and Taiwanese.  Contesting discourses on ethnic 
difference in Taiwan employ strategies involving all of the other identity terms I have 
isolated in this paper  except that of race.  That is,  nation, culture and language are all 
employed with the two terms Taiwanese and Chinese. As stated earlier, the absence of 
the concept of race in these contesting discourses, I believe, is because the of the 
presumed facticity of common race.  Both groups are unquestioningly designated as 
racially Chinese or Han.  Therefore, the debate functions within the confinements of a 
representation of Chineseness as a distinction that naturally binds mainland Chinese, 
overseas Chinese, Singaporean Chinese and Taiwanese Chinese in contraposition to all 
other groups.  
   Chun analyses the various uses the concept of  “Chineseness” has played in 
various discourses globally. Various terms have been used to denote different 
aspects of Chineseness and Chun (FC, 1996) searches for some attribute or quality 
that might justify the use of a common term,  only to conclude that:  
 
In the Chinese world, cultural discourse constitutes an appropriate 
“space of dispersion” in Foucault’s terms, for understanding how 
ethnicity (as nationality) is constructed….it involves the authority 
of statements about shared values embodied in language, ethnicity 
and custom, as well as shared myths encoded as genres of 
knowledge, such as history, ideology, and beliefs. In the context of 
the state, such discourses rarely emanate directly from the people 
themselves, but are articulated by the state, intellectuals, and other 
vested interests, all of which claim naturally to speak on behalf of 
“society as a whole. (p.115)  
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Chun’s investigation finds in the rise of nationalism a force that served to 
simplify a complicated ethnic situation. This was a part of a global trend that nations 
undertook to establish their uniqueness as a demonstration of unity and strength. At the 
turn of the century, beyond the use of a common script, limited mostly to the Confucian 
adepts, there was no common Chinese culture practiced by what could be considered a 
unified group.  
 
Prior to the Nationalist Revolution of 1911, there was no cognate 
notion in Chinese society or nation as a polity whose boundary 
was synonymous with that of an ethnic group. (p.113) 
 
 For Chun (FC, 1996), Chineseness, in the case of China and Taiwan, is an ethnic 
identity construction that developed alongside the establishment of the Chinese and 
Taiwanese nations. The imagined nation became associated with an imagined 
singular biological and cultural constitution. The concept of ethnicity, with its 
scientific credentials, is stretched to the limits of the boundedness of the nation state: 
 
The criteria of traditional practices and ma terial customs applied to 
distinguish ethnic groups…made the notion of ethnic identity 
within a cultural taxonomy problematic, especially in the cases of 
historically known minority groups that had been undergoing a 
long process of sinicization. In this regard the hard and fast rules 
characteristic of the boundedness of a modern nation-state 
ultimately fabricated ethnic divisions that did not exist in the 
minds and lives of the people themselves, while at the same time 
made cultural objectification a normative practice in the state’s 
institutional routine. As in the case of Taiwan, history and 
ethnicity thus combined to produce (a national) identity in which 
they were, in fact, nothing more than imagined constructions by 
the state to define the ethos of its own modernity. (p. 118 )  
 
 Here is an example where the term ethnicity intersects with the discourse on 
nationness and takes on a new political meaning. It may be argued that this is a 
misuse of the term, that it deviates from even the loosest scientific definition, but 
from the perspective of Bourdieu this is simply to insist on an unequivocal  and 
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objective  meaning of the term that cannot be sustained. Rather, the term has been 
used in many different ways for various theoretical and political ends. Its use in 
Taiwan  is only one example of such a use, and in fact its meaning is diffused 
amongst those uses. 
 
3. 5  Compacting the Sand;  Culture in Service of the Nation State Rationality 
  
Allen Chun (FC, 1996) tells us: 
When Chinese people wish to talk about themselves as a unified 
people belonging to a unified culture they refer to themselves as 
“people of the Han” (Han jen), as belonging to a Han culture that 
originated in the region of the Han River…but in fact the people 
consolidated by the Han empire were certainly not ethnically 
homogeneous….likewise the term Chung Kuo ( Middle 
Kingdom), as well as the concurrent notion of Chineseness as hua 
hsia, predates the Chinese empire, but the centripetal unity 
emanating from this civilizing centre was something that in pre-
dynastic times actually united different polities, occupied by 
diverse peoples who had inherently different languages, beliefs 
and practices- in short, different ethnic cultures. If we on the other 
hand, view China as an unambiguous political entity and 
Chineseness as a feature shared by ethnic Chinese on the basis of 
discrete traits and traditions, it is really because we are influenced 
by a homogeneous notion of culture that is essentially modern, if 
not national, in origin. (p.113)  
 
The program of establishing a definitive Chinese cultural identity was 
applied in Taiwan by these same Nationalists as a part of an intensive re-
education program.  Sun Yat Sen compared the Chinese people to “a dish of 
loose sand” underscoring his recognition of the lack of coherency that needed 
to be overcome in the establishment of the modern nation state on the 
mainland. This project of unifying was deployed in Taiwan. Chun (FC, 1996) 
says:   
 
Since the very idea of (a national) identity is new, any notion, of 
culture invoked in this regard, no matter how faithfully they are 
grounded in the past, have to be constructions by nature. In the end 
they conform to a new kind of boundedness in order to create the 
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bonds of horizontal solidarity between equal, autonomous 
individuals constitutive of the empty, homogeneous social space of 
the nation in ways that could not have existed in a hierarchical, 
cosmological past. (p. 114) 
 
  Chun shows clearly the new forces at work in the construction of mythical 
cultures with the rise of the nation state that replaced the old cosmological order. On 
the international stage the status of nation-ness had already become the pre-eminent 
political value and those able to establish new nations were bound for the prize of 
extreme prestige and power.  The motives of individuals such as Sun and Chiang 
were not the same but the goal of nation-ness was the same. A new Chinese nation 
would put them on the same international playing field as the most powerful social 
and financial forces in the world. The expression of a population with a unified 
cultural identity was deemed an essential asset in that arena.  In Taiwan, according 
to Dikotter:  
 
KMT designated itself as the guardian of “traditional Chinese 
culture”…at the core of this traditional Chinese identity is the 
concept of hua-hsia. By invoking the sense of (hua) that is rooted 
in the shared civilization of the first (mythical) dynasty (hsia), hua-
hsia is, in essence a code word for both political legitimacy and 
historical destiny. Specifically, in opposition to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), hua hsia represents the metaphorical 
defence of a traditional past that contrasts with the extreme 
radicalism of a communist world view. (CRN, 1996,  p.116)  
 
Because of its conscious break with the past, the PRC had to rely more 
heavily on the notion of biological inclusiveness in the expression of the unique 
social face it presented to the world. Dikotter (CRN, 1996) notes that 
archaeological projects are enlisted in the service of creating the narrative of a 
singular historical destiny for the people of China. (p.117)  They are constructed 
as forming an unbroken heritage that dates to the dawn of modern man.  On 
Taiwan, there is a combination of racial and supposed cultural factors placed in 
the service of the new polity of the nation. This narrative, despite its distance 
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from the everyday lives of the Taiwanese, has been relentlessly disseminated 
among the island’s people. As Chun (FC, 1996) says:  
 
the fact that the government felt compelled to orchestrate social 
sentiment through mass movements suggests that culture was 
hardly something that could be taken for granted. ( p.117)   
 
As Gellner points out ‘culture’ became an important concept for national 
legitimation of emerging nation states that bounded groups whose life practices and 
languages were very different: 
 
Culture is no longer the adornment, confirmation and legitimation 
of a social order which was also sustained by harsher and coercive 
constraints; culture is now the necessary shared medium, the life-
blood (my italics), or perhaps the minimal shared atmosphere, 
within which alone the members of the society can breathe and 
survive and produce. For a given society it must be the one in 
which they can all breathe and speak and produce; so it must be 
the same culture. Moreover, it must be great or high (literate, 
training sustained) culture, and can no longer be a diversified, 
locally tied, illiterate little culture or tradition.”(cited in 
Schlesinger, 1991 p.160)1 
 
The application of regimes of knowledge and institutional practice that 
homogenize citizens under the combined categories of race, ethnicity, culture and 
                                                 
1 In a lecture given by Foucault (1988) the rationality of modern nation states is 
traced to the ancient concept of pastoral leadership.  Foucault observes that the idea 
of pastorship is of Oriental origin. It found expression in ancient Greece city states, 
was used in Christian Europe in the middle ages, and was finally  reinscribed again 
in programs for policing in the Reason of State in modern times, a transformation in 
which it took on a more scientific and technical form. He says:  
 
the development of power techniques oriented themselves to 
individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and 
permanent way. If the state is the political form of centralized and 
centralizing power, let us call pastorship, the individualizing 
power…the Shepherd gathers together dispersed individuals.” (p. 
61) 
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language serve the rational purposes of the centralized state in its role as a pastoral 
and policing organ.  It situates individuals within a precise matrix of categories of 
identity. In this respect attempts to challenge some definitive categorization for 
individuals and groups work in direct opposition to the logic of the nation state.  
  
Chun’s (FC, 1996) description is indicative of the discourses promoted and the 
procedures carried out by the state in this regard: 
 
the production of discourse is an integral part of the state’s 
exercise in legitimation; or as they put it “the state never stops 
talking”…the rise of the state brought about forms of knowledge 
that necessitated incessant documentation in the genre of reports, 
investigations, commissions, and statistics relating to the 
accountability of it’s citizens in various domains, such as finance, 
industry, trade, health, demography, crime, education…etc. The 
will to knowledge to power ultimately provides the state a basis on 
which to define and classify spaces, make separations between 
public and private spheres, demarcate frontiers, standardize 
language and personal identity and licence the legitimacy of 
certain activities over others. Culture’s institutional link to power 
then makes all forms of knowledge that contribute to the 
construction of identity potential hegemonic tools within the 
state’s regime of “disinterested domination”…the fact that cultural 
narratives differ in different Chinese political contexts is testament 
to the possibility of different interpretations and political uses of 
Chineseness. ( p.116)  
 
We see clearly here how the presumed scientific category of ethnicity is able to 
serve specific ideological ends in discourses aligned with state rationality. Chun explores 
the theoretical implications of cultural identity and concludes that:  
 
cultural identity is less a matter of being than becoming and….as 
unstable points of identification and suture, they are subject to the 
continuous play of history, culture and power rather than grounded 
in the recovery of the past. (p. 128)   
 
Nonetheless, I would add that the establishment of identity is most strongly 
depicted by those purporting to represent the interests of social groups as some kind of 
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recovery of tradition, as the search for the essential aspects of who that group are. To 
reverse the direction of my own analysis somewhat, I would like to ask if tradition 
should be rejected definitely, in the construction of cultural and social identity. If it is 
rejected doesn’t the problem arise that any form of identification can be promoted as 
equally valid as any other? Rather, I would claim that a complex set of factors need to 
be accounted for, including narratives of tradition for how identities are expressed and 
considered plausible.  It is out of the scope of this paper but an alternative to both is 
suggested in Paul Riceour’s hermeneutical understanding of the creation, maintenance 
and transformation of identities. Chun continues:  
 
While it is clear that these multiple identities and other 
reinscriptions of post-colonial space …constitute positionings in 
an ongoing politics of identity, it is equally important to ask what 
all these positionings really mean….if ethnic identities and cultural 
discourses are all constructions anyway, why bother to ask how 
true they are? …The notion of a cultural based national identity in 
Taiwan is mostly a post-war creation, and despite recognition of 
the oppression of authoritarian rule, the illusion of Chineseness 
forcibly inculcated in these brief decades is still deeply ingrained 
in the minds of the people, most of whom are ethnic Taiwanese. 
(p.130 )  
 
For Chun (FC, 1996) the specific way culture is used in the construction of 
national identities is determined by the both the internal dynamics of a society and the 
geopolitical forces that they are responding to. In the case of Taiwan he says: 
 
In post-war Nationalist Taiwan, the compelling need to redefine 
national identity in terms of race, language and history, by rallying 
around the defence of traditional Chinese culture has to be 
understood in the first instance in reference to its relationship to 
mainland China as a part of…global concerns. …it is no 
coincidence that the invoking of tradition represented an 
ideologically conservative response to the radical visions of a 
Communist national polity. (p.122)  
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In other words, the choice of content for the establishment of a traditional 
Chinese culture was a strategically employed with the communists in mind. He 
continues: 
 
The orchestrated if not oppressive way that culture was promoted, 
defined and then disseminated or imposed upon the populace in 
effect produced two kinds of response: conformity and resistance. 
In the long run by making culture conform to the nation and the 
process making the state the sole voice of cultural authority, the 
political writing of culture as patriotic fervour combined with 
nostalgia of an imagined past made responses to culture, the state 
and cultural authority an all or nothing affair: an attack on one was 
by definition an attack on the other two. (p.123) 
 
The very forced nature of that program made adherence a relatively all or 
nothing proposition. Local Taiwanese had already gone through the process of 
cultural reconfiguration with the Japanese and those old enough to remember were 
accustomed to the pattern and had developed a repertoire of coping mechanisms to 
deal with the imposition, even if that meant only having patience and remembering.  
The bravest of them continued to talk, albeit only within certain social settings. 1.  
A new question presented itself to the islanders: what is “Taiwanese 
identity?” and, what should the relationship between that identity and Taiwan as a 
nation consist in? The question was complicated by the presence of mainlanders and 
their descendants who had now been established on the island for 50 years. The two 
groups were by no means entirely segregated, although certain segregating processes 
were employed on both sides. For example, Taiwanese who owned businesses 
refused to hire mainlander labour and nepotism and prejudice in government 
departments largely excluded islanders. The question of Taiwanese identity was 
                                                 
1 Soon after my arrival on the island in 1990 one of my students, 15 years old, openly 
proclaimed that he was Taiwanese and refused to speak Mandarin. The sedition law had 
just recently been deleted but most people were still reluctant to express political 
opinions openly. Silence had become a habit. What struck me about this particular 
student was both the strength of his convictions and the fact that he was alone in 
expressing them. Others like him began to emerge over the decade until the discourse 
reached a critical mass and then it simply exploded.  Remarkably, in the first open 
presidential elections the local Taiwanese DPP party came to power. 
  
 
 
79 
caught between an attempt to think of an authentic cultural past that had been 
obscured by the cultural programming of the Japanese, and the KMT, and what 
came to be seen as a society composed of two groups of ethnic Chinese, the 
mainlanders and the Taiwanese.  For me, however, what was really new was the way 
Taiwan had come to adopt the established conventions of nation-ness and the 
unconscious adoption of the rationality of the state was a transformation that was at 
least as significant, and also inseparable, from the question of cultural identity.   In 
other words, whatever reinterpretation of culture might be pursued, employing the 
designations of Taiwaneseness or Chineseness, it would have to be pursued in terms 
of the logic of modern nation-ness. It could never simply be a simple reconstruction 
of a lost cultural identity but would need to be the configuration of tradition in line 
with the needs of nation-ness, and even more broadly, the new and growing  
internationalism that the island has come to embrace.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: LANGUAGE USE AND IDENTITY 
 
4.1 Compulsory Mandarin 
 
I will now turn to the last of the constellation of identity terms I set out at the 
beginning of the paper. The learning of languages, in Taiwan as elsewhere, has largely 
been sectioned off as an economic good unrelated to socio-political concerns. No less 
than the other terms it has been naturalized and neutralized in discourse as a factor to be 
personally sought after for determining life possibilities. However, language learning, as 
Bourdieu’s work shows, is central to the structural reproduction of socio-economic 
advantages and disadvantages. Furthermore, the different proficiencies in the ability and 
right to use and teach different languages has become associated with national and racial 
categories. The overall identity of an individual or group is constrained by these 
interacting identity terms.  
An understanding of the significance of the imposition of the official language of 
Mandarin Chinese by the KMT upon their arrival on the island is a crucial factor for 
understanding how the question of Taiwanese identity has come to be framed. This 
policy must be seen as central for how the other elements of social identity, nation-ness, 
race, culture and ethnicity were deployed in discourse thereafter and therefore for how 
something called Taiwanese identity could come to be understood.  Both the learning of 
Mandarin by the people of Taiwan, and the specific content of the courses taught in that 
language, established a particular linguistic and cultural complex as the dominant one 
against which the status and value of all other linguistic and cultural complexes existing 
on the island would be measured. The Mandarin language, being the language that 
corresponds most closely to the official literary language of Beijing, is discursively 
established as the centre of the Chinese linguistic world. Applying the same 
classification schemes as biology, Hakka, and Hokklo (Taiwanese) languages, as with 
their cultures in general  are considered to be derivations from the main linguistic and 
cultural trunk rather than historically parallel and equal dialects. Within a discourse that 
places Mandarin at the centre, other Chinese language cultures are subordinated and so 
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are their users.  Mandarin language and Chinese culture established a baseline official 
social identity which individuals and groups could either aspire to or challenge. Since 
the KMT had firm control of mass education, it was able to consecrate an official 
understanding of what it meant to be Taiwanese as Chinese, to pronounce and project it, 
and to monitor and guide its development through language and cultural education. This 
was the intentional deployment of a logic of kinship that combined groups in order to 
privilege a group and its right to rule over the others.  
This process followed a well-established global pattern. The establishment of 
official languages had already been accomplished with the emergence of many new 
nation states around the globe when the process was begun on Taiwan.  According to 
Bourdieu the science of linguistics which described language in a way that detached it 
from the social conditions in which it was established, as an abstract system of signs 
which represented a inexhaustible treasure that everyone was equally able to draw upon 
and deploy equally, masked the way official languages, as one among many dialects, 
gave a decisive socio-economic advantage to groups whose dialect was closest to the 
official form. Bourdieu (1991) says:  
 
Saussure’s langue, a code both legislative and communicative 
which exists and subsists independently of its users (‘speaking 
subjects’) and uses. It (parole), has in fact all the properties 
commonly attributed to official language. As opposed to dialect, it 
has benefited from the institutional conditions necessary for its 
generalized codification and imposition. Thus known and 
recognized (more or less completely) throughout the whole 
jurisdiction of a certain political authority, it helps to reinforce the 
authority which is the source of its dominance. It does this by 
ensuring among all members of the ‘linguistic community’, 
traditionally defined, since Bloomfield, as a ‘group of people who 
use the same system of linguistic signs, the minimum of 
communication which is a precondition for economic production 
and even for symbolic domination.(p. 45) 
  
In view of the work of Bourdieu, when we use the names of different languages 
to designate an individual or group, names such as Chinese, Taiwanese, or English, we 
are glossing over a crucial form of social differentiation that has come into being 
through the social conditions that gave rise to differences in the ability of individuals 
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and groups to accumulate and employ what he calls cultural capital, where language 
competency constitutes one form of such capital. By simply designating the population 
of Taiwan as Mandarin speakers for instance, as part of the overall characterization of 
Taiwanese identity, the differential competencies in Mandarin, which in part determine 
material and social prospects, is entirely masked.  The deployment of the cultural capital 
of competency in the dominant language form, in this case standardized Mandarin, 
allowed the groups most proficient in the highly nuanced use of Mandarin in contexts of 
an official nature such as politics and education, that is the mainlanders, to accumulate 
further material and cultural capital. This accumulation was made possible through the 
attainment of educational credentials, and the further refinement of their abilities to 
reproduce the dominant competencies in Mandarin. In Bourdieu’s understanding, those 
who did not possess enough symbolic capital, linguistic style being one form of such 
capital,  would be excluded from this cycle of its deployment and further accumulation. 
It is easy to see how in the absence of corrective measures, that is in a laissez-faire 
environment vis-à-vis culture and material capital, that this capital is concentrated in the 
hands of those who already possess it, thereby further entrenching the status quo.  
However, in the case of Taiwan a complete monopoly did not arise and some 
explanation is called for.  It is certainly true that this situation started out as Bourdieu 
describes. Dr. Shih (EINI) tells us: 
 
Corrupt Mandarin spoken by the natives had long been ridiculed as 
Taiwan Guo Yu with the intention to humiliate the natives and 
deprive them of their cultural pride.(p. 3) 
 
Local Taiwanese had little choice, with the threat of violence against open 
dissent, but to attempt to learn Mandarin. With a certain minimum proficiency in  
Mandarin, the islanders were able to grasp the distance between their abilities and level 
of competency required for social and political advancement. In Bourdieu’s language 
the domination of a group by another is only possible through the recognition of this 
gap by the dominated group.  For the islanders the establishment of Mandarin as the 
language of social mobility created the dilemma of either attempting to make up the 
  
 
 
83 
difference in linguistic capital through hard work, in no way guaranteeing success, or 
abandoning any hope of advancement in the official social hierarchy.  
The KMT could claim to be exercising rule over a citizenship that was 
linguistically homogeneous, exemplifying a main factor in the expression of a common 
identity, the reflection of a distinct social face.  The KMT control of the media meant 
that the way this policy disadvantaged the islanders could not be expressed, while the 
promotion of education as the means to socio-economic advancement was offered as 
consolation for public discontent. The acceptance of this proposition by the populace 
meant accepting the process, the daily engagement with a specific language and specific 
cultural discourse, that would further establish the cultural identity offered by the KMT 
in the minds of its learners: 
 
The dominant culture produces (an) ideological effect by 
concealing the function of division beneath the function of 
communication: the culture which unifies (the medium of 
communication) is also the culture that separates (the instrument 
of distinction) and which legitimates distinctions by forcing all 
other cultures (designated as subcultures) to define themselves by 
their distance from the dominant culture. (Bourdieu, 1991, p.168) 
 
Bourdieu (1991) cites George Davy on the role of the language teacher in such a 
process:  
  
He (the primary school teacher) , by virtue of his function, works 
daily on the faculty of expression of every idea and every emotion: 
on language. In teaching the same, clear, fixed language to 
children who know it only very vaguely or who even speak 
various dialects or patois, he is already inclining them quite 
naturally to see and feel things in the same way; and he works to 
build the common consciousness of the nation’ (p.49)  
 
Bourdieu is careful to point out that we cannot understand the significance of the 
role of an official or dominant language form for determining the overall calculus of 
social differentiation of power by viewing it either as passively accepted or freely 
chosen, even when initially it has been imposed, as was the case for Mandarin in 
Taiwan. 
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It is inscribed, in a practical state, in dispositions which are 
impalpably inculcated, through a long and slow process of 
acquisition, by the sanctions of the linguistic market, and which 
are therefore adjusted, without any cynical calculation or 
consciously experienced constraint, to the chances of material and 
symbolic profit which the laws of price formation characteristic of 
a given market objectively offer to the holders of a given linguistic 
capital…The distinctiveness of symbolic domination lies precisely 
in the fact that it assumes, of those who submit to it, an attitude 
which challenges the usual dichotomy of freedom and 
constraint…the propensity to reduce the search for causes to a 
search for responsibilities makes it impossible to see that 
intimidation, a symbolic violence which is not aware of what it is 
(to the extent that it implies no act of intimidation, can only be 
exerted on a person predisposed (in his habitus)  to feel it….little 
by little one has to take into account thereby the whole social 
structure. (p. 51) 
 
 We are not looking for agents of oppression but trying to determine how power 
in a society is systematically produced in the numerous forms of social interaction 
where the differences in linguistic competency have specific outcomes for specific 
individuals and groups. For Bourdieu these sanctions can take the innocuous forms of 
gestures, glances, ways of looking, standing, or keeping silent. 
 
The power of suggestion which is exerted through things and 
persons and which, instead of telling the child what he must do, 
tells him what he is, and thus leads him to become durably what he 
has to be, is the condition of the effectiveness of all symbolic 
power that will subsequently be able to operate on the habitus 
predisposed to respond to them…(Bourdieu, 1991,  p. 52) 
 
 The education of learners is the continuous subtle imposition of an identity that 
situates the learner within a social hierarchy: that hierarchy is a function of the 
relationships between the linguistic competencies of those learners and a standardized 
dominant language form. The official language that constitutes that dominant form is 
posited as one of the major attributes, including ethnic makeup, race, and culture that 
define the identity of a society. It makes up one feature of the face that society presents 
to the rest of the world.  Discourse that glibly describes a country as Chinese, or 
  
 
 
85 
English-speaking or even bilingual thereby conceals the internal differentials that 
determine life prospects of individuals and groups within the logic of official languages. 
In the case of Taiwan this language was Mandarin but we can expand the domain of 
investigation to include the international village and shift the focus to the English 
language. 
 
4.2 The Taiwanese Languages  
  
The imposition of Mandarin was contested by the islanders from the time it 
was imposed and a continuous low-level form of dissent was nurtured privately.   In 
response to the compulsory use of Mandarin and the prohibition of Taiwanese in 
official contexts the Islanders refused to hire non-Hoklo and non-Hakka speakers in 
their businesses and routinely asked strangers to speak Hoklo, Hakka or even 
Japanese to determine if they were mainlanders and therefore whether they could be 
trusted.  (Shih EINI p. 2) Language was deployed in a counter-hegemonic fashion. 
For example Shih (SDTC) tells us: “elder Taiwanese elites would communicate with 
each other in Japanese as a gesture of protesting the Nationalist rule, as the latter 
resented anything Japanese so much.” (p. 4) 1 
The mainlanders and Taiwanese tended to occupy different socio-economic 
niches and were able to exploit their linguistic advantages against each other by 
maintaining monopolies in those respective niches. The Taiwanese refused to hire 
mainlanders but rather than state this openly asked for fluency in Taiwanese as a 
requirement. Shih (SDTC) tells us: “Since the Mainlanders are either unwilling to 
learn Taiwanese or lacked the opportunity to learn it due to residential segregation, 
                                                 
1 Shih (SDTC) tells us that the use of language as tool of resistance goes 
back to the early years of KMT rule: 
 
During the Feb. 28 Uprising in 1947 (Chen, 1988), the Taiwanese would 
stop any stranger and ask him to speak Hoklo. As he may have been Hakka 
Taiwanese, a second test would follow if he failed: he would consequently be 
required to speak Japanese and to sing the national anthem of Japan, as few 
mainlanders were able to speak Japanese. Therefore the basic criterion of 
being Taiwanese was speaking Hokklo or Hakka, with Japanese as an 
auxiliary surrogate. (p. 4) 
  
 
 
86 
the condition almost excludes them from entering Taiwanese firms.” (p.12) The 
Taiwanese countered the official imposition of Mandarin as an official language that 
disadvantaged them with their own unofficial language policy that, as a consolidated 
trading and manufacturing group, gave them some economic leverage. Therefore, 
the economic advantage of the mainlanders was reduced.  Nonetheless, it is 
Taiwanese that is the more endangered language. It is declining while Mandarin 
becomes more entrenched, despite the high number of users of Taiwanese. It is the 
general lack of concern about this decline that should be of concern to linguistic 
conservationists. Even with the growing importance of Mandarin and English the 
continued widespread use of Taiwanese has made its decline a minor political issue.  
Although there has been a decline in the abilities of younger generations of 
Taiwanese to speak Hoklo and Hakka, their uses in non official contexts, at home and in 
the market place, prevented these languages from coming anywhere near extinction.  
However, many younger Taiwanese, whose parents spoke Hoklo and Hakka, despite 
some bravado about the importance of Taiwanese because of the well-known injustices 
performed against it historically, cannot use the language as effectively as previous 
generations. Many are at the stage where they can understand but cannot reproduce 
Hoklo or Hakka in speech or writing. Shih (EINI ) tells us: 
 
Currently, the mother tongues of the young generation have  
become degenerate as everyday life languages, as they neither 
have formal course nor any incentive to learn them. For those 
natives who are better educated, they may be fluent in Mandarin, 
but are awkward in either Hoklo or Hakka…There are even some 
Natives who perceived that speaking “correct” Mandarin is the 
minimum criterion for upward mobility and therefore consciously 
adopt Mandarin exclusively at home, in the hope that their 
children’s pronunciation will not be marred by their mother 
tongues. Fortunately, for the Native masses, entangled in the 
structure of vertical division of labour, Hoklo or Hakka is their 
main medium of daily communication as long as they swear off 
any hope to seek a job in government organizations. (p. 3) 
 
With the removal of government censorship and the repeal of the sedition law, 
long repressed dissatisfaction with the KMT finally found vent in various publications 
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and in the democratic election of Taiwanese public officials.  Shih (SDTC) tells us, in a 
reversal of fortunes, politicians contesting elections find themselves prevented from 
being able to give speeches in Mandarin, the crowds proclaiming they don’t understand 
“that language” (of course they did) and therefore they have to cram for Taiwanese and 
give speeches in the local tongue, often with very poor results. (p. 5) The surprising rise 
to power of the DPP has resulted in a campaign for strengthening the presence of Hoklo 
and other native languages on the island. So far this campaign has been of limited effect 
with only a few hours of Hoklo offered in public school every week and the continued 
importance of Mandarin the mainstay for educational promotion. It remains doubtful 
whether the socio-economic advantages of Mandarin  and  the momentum it has gained 
as a crucial form of cultural capital can be countered by the sentimental  attachment to 
Taiwanese. It would need to be provided a far larger role in education from primary 
levels to university, a reform that is not likely to be popular with a people already deeply 
invested in the acquisition of Mandarin and now with the growing presence of English.  
In fact Mandarin is becoming further entrenched as the dominant language in Taiwan 
because it is the standard dialect of Mainland China with whom Taiwan has accelerated 
cultural and economic ties over the last ten years and English simply continues to be 
considered an essential language for education and commerce.  With these forces in play 
the continued vitality of ‘native’ Taiwanese languages remains questionable. 
 
4.3 English as a Foreign/Second/Imperial Language  
 
Finally, the linguistic picture on Taiwan needs to be filled out by looking at the 
importance of English.  Once again, the term English conceals the complexity of 
language forms that fall under that name.  It constitutes another form of linguistic 
capital, one whose stock is rising steadily in the international market. Its standard forms, 
especially standardized British and American and Canadian standardized Englishes, are 
most competently used by the educated and moneyed classes in countries around the 
world.  It is to these competencies that all other speakers of English aspire in order to 
increase their cultural capital, and in relation to these forms, that their lack of 
competency is measured.  In an ever-widening trend, those in the best position to master 
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these competencies, both native speakers and those whose first language is other than 
English, are the ones that have already achieved dominance in the local linguistic and 
educational markets. Well connected and wealthy non-first language speakers of English 
are in an even better position to do so than first language English speakers who occupy 
the lower rungs of the linguistic hierarchies in ‘English speaking’ countries.  This is 
because they have more access  to highly educated English speakers as teachers, and are 
more likely to use English with other internationals in the same socio-economic 
positions than those who are in the socio-economic lower classes of “English” countries. 
Their possession of economic capital compensates for whatever deficiencies in English 
they originally had because it gives their families access to the best schools and teachers 
for acquisition of educated English forms. As they acquire them their cultural capital 
increases as well.  
Bourdieu’s work with the French education system, a centralized and 
bureaucratic system that closely mirrors Taiwan’s in those respects, is relevant in this 
regard. For Bourdieu, despite the explicit condemnation of nepotism as a legitimate 
mode of socio-economic ascendancy in modern liberal states, family continues to be the 
site of the reproduction of class differences, but this fact is systematically obscured 
through the process of public education whose mechanisms of evaluation and promotion 
are linked to one’s habitus, one’s cultural disposition, a part of which is the linguistic 
heritage bequeathed to a family member. This habitus marks the individual as belonging 
to a particular social class and is difficult to consciously conceal or transform.  
 
Children from the lower middle class can only acquire with great 
effort something which is given to the children of the cultivated 
classes. (p. 88) 
 
 In Taiwan this distinction originally occurred along ethnic lines. Mainlanders, 
proficient in Mandarin, had a head start on the Islanders. For the English language, 
mainlanders are the ones most likely to have had some education abroad, in America, 
Australia, or England and are the most likely to be able to practice English at home with 
their children. As noted earlier, the families most likely to have travelled, lived or been 
educated abroad are the Mainlanders. As Shih (SDTC) notes, some parents have even 
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taken to speaking Mandarin rather than Taiwanese at home in order not to handicap 
their children’s chances at educational advancement.  In addition to difference of access 
for learning English between social classes for economic reasons, English teachers, 
ignoring initial socio-economic conditions, often assume differences in language ability 
reflects real differences in aptitude and intelligence. Especially with poorly trained 
English teachers, there is the danger that expectations are lowered disproportionately for 
poor speakers of English or that instruction will focus on the best students in the class. 
These are often students already getting extra help, who speak English at home, or who 
have been taught English abroad.  
 In Taiwan, parents, who are scrambling to get an English education for their 
children, seem to have an implicit understanding of languages being forms of cultural 
capital. However, Alistair Pennycooke (DCL) asks: “Does parental demand amount to a 
sufficient reason for wider provision?…how might such access to English be linked to 
poverty, inequality, and development….the issue is often one of parents demanding 
access to the language that inequitably divides, social, educational and economic 
access.” (p. 1) With limited resources the question should be asked: what will not be 
learned as teaching time is filled with English lessons? At present Taiwanese has only a 
small place in the public school timetable, about equal to that of English, but it is not 
likely to be pursued as a subject out of school time, as English most emphatically is.  
  In Taiwan, education for many children is a full-time job. They finish school 
and go to the bushiban or cram school to learn English, math or other subjects. When 
not in class they are often doing homework. Global competition has made them 
schoolaholics. Pennycook (DCL, 1999) notes that development “almost by definition, 
seems to imply an upward linear path that is easily conflated with notions of 
modernization and westernisation” (p.6)  He quotes Escobar (1995) who says that 
“development discourse ‘has been the central and most ubiquitous operator of the 
politics of representation and identity in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America…’ 
who have suffered ‘a succession of regimes of representation’ that originate in 
colonialism and continue into the discourse of modernity.”  (DCL, 1999, p. 4 ) 
Pennycook (DCL, 1999) compares different conceptions of the role of English in 
relation to development. One is that English is represented as the key to modernization, 
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and upward mobility for all. “While other languages play a role as “home tongue for 
lovemaking, religion, verse craft, back chat and inexact topics in general”…English is 
assumed to be “a medium of communication about what will matter to most of us in 
what we hope will be the One World of Tomorrow. ” (p.7) It is the language of hi-tech 
and science.  Quoting Ordonez (1999) who speaks of the Philippines, Pennycooke tells 
us “English…being the language of the ruling system, government, education, business 
and trade, and diplomacy…fits into the type of education that would conform to the 
requirements of an export-oriented economy pushed by the IMF- World Bank.”(DCL, 
1999,  p. 19) In Taiwan, although Taiwanese is now being taught in schools, many are 
lukewarm about the idea of elevating it to official status. Many say its use at home is 
adequate. English is almost universally understood as good and necessary to learn in an 
institutionalised setting . 
 Pennycooke (DCL, 1999) tells us that laissez-faire attitudes to language 
education espoused by David Crystal (1997), for instance, suggest the use of multiple 
languages and that a balance can be attained. This is based on the assumption that 
everyone has the means and time to choose various languages, but “such a view of 
individual agency and choice fails to account for social, cultural, political and economic 
forces that compromise and indeed produce such choices” (p.8) which Pennycook, 
(DCL, 1999) quoting Hanson (1997: 22 )  thinks leads back to a colonial celebratory 
mode of thinking: “On it still strides: we can argue what globalisation is until the cows 
come home – but that globalisation exists is beyond question, with English its 
accompanist. The accompanist, of course, indispensable for the performance.” (p. 22) 
For Pennycooke, this suggests nothing but “an uncritical endorsement of capitalism, its 
science, technology, a modernizing ideology, monolinguilism as a norm, ideological 
globalisation, and internationalisation, transnationalization, the Americanisation and 
homogenisation of world culture, linguistic and, cultural and media imperialism (p. 274) 
 Certainly, these dangers are apparent in Taiwan even without English being 
universally spoken there.  However, against the view that all cultures will necessarily 
succumb to these forces Pennycook reminds us that English is picked up in a variety of 
ways and that these performative differences are a mitigating factor against 
homogenisation. He quotes Appadurai (1990: 296) who says the “new global cultural 
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economy has to be understood in terms of existing complex, overlapping, disjunctive 
order, which cannot any longer be thought of in terms of existing center-periphery 
models”  Therefore “while never losing sight of the very  real forces of global capital 
and media, we need, at the very least, to understand the response to cultural spread and 
not assume its instant effects.” (p.13) For Pennycook the assumption that everything is 
transported in whole cloth from the west, without modification, and reciprocation, is to 
assume a passivity in non-western cultures that speaks of a continued cultural 
chauvinism. In Taiwan for instance, English is almost deliberately, or at least from an 
English purist point of view, negligently, publicly “perverted” into weird grammatical 
and spelling formations. It has been consciously appropriated as a form of art on 
clothing, and accessories, memorabilia, where little attention to semantic coherence is 
paid. There is a sense in which English is deconstructed as a form of communication, 
wresting ownership of it from westerners by appropriating it in another way.  Claire 
Kramsch (1993) calls these appropriations “third spaces” that cannot be understood in 
the simple terms of imperialism or resistance. Pennycooke warns of thinking of cultures 
as static, fixed and passive. (DCL, 1999,  p.12)  
Finally, the idea that languages belong to certain people needs to be restated. 
First of all, groups are often differentiated by separate means and then linguistic  
identity becomes attached to these groups. In this work I have focussed on 
differentiations by race, ethnicity and nation. Languages are easily thought of as 
belonging to nations, as are races, and therefore languages are too easily thought of as 
belonging to races as well.  I believe the following interviews give some indication that 
in Taiwan these associations are particularly strong and that the strength of these 
associations can be explained by the socio-historical discursive relations between nation, 
culture, race and language I have outlined in this paper.  
Pennycook, pointing out the work of Kramsch and Sullivan (1996) hopes for a 
more empowering  understanding of language education as appropriation. In the case of 
Taiwan I have tried to show that language has always been a political tool for both 
domination and resistance. Kramsch  sees resistance happening through “a pedagogy of 
appropriation, based on the unique privilege of the non-native speaker to poach on the 
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so called authentic territory of others, and make the language their own.” (p.210) 
Pennycook (DCL, 1999) says:  
 
this syncretic model of cultural interaction works with a version of 
cultural difference that acknowledges that cultures are 
heterogeneous, diverse and dynamic; that cultural relations 
produce hybrid forms; that people actively appropriate cultural 
forms (rather than accept or reject them); and that the product of 
such appropriation (heterosis) maybe different from the sum of its 
original parts. (p.18) 
 
 
The fact that language attainment is expressed as something that needs to be “poached” 
reveals the strength of the association of groups with languages. Although I believe 
Pennycooke’s point is valid, I also think this perspective can obscure the way powerful 
socio-political and economic forces push societies toward cultural and linguistic 
homogeneity. I believe both of these tendencies, homogenizing and diffracting forces, 
need to be kept in mind when considering the nature and import of language education 
in Taiwan and globally.  Neither should be assumed nor neglected.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  INTERVIEWS 
 
In light of these discussions I would like to look at the responses of the educators I 
interviewed on the topic of Taiwanese identity and language education.  
 
5.1  Description of Interviews:  
 
I did six interviews with teachers and administrators in Southern Taiwan in an 
attempt to elicit responses that would give a sense of how questions of language, 
culture, race and nation were thought of in relation to the question of Taiwanese 
identity.  I decided to include responses of only four of these interviews so that I could 
compare and contrast them with each other in a reasonable amount of space for this 
study. They were chosen on the basis of the range of perspectives they represented.  
In the interviews I asked each participant twenty-four questions. I have chosen to 
provide responses to about half of these. The questions were given to the participants in 
written Mandarin Chinese a day before the interview. They were also given time to 
reread the questions before answering them. I did not want them to write the answers 
and return them because I believed giving spoken responses would mean less self-
editing. However, because English was a foreign language for them, to make sure they 
had understood the questions very clearly they were given in written form.  There was a 
Mandarin translator in the room during the interviews but he was called upon very few 
times as the teachers seemed confident in their understanding and ability to answer the 
questions. One of the interviews was done entirely in Mandarin and translated.  When 
transcribing the answers, I took the liberty of placing grammatical corrections in 
parenthesis to facilitate ease of reading. This sometimes included adding a noun or 
pronoun, correcting a common mistake, where in English it is repeated while in 
Mandarin it is not. I also sometimes suggested another term or phrase that I thought 
corresponded to the participant’s intent when they used a word that seemed awkward. 
The original word is left in the transcription with the suggested replacement word in 
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parentheses. The original phrasing is available by ignoring the parenthesis. In this way 
the reader may get a different interpretation than the one I felt was most obvious.  
  The questions were deliberately general and deliberately repeated. They were  
rephrased with a small shift in meaning in order to give the participant a chance to 
tackle issues in a general way more than once.  Similar questions were spaced so that 
participants would cycle through the issues and not be confined to one issue completely 
at a time but would be able to respond to each issue from a slightly different perspective 
at a different time. My intention was to achieve a more comprehensive statement of their 
positions on each issue. I believe this worked well. When the participants came to a 
question similar to a previous one, I believe they responded more spontaneously which 
was what I was aiming for. I was especially looking for consistencies and 
inconsistencies in their answers both as individuals and between the participants. For 
each individual I hoped to be able to find out not only his/her opinion but also how 
definite or indefinite they were. Because most were speaking English, hesitations were 
not interpreted as uncertainty about the topic. A Mandarin or Taiwanese interview could 
have looked at these hesitations as a part of the interpretations. Instead, I therefore had 
to look solely at the content of their remarks, and some differences in phrasing, to try to 
determine consistency. There were limitations in the participants’ abilities to reproduce 
a large number of modifying phrases in English that are important for determining 
consistency or variation in ideas. However, I believe their abilities in English were 
sufficient for making out some general features of consistency and inconsistency in their 
answers. Once again, these phrases would be more readily telling in an analysis of their 
answers in Mandarin or Taiwanese. 
 I also wanted to know if there were general consistencies or marked 
inconsistencies from individual to individual. In the interpretations I was not trying to 
correlate answers to the person’s particular position as a male or female, or as an 
administrator or classroom teacher. The only presumption was that they were all 
professional educators who would have an interest in the topic and would have given 
some previous thought to the issues raised.  My subjective impression was that they 
were forthright and desired to express their true opinions. The group was evenly split 
between two different primary schools in the same part of the same city in southern 
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Taiwan and is therefore not a randomly selected group for Taiwanese teachers. For 
Taiwan it is also not statistically significant to any extent. On the other hand, because 
they were familiar with me as an English teacher and administrator at both schools I 
hoped that they would feel comfortable and not be intimidated to express their thoughts 
on the issues. The results in this regard were extremely encouraging as there was little 
uneasiness or hesitancy to answer on the parts any of the participants. I was also 
interested in getting these educators to reflect on standard practice and perceptions and 
their own attitudes to questions of language instruction, culture and race. Finally, I was 
also interested in the amount of self-reflection each participant gave to the issues and, 
although there was a range of difference, I was pleasantly surprised at the ease with 
which the questions were handled despite the use of English rather than Taiwanese or 
Mandarin indicating an informed understanding of most of the issues. This is hardly 
surprising given the topical nature of the question of identity in Taiwan.  
 
5.2 : Racial, National and Ethnic Identity  
 
Participants were asked to designate themselves by race, nationality, and 
ethnicity and their reasons for making those designations. Typically, in the ir answers 
they did not distinguish ethnicity and race. Race was conflated with ancestry.  Some 
effort was made to distinguish nationality from the other categories. All of the 
participants were born in Taiwan and only one of the participants’ parents were born 
outside of Taiwan.   
 
Questions 1-3  
 
Where were you born?  Where do your ancestors come from?  What is your ethnicity?  
What is your nationality? Please give reasons for your answers. 
Give a brief definition of: nationality, ethnicity and race if you like. 
Does that influence whether you think you are Taiwanese or Chinese? How? 
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A:  I’ve thought that I’m Taiwanese since I was young. I am sure 
about this identity because I was born in Taiwan. I’m both Taiwanese and 
Chinese. Of course according to culture and blood I’m Chinese..the only 
difference is I am living in Taiwan. 
 
B:  Republic of China (Taiwanese). My parents told us from the time 
we were little. There was no mention of Chinese.  According to my lineage (I’m) 
Taiwanese 
 
C:  What I think…its very hard to say this. I always say I am 
Chinese. I’m Chinese. My nationality is Chinese. Why? I can’t give you the 
answer. I think our government can’t answer. I think Chinese is better for me. 
 
D:  Nationality is a person who lives in a nations now in Taiwan we 
say our nationality is ROC but …….we can say that we are Chinese. Now we 
say we are Taiwanese nationality but in (unintelligible)-because our ancestors all 
came from China we can combine with the mainland we are willing to be 
Chinese. 
 
Analysis of Answers 1-3:  
 
This range of answers is typical of what I have heard in Taiwan.  ‘A’ talks about 
feeling  as if he/she were Taiwanese but when questions of blood relation and culture 
come in “of course”  Chineseness is evoked. Is he/she saying that he/she is therefore a 
Chinese who happens to live in Taiwan or rather a Taiwanese who happens to have 
Chinese ancestry.  This echoes the program of enculturation undertaken by the KMT 
where Taiwanese were inundated with the ‘fact’ of their racial and cultural Chineseness. 
Chineseness is deeper and more profound than Taiwaneseness which is ethnically 
derivative.  B’s experience is different, claiming to be exposed mainly to designations as 
Taiwanese.  And in contrast to the others, his/her “lineage” is designated as Taiwanese 
and not Chinese. C is the only one with a parent from the mainland and his/her 
Chineseness although “hard to say” habitually says he/she is Chinese. Furthermore there 
is some exasperation about who really knows why that should be so? Not even the 
government. While A refers to “blood and culture”  as determining their Chinese 
identity, D refers to nationality, but in two ways: as a Republic of China citizen and as a 
Taiwanese citizen. This is a common point of contention and confusion in Taiwan. The 
participant only says “we can say” which indicates the degree of comfort he/she has 
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with the ambiguity of these designations and finally notes that, without question, 
because of ancestry Taiwanese are all Chinese.   
For me this is typical of my conversations in Taiwan. Although none of these 
participants has ever been to China and most have no recent ancestors from there, they 
are quite willing to designate themselves as Chinese, racially or at least through blood 
relations except B, who I believe comes from a family who deliberately designate 
themselves as non-Chinese for political reasons.  It is impossible that he/she has not 
been exposed to the idea that Taiwanese are all a branch of the Chinese family as it has 
been promoted in school and society for the past 50 years. Therefore while the program 
of Sinicizing appears to have been effective with this group, accepted as plausible, 
reasonable and significant for them, there remains doubt on the part of participant C, 
ambiguity for D, hesitation and questioning for C, and outright rejection on the part of 
participant B.  These different approaches and understandings underscore the great 
diversity of opinions and the degree of ambiguity there is for national, racial and ethnic 
designations in Taiwan.  
 
Question 4: Nationality: Is your nationality or ethnicity important to you? Why? Why 
not? 
 
A:   Of course nationality is very important. No state, no family. It’s 
not necessary for me to think about where my ancestors are from. Human beings 
should consider the ir origins to accord with their country…to cherish and love 
their homeland. 
 
B:  Yes, it is very important. Taiwan is my country. I want it 
(Taiwanese) to be my nationality.  
 
C:  So far it’s not very important. Maybe its not. Not for 
relationships, for my job, for my family. 
 
D:  This is an important question. Some people think they are 
independent. Many people don’t think this way. Example.. I was born in Taiwan 
but I hope I am Chinese because this was my ancestor’s birthplace. If Taiwan 
and China can combine as one is important to the Taiwanese. Nationality is 
more important than ancestry because I know nationality is more important. So I 
believe ancestry is important but nationality is more important. 
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Analysis of Answers to Question 4 :  
 
It is interesting how the opportunity to respond to this question was taken 
differently by the participants. A uses it to express nationalist and primordial sentiments. 
B makes a straightforward political claim for independence.  C is very pragmatic and 
says “so far” this issue isn’t important while no doubt fully realizing the potential for 
conflict and change the question implies. D’s desires for a unification are freely 
expressed. The last part of D’s statement is difficult to interpret but by evoking ancestry, 
when it was not a part of the question, the speaker suggests that ancestry should be 
considered in the debate on nationality.  Nationality, as stated before, is an almost 
unquestionable modern social and political value.  This group represents almost the 
entire range of feelings on the national question. ‘A’ does not advocate unification but 
evokes ancestry and homeland. He/she thinks that homeland is not stated and is difficult 
to guess from their response to the first question. B is pro- independence. C is 
ambivalent but presumably at this point would accept unification from his/her answer in 
the first question where he/she naturally designates him/herself as Chinese, and D is 
straightforwardly for unification despite not being of immediate mainland descent.  It 
should be clear that the lines that separate different individual’s beliefs about unification 
can hardly be determined by whether they or their parents came over with the KMT. 
Although in general those advocating independence do not have family that came at mid 
century, while those who advocate unification do, after 50 years opinions on the island 
do not follow these lines very strictly anymore.  Exact statistical analysis of a large 
sample group would likely determine this more clearly.  
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Questions 6, 7: The relationship between Taiwaneseness and Chineseness 
 
What is the relationship between Taiwanese people and Chinese people on the 
mainland? Answer in terms of nationality, ethnicity and race? 
What does it mean to be Taiwanese?  What does it mean to be Chinese? 
 
A:  This is a big problem. In my opinion it’s connected with politics. 
I will have more chances to visit the mainland of China. I think that I am also 
Chinese. Chinese and Taiwanese are not different. We are the same. But on the 
politics maybe there is some argument about education or citizenship. It’s not 
very important. You must do well in your work…be able to live in Taiwan. This 
is what is important. Not whether you are Chinese or Taiwanese.  
 
B:  We are Ben Shen Ren not Wei Shen Ren. There is a little conflict 
between them. We are the same nationality. Maybe someday they will (go) back 
to (the) mainland. I think they don’t really love Taiwan. Their hearts stay in 
China. 
 
C:  Meaning of Taiwanese: Just live in Taiwan. Chinese: same thing. 
 
D;  All Taiwanese except native (Aboriginal) Taiwanese all come 
from China, so appearance is all the same…yellow skin, black eyes and hair. We 
speak the same language so I would say Taiwanese and Chinese are the same 
race. 
 
Analysis of Answers 6, 7:  
 
 ‘A’ wants to diminish the importance between Chineseness and Taiwaneseness by 
emphasizing good citizenship and turning away from mere labels.  It is a political 
question that he/she doesn’t offer a response to except to hope to be able to go to the 
mainland, suggesting that some form of normalization between the two sides of the 
strait that would allow such practices is what is desired. He/she says he is  “also” 
Chinese, suggesting that first off he/she is Taiwanese and secondly Chinese, putting 
homeland ahead of ancestry. This clarifies somewhat the question of ordering posed in 
response to his answer in question 1 where he/she says he is a Chinese “living in 
Taiwan” that suggested the opposite ordering. B is consistent and now gives a reason for 
claiming a difference that is a part of the rhetoric for pro- independence espoused by 
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many in Taiwan. Wai shen ren (mainlanders) do not love the land as local Taiwanese 
do. Comments by A and D would likely be interpreted as evidence for this lack of love 
for the island. C is trying to be pragmatic but is almost contradicting his/her previous 
statements. If being called Chinese means living in mainland China, since it is 
contrasted with Taiwan (this is presumably what he/she means when claiming that 
Chinese live in China and Taiwanese live in Taiwan) then why call him/herself 
“Chinese”? By desiring to have clear-cut designations as this answer implies it is no 
wonder this participant feels exasperated by the profound ambiguity in the question of 
social identity in Taiwan.  D chooses to interpret the question in racial terms and is 
consistent in using racial unity, along with culture, as reasons for political unification as 
expressed in the previous answer.  
In these responses the participants are fairly consistent. A acknowledges his/her 
Chineseness but does not commit to national unification. B is against unification and 
gives reasons why. He/she takes a definitive political stand. C is confused by the 
ambiguity both about the general question of national and racial identity and their 
relationships and about his/her own self-designation as someone born in Taiwan but 
who refers to himself/herself as Chinese. D is pro-unification and provides the reasons 
of  common race and culture for that stand.  
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5.3 Language Use, Education and Status  
 
In the interviews done with the educators in southern Taiwan all of the 
respondents thought it was important to learn all of the three languages: Taiwanese, 
Mandarin and English.  Interestingly, there was little enthusiasm about having 
Taiwanese taught in the schools. Two participants were supportive of the government 
policy for including Taiwanese in the curriculum but were more interested in the 
prospects for improving English programs, while two others felt strongly that Taiwanese 
should remain the spoken language at home and should not be taught in school at all.  
Speculating somewhat, this may be a result of wanting more space for the English 
language in the public school curriculum, but it also may have to do with keeping the 
public and private spheres distinct. This is understandable as the private sphere has long  
provided a refuge from the machinations of colonial and national infiltration and 
manipulation of culture. Follow up questioning might help determine this.  There was 
near unanimity on the question of the social status of languages and the opportunities 
afforded by the learning of each.  
 
Question 9:   
 
Is there a particular status attached to speaking Chinese, Taiwanese and English? What 
is the relative status given to those who use these three languages? Why do you think 
this is the case? 
 
A:  Most people think if you can speak English you are an upper class 
person of position and status and education. They will give you the good name 
“intellectual”. If you can only speak Taiwanese and cannot speak English or 
Mandarin you are a lower middle class person or peasant. In fact this was the 
thinking but when we are educated we cannot agree with language classes. 
Maybe we have strong expectations about language. If you have more than one 
language you have more chances to do things. You can make unlimited potential 
for yourself when you look for work. You have a good chance if you can speak 
more languages than others. Eg. If you are good at English. You can choose an 
overseas company. If you cannot speak English you cannot. This is the reason 
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parents pay more attention to studying English than the (mother) language. 
Parents are cool to study the mother language. Actually in Taiwan English 
provides a good chance to look for a job in the future. 
 
B:  English speakers are high status people. High level of English. 
Taiwanese belong to low class…not enough education. Mandarin everyone can. 
But now emphasize Taiwanese. We love our country so we need to speak our 
language  
 
C:  It’s (English) very popular. I think learning English in Taiwan. If 
you can learn English you can show how good you are. Symbolize(s) higher 
position. Good chance to take a (good) job and (good) salary. 
 
D: (long pause) In usual we say Mandarin and Taiwanese we have no 
difference but English most people have the confidence. English is the 
international language…strong culture..if you can speak English the status is 
higher.  In Taiwan most people speak Taiwanese. Only because Mandarin is 
very popular. In T.V. in public we all can listen to Mandarin except old man and 
old woman. Except this group we can all speak Mandarin. 
 
Analysis of Answers to Question  9:  
 
English and Mandarin afford high status. Ability in Taiwanese only, is a marker 
of low social class. Older people did not have an opportunity to learn Mandarin but both 
Mandarin ability and English ability are indicators of economic class as families with 
money can afford the best schools for both languages. Although everyone understands 
Mandarin not everyone is equally competent. English is even more prestigious because 
it indicates even more access to education than does Mandarin.  ‘B’ consistently 
advocates the use of the Taiwanese language as an indication of love of the island of 
Taiwan. Here national independence and the Taiwanese language are being associated. 
 
 Question 10 Fairness of the status of different languages:  
 
In another response all the participants considered these language classes as 
unfair. ‘A’ suggested that it is “immature” to judge people this way.  Nonetheless, 
respondents made it is clear that being educated in Mandarin, and any English ability, 
constitute a valuable form of “cultural capital” to use Bourdieu’s phrase. One 
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respondent claimed that it was very unfair that some people in Taiwan had access to 
English while others did not and wondered how the everyone might gain access to good 
English instruction equally.  When asked about the relationship between language and 
culture and the potential loss of Taiwanese language and culture, once again the 
participants were consistent: 
 
5.4 The Problem of the Loss of Taiwanese Language and Tradition 
 
Questions 11, 12  
 
Many young people cannot speak Taiwanese now. Do you think this is a problem? 
Why? What do you think the causes of this are? What do you think should be done 
about it, if anything? Do you think that Taiwanese students are in danger of losing 
traditional values, for example family values or community values, because of foreign 
influences like movies, magazines, television, and advertising?  With your answer in 
mind what do you think the significance of language education is in determining the 
values of Taiwanese students? Consider the role of learning Taiwanese, English and 
Mandarin in your answer.  
 
A:  This kind of problem is reflective of the present situation in 
Taiwan but most people and many parents can’t understand it. I am a teacher, I 
think we now live in an age between traditional and modern times (a tug of war 
stage). We want to safeguard our tradition, but we can’t. Because there are too 
many pressures from abroad, like movies, songs, books, even the internet. 
Contemporary adults and youth are not interested I local culture anymore. They 
like foreign cultures, Western and Japanese styles eg. They adore the Japanese 
“Hari” group. I means youth are losing their way in a complicated world. At 
present the government is paying more attention to having students study local 
culture. There are many teaching programs and activities to get youth to know 
and cherish our local culture, to value its inherent worth, to understand the value 
of things we have inherited from our ancestors.  I mean not all traditional things 
are bad. It can help young people to think about their ideas and sense of the 
world and the sense of their territory and keep a balance between them, not to 
lose their way in the fashionable world. It is a danger for a person not to know 
the history of their family=clan=root…it will be difficult for the society, the 
nation to improve. Once youth lose the sense of traditional values the ir society 
will be terrible and hopeless. 
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B:  We are a poor (pathetic?) people…we don’t have our own 
country. We don’t have our traditional values…Are we Taiwanese or 
Chinese…we are confused. We don’t have our tradition. Some people love 
Japanese…we listen to Western news to show our high education and make 
friends and get more information and knowledge 
 
C:  Some problem. Taiwanese culture. If you can use Taiwanese it 
will be better to understand Taiwanese culture. Like speak English use more 
than…anytime anywhere. English and Japanese can have this effect. 
 
 D:  Nowadays in Taiwan the students study many kinds (of language) 
except (besides) the mother language. The one is English, the other is Mandarin. 
When we study English we can learn the other culture same time maybe. We can 
lose our own culture….we don’t (without)know(ing) we can lose(it). The 
international(world) is closer and closer everyday. The world is (becoming) one 
culture. We will also know the other culture and communicate eas(il)y. More 
and more we(are) lose(ing) the traditional value(s). Yes,  I am convinced we 
have this problem. The young people learn many(a lot) from America, Europe, 
other culture(s). If we keep the traditional(ways?) we can learn the other 
culture(without harm?). We can learn the complete things or learn(things from?) 
Canada America France, Germany (who) have information and the technology 
very very fast. We can learn from you. Yes, our values lose some(as well). 
 
Analysis of Answers to Questions 11, 12. 
 
‘A’ considers the ‘tug a war’ between modernity and tradition to require a 
balance. Tradition is equated with family=clan=root, an attitude strongly aligned with 
the orientation of  education on the island from the time of the KMT’s arrival. Tradition 
and a sense of ancestral heritage is considered crucial for ensuring the integrity of 
Taiwanese society. Safeguarding tradition against the wave of outside influences seems 
impossible for him/her despite this claim.  This pessimism is even more pronounced in 
the pathos of ‘B’s comments. The deep felt sense of loss of social grounding is palpable 
and profound. This is consistent with his/her desire for the reestablishment of a true 
Taiwanese identity years of cultural overwriting, Chinese nationalist discourses, and 
industrialization and modernization have buried. Nonetheless, he/she is forward looking 
and sees English as a vehicle for positive social change. B’s pathos is in stark contrast to 
C who considers the continued use of Taiwanese as a solution to reinvigorating 
Taiwanese culture, and while acknowledging some problem does not dramatically 
  
 
 
105 
express deep concern about the loss of Taiwanese culture.  ‘D’ is forward looking and 
while acknowledging that traditional values and languages can be lost without the 
society noticing nonetheless advocates opening up to other cultures, the learning of 
other languages and learning new technologies. Once again the participants, while 
agreeing with the problem, frame it in very different ways and have entirely different 
interpretations of what the loss of Taiwanese culture and language mean for the society 
of Taiwan.  They uniformly think English and internationalism are good things for the 
people of Taiwan to embrace and this seems to override any desire for a program of 
Taiwanese cultural reconstruction.  
 
5. 4 The Association of Race, Nation and Language in Choice of Teachers  
 
On the question of race what surprised me was the matter-of-factness, the 
unselfconsciousness, of racial associations with countries and languages and the 
naturalness of the association between adequate teaching of English and white teachers. 
One of the participants seemed to equate whiteness with American or Canadian teachers 
very strongly, thinking “white skinned teacher” meant American or Canadian teacher. 
He/she was asked to look at the question again as I wanted the participants to consider 
the suitability of different “racial types” for teaching English and I needed him/her to 
understand the distinction to get an adequate response. 
 
Question 18:  Do you think skin colour or other factors related to a teacher’s appearance 
affects parents’, teachers’ or administrators’ attitudes about the teachers’ suitability as 
an English teacher? 
 
A:  There is a proverb in Chinese “The Buddha needs the golden 
appearance the people need beautiful clothes= people need good clothes to 
change their temperament and image. Normally, we get a first impression from a 
person’s appearance. We get a first impression from the foreign teacher from 
their dress, appearance, facial colour. Of course later you can know them day by 
day. But at the beginning you don’t know them well. Only depend on facial 
colour, and their way they treat others to judge. In the new semester Dean 
(name) introduced a foreign teacher to us. He had tanned skin. There were few 
tan skinned teachers at the university. Both students and parents had difficulty to 
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accept him so considering that we didn’t employ him. But as multiculturalism 
increases many of these worries will be reduced. 
 
B:  Character and personality is more important than where people 
come from. Appearance …I don’t think (it’s) important. Some people think that 
ability (of non-whites) is not good. Skin colour effects parents’(thinking). We 
like white people most (more) than black people (for teaching English). 
Impression of lower person because of where they come from originally.  
 
C: Oh it will a little.  
 
D;   Nowadays, in Taiwan the government office..officials… We all 
have the thinking that if we have the foreign people, because English is the 
mother language and fluent we like you to teach our students. Parents also know 
this. Because the best teachers come from America and Canada. 
 
Analysis of Answers to Question 18: 
 
‘A’ seems to be saying that the first impression will be quite bad for an English 
teacher if they are not white, although “day by day” this impression can be changed. The 
non-acceptance of the “tan skinned” teacher corresponds to many situations I witnessed 
in Taiwan including hiring and firing practices and general happiness on the part of 
parents and schools with non-Caucasian teachers.  ‘B’ seems to contradict him/her self 
by saying first that skin colour doesn’t matter but notes that really parents and others 
will think of dark skinned people as “lower”.  She is also expressing the common 
assumption that skin colour can determine a person’s place of origin, or nationality. ‘D’ 
interprets the question as referring to nationality not race, in fact conflating the two. 
Skin colour truly does leave an impression on the minds of many people in Taiwan. 
Status as a Caucasian is very high. It is one of the reasons white teachers enjoy living in 
Taiwan as they receive a relative status much higher than they would normally if they 
remained at home. Many are working in a well- respected field of education in Taiwan as 
well, without the qualifications required to teach at home. Indians, Filipinos and Blacks 
on the other hand, can meet resistance, may be paid less, and must tolerate more 
criticism from employers if they want to teach English in Taiwan. In a further question 
about the adequacy of different races for the participants elaborated: 
 
Question 19.  
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Do you think a fair skinned person is more likely to be accepted as a suitable English 
teacher than a dark skinned person by Taiwanese parents, students or administrators? 
Why do you think this is so? 
 
A:   If the skin colour is not too dark..the feeling is not too 
uncomfortable as long as dress and behaviour is not too strange. Basically we 
can accept them. Taiwanese skin is also very tanned but it is also very important 
where you are from. If you are from US Canada and other native English 
countries there is no problem to employ you. But if you are not from a native 
English speaking country just like the Philippines or other European countries. 
You will be refused.  
 
D:   long pause: I say no! We choose the English teacher that can 
teach read(ing) and writ(ing) and teach more.  (Interviewer rephrases…). Maybe 
the one reason is that all say the white skin…we say the white skin come from 
America. Dark skin come from Africa. (laughs) but there are many dark skin in 
America can speak fluent English. 
 
Analysis of Answers to Question 19: 
 
‘A’ notes the difficulty of “non-native” speakers with darker skin in being 
accepted.  European countries are also singled out. However, I have known “non-native” 
white teachers of English who have had little problem in their employment as a result of 
their accents.  Filipinos and Indians are interesting cases because  technically their 
accents are no further from “standard British” or “standard American” English than 
many other forms of English (consider the many London or American dialects), yet they 
have little opportunity to share their language or teaching expertise in Taiwan. Once 
again D associates skin colour with nationa lity and nervously laughs about blacks being 
associated with Africa.  Laughter, it should be noted, often means something different 
for Taiwanese than for Canadians, for instance. In this case I believe it was indicative of 
embarrassment and not ridicule.  
.  
Question 22. Many parents and administrators insist on having light skinned or white 
skinned foreign teachers? Why? 
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A:   I never have this kind of problem. My daughter’s first English 
teacher is a Filipino who  immigrant to US also his English is not standard and 
his skin is tanned, tanned but the way he taught was so lively and good. 
Although the tuition fee is high, many students want to be taught by him. My 
friend introduced this teacher for my daughter since she was four. Now her 
English is good. Maybe some parents think that the light skinned teacher will 
teach better but in fact if the teacher really teaches well they can also be 
accepted by the students and their parents. So the skin colour is not the most 
important thing. Later on we’ll have more and more foreign teachers and the 
conception of the skin colour will be fainter and fainter.  
 
B:  Why white teacher? Because they (Taiwanese people/parents) 
think they(blacks) are low so (they) want whites. Most suitable accent is 
American because T.V. and movies(?). 
 
C:  But at X school there is a South African teacher. He is black 
(laughs). 
 
D:  This is an old (previous ) question. Dark(skin) have some(people) 
refuse. Not me, (refuse) but the skin…if we have this idea or parents(have it) but 
many don’t have this idea. We are convinced that the skin colour is innate. Not a 
big question. We are open to receive any kind of people. We can go to another 
country and see white, yellow, black anyone. 
 
Analysis of Answers to Question 22. 
 
‘A’s personal experience with his daughter’s teacher, I believe, has made an 
impression on him/her about the suitability of teachers of English and race.  ‘B’ explains 
again that dark skin is associated with lower class people and the effect of movies for 
creating the desire for American teachers (likely with white actors and actresses). C 
laughs (nervously? derogatorily?) about a situation where another school has hired a 
black English teacher. D distances himself from the common perception of the 
suitability of certain races for teaching English. Nonetheless when talking of the 
potential for meeting others abroad he/she uses racial categories.  
When it came to the question of the suitability of Taiwanese teachers to teach 
English; only one participant felt that fluent and qualified Taiwanese teachers would not 
be suitable to teach English. A and D cite cultural understanding as a reason why 
Taiwanese teachers, as opposed to Filipinos, for instance, are suitable to teach 
Taiwanese students English. Cultural familiarity is able to outweigh the stigma of ‘non-
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nativeness’ in this case for determining teacher suitability. It should also be noted that 
Chinese teachers are not considered ‘low status’ as is the case for non-white foreigners.  
 
5.5 Questions 21, 23 The Choice of Accents for Teachers of English. 
 
Question 21: Do you think Taiwanese teachers can teach English as well as “native” 
speakers of English with the same amount of training? What kind of English should 
students learn? American? Australian? British? Other? Why 
 
A:.   It’s not the same because we are trained in different education 
systems, conceptions and ideas will be different. Including(thinking about) 
supply and demand. Mainly we are talking about American accent and style or 
the British accent (style). The American accent is more formal and 
standardized..just like Mandarin. In fact we don’t care too much about accent. 
The most important thing is that we can communicate with each other. If you 
can speak English that’s enough.  That’s excellent but difficult. It’s difficult for 
the Hakka to speak Mandarin. They are different from Ming Nan people Beijing 
and other provincial people..its not connected to educational quality. Also it 
doesn’t mean Mandarin is good and Hakka is not good. The way you are 
educated, your attitude are the most important factor. If you find a teacher who 
can teach you well that’s a good teacher. 
 
B:  Foreign teacher(s are) is better than Taiwanese (for) elementary 
(classes). Middle school (students) need Chinese explanation(s) for grammar. 
Fluent Taiwanese (teachers are) ok. Qualification(s) (are) not as important as 
heart, love kids and patience. Taiwanese(teachers) are not the best way. (They) 
cannot teach(English) as well even though(they have) the same qualifications. 
 
C:  Anyone is better(OK). But in Taiwan more people are learning 
American English. Why? (It’s) what we learned before. Maybe(we learned it 
from) it comes from the magazine. They speak American English. That’s what 
we want to learn. They don’t know which one is American or British. English 
they just learn. 
 
D:  In general the English teacher from anywhere with the same training can 
teach well but attitude is important…(to) teach very hard(make an effort) he can 
teach the students well. What kind is lost would really tell you America is the 
mainstream…all people…parents would (like to) learn the American English 
because it is the most popular international language. They have the strong 
power (The language?people? are powerful). 
 
Analysis of Answers to Questions 21: 
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‘A’ seems to suggest Bourdieu’s point about language as capital and the values 
of American and British English in that respect but then retreats to the notion that simple 
communication is really the most important factor for language learning. Finally, by 
comparing Mandarin and Hakka ‘A’ seems to be taking an apolitical view of linguistics 
that all languages are equal. This view implies a laissez faire attitude to the politics of 
language learning. By making it a personal responsibility, that success depends on “ones 
attitude”, ‘A’ avoids the structural aspect of language learning and social 
differentiations.  ‘B’ s response indicates a certain perspective on method where young 
learners are best taught aurally while middle school requires translation. This probably 
arises from ‘B’s focus on high school entrance exams in English that are heavy in 
grammar questions. Overall ‘B’ seems to think Taiwanese teachers cannot teach English 
as well as ‘native’ teachers, likely because of accent or general proficiency. ‘C’ points to 
the historical precedent of American English on the island and the orientation of the 
mass media to American, using “magazines” as an example. ‘D’ notes the “mainstream” 
presence of American English and the “strong power” of American culture. It is a norm 
that is desired to be acquired for the enhancement of one’s own power.   
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Nationality and Accent 
 
Question 23.  What kind of  English accent is most suitable for Taiwanese students to 
learn? For example: British, American, or Australian. Why? 
 
 
A:   I’m not an English education specialist so I don’t know too much 
about it. But I think there are different values between educators about method. 
The most important thing is effectiveness. Can they make kids feel interested in 
studying English. It’s not important to study an American or British accent or 
Australian. Maybe American accent is the main trend, also British accent is not 
bad. But most use the KK alphabet at present. It’s from the US not from Britain. 
Once my daughter studied in England for one month. She liked it because it was 
formal and standard. Some people choose to study an American accent because 
it is a super power nation. Maybe I’d choose the British accent because of the 
first generation of American emigrated from England. Time pass by, the 
accent(s) changed. If you want to study the British accent will be 
better…beautiful.  I don’t know too much about it but everyone who knows 
English will think that British accent just like Mandarin in China.(is) very 
excellent 
 
B:   Maybe American (accent is the best) because we accept their 
culture. We get confused by strong accents.  
 
C:  If I can learn American English I only can speak American. 
British (English is) very beautiful. (There is a problem with) British(English) 
have problem because kids(are) learn (ing to understand)American English 
but(the British) accent is ok. In my opinion. I know America is the mainstream. 
Most people like to learn American English. 
 
Analysis of Answers to Question 23:  
 
For ‘A’ American English is “the trend” but aesthetically British English is 
beautiful. We can speculate on why it should be perceived in this way but Bourdieu’s 
point about the feminisation of dominant language, in contraposition to the vulgar and 
course dialects, suggests itself.  The comparison of the (standard)  British accent to 
(official) Mandarin, also a dominant language form is telling in this regard. American 
English is depicted as derivative of British English, suggesting that there is one main 
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standard to which all others owe their power. The advantage of American English is its 
association with the powerfulness of the American nation.  ‘B’ says “strong accents are 
confusing, suggesting again that American English doesn’t constitute an accent and that 
all other Englishes are to be measured by their distance from that standard. ‘C’ 
compares American and British accents using the criteria of beauty and distribution, 
each having their own merits. D reiterates how profuse American English has become as 
a reason that Taiwanese prefer to learn it.  
 
5. 6  Conclusions from Analysis of Interviews: 
 
The consciousness of the status of users of different languages was highly visible 
with the participants. Although there was some notion that this is unfair and a product of 
socio-historical conditions,  there was no thing in the way of suggesting that Taiwanese 
or aboriginal languages needed strong intervention for promotion. The inclusion of 
Taiwanese in the public schools was thought of rather neutrally and even negatively. 
This perspective is quite curious to me and I guessed it might have something to do with 
wanting to protect it as a domestic possession. It reflects a particular position described 
by Pennycook (DCL) and represented by Crystal, who he critisizes, that says that multi-
lingualism is desirable with a common international language of commerce and 
education and home languages that have non-official functions. Pennycook is critical of 
this view because it assumes that local languages can resist the colonization of the 
dominant languages even in the domestic sphere.  
What these interviews showed me were tendencies in these groups towards an 
association of language, nation and race, if not in their own minds at least in the way 
they characterized the thinking of Taiwanese people in general. These associations were 
not absolute. There were gestures made toward the idea that the English language could 
be taught by anyone who was qualified and perhaps more importantly, committed and 
dedicated to doing a good job. Qualified and committed Taiwanese teachers were 
preferred over all other ‘non-native’ speakers because of their intimate knowledge of 
their students. Nonetheless, there is a definite awareness of the accent as an important 
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factor in the acquisition of English and the association of the ‘native’ speaker with the 
standard for English that naturally should be sought out.  
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CHAPTER SIX: THE ALIENATING CLOAK OF ESSENTIALISM 
 
Although we have the capacity to understand people in many different ways with 
the application of many different forms of classification a certain system of 
classification has come to dominate our thinking in a way that limits that flexibility.  
There is relatively consistent general discourse that has been propagated globally, 
although not without controversy or contestation, that has come to attain  status as the 
natural and  objective classification of human beings. It retains the aura of scientific 
objectivity, even though reputable science no longer adheres to this view, and we carry 
it around with us like a well-worn cloak. It is a familiar shell that, although usually not 
always relevant to our immediate activities, it erupts into view when its logic is 
challenged. It provides a sense of belonging to a greater whole that has a fixed natural 
structure but it divides us from others who we may have more in common with than we 
dare to know.  
These naturalized self-understandings are not far removed from certain 
conceptions of religion.  This association has been made by many theorists, including 
Benedict Anderson (1981), to explain the rise and power of nationalism, but I want to 
extend the religious metaphor, the idea there is some preordained place that is 
established for each of us in the scheme of the universe, to the other aspects of social 
identity as well. A part of it is race but it is not limited to that form of categorization. 
We are told we have a culture, but we experience a wide variety of activities that do not 
have a single common thread. We are told we speak a particular language, but the 
modes of use of that language are anything but uniform. We are told we are national 
citizens, but this association is only maintained under a constant imposition of images 
and slogans that appear forced and arbitrary.  We are told that racism does not exist, but 
we see it all around us. These categorizations work complementarily.  I have tried to 
show, in turn, as with race, that none of them can be considered essential aspects of 
individuals or societies and should be strongly questioned whenever they are employed 
in discourse to justify some social project or policy or understanding of real difference.   
The direct logical outcome of thinking of individuals as falling into precise 
categories is that when a group of people are understood to occupy those categories in 
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roughly the same way tha t group comes to be understood as having a distinct social 
identity. The psychological effect of understanding  individuals with the same attributes 
living in a geographically defined region is the creation of an impression of some 
idealized  individual written large, into the identity of the entire society. Or, rather, the 
individual more or less fits the pattern established as a norm that constitutes the identity 
of the society. Therefore, when identity terms applied to individuals are considered 
essential, so too is there a tendency to consider the identity of the social group to be 
based on essential qualities.  
We are therefore led to speak of English societies, Black societies, and the 
Taiwanese society as though the term captured something of the essence of that group 
that corresponds to the way it is composed of individuals of a certain type. As Willinsky 
says: 
 
Our subjectivity is written and named within historically 
contingent texts of schools and popular culture. We are as we are 
named. (Willinsky, 1998, p. 24 ) 
 
The human world is therefore experienced not as the multidimensional and 
complicated situation it is but as the mundane substitution of human types.  Reflection 
on the uniqueness of self and other is erased and substituted with the reflex of general 
categorizations.  These stereotypes become imbedded in official and non-official 
discourses unconsciously.  
 
 are not anything as what we have learned to call ourselves. 
Learning to read ourselves within and against how we are written, 
too, seems to be a part of the educational project..but learning to 
read oneself is also about learning to read the other, as we consider 
how to re-write the learner and the learned, perceptions of 
difference. How are we to overcome the foreignness of the other, 
if not first finding it in ourselves, as we have made ourselves over 
in education and were all born foreign (ignorant, poorly spoken, 
barbaric). Hence we are all foreigners.  ‘the stranger is within me.’ 
(Julia Kristeva, 1991. Cited in Willinsky, 1998, p. 264) 
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Because a frame of mind persists that the words, American, Chinese, or 
Taiwanese need to correspond to some essential common quality in a populace, the 
exact attributes that should be considered determinative of that society’s social 
identity are debated endlessly in the social sciences and popular discourse. Positions 
are staked out on how to define identity in terms of some combination of race, 
ethnicity, and language. One or more may be considered foundational or essential 
while others are considered derivative. It is my position that these terms work 
together to give the impression of a common essence but that alone none of them 
can be established as a rational basis for categorizing human beings in any non-
historical, immutable or essential way. As in the case of nation-ness, which is an 
originally artificial and learned association, they are imagined qualities that mask 
much more complex linguistic and cultural realities where identities are constantly 
being negotiated and contested, not only in Ta iwan but everywhere.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study I have tried to show that what are normally considered the basic 
facets of social identity, have become naturalized and strongly associated in discourse 
on Taiwanese identity. They have become common sense attributes on which the 
discourse on Taiwan identity is focussed. While not neglecting the way Chineseness, as 
a single term associated with race, ethnicity, nationality and language has also been 
contested as an appropriate identification for the Islanders of Taiwan who consider 
Taiwaneseness and Chineseness as analytically and historically unique designations, the 
force of an assumed Chineseness, defined under these categories, remains powerful in 
Taiwanese society.  
 I have tried to outline the processes by which the force of this identity thinking 
became established. The establishment of a national and bureaucratic rationality, first 
with the Japanese and then with the KMT, which sought to harness the minds and 
bodies of the populace as a means for creating social stability and economic production 
at the same time produced national Taiwanese citizens. Nation-ness became a 
naturalized part of how Taiwanese people came to see themselves, even though, for 
many, this nation-ness was hoped for but never fully attained in an indigenous form.  
Focussing on education, with Foucault, I noted how modern institutes tend to 
subjectivize populations through regimes of disciplinary power that take the body as an 
object of technical manipulation and observation. This creates a docile populace that 
internalises the monitoring gaze. State and institutional practices are therefore implicit 
forms of learning, perhaps better described as training. Traditional patterns of spatial 
and temporal consciousness become transformed in these processes and the Taiwanese 
population entered the modern world through these processes. I argued that this exactly 
followed the pattern established with capitalism and colonialism that occurred with the 
emerging European nations.  
The presumption of a hierarchy of racial types that was a presumption of 
colonial exploitation was also repeated in Taiwan.  More explicit forms of self-
understanding and human distinction were adapted by western trained KMT 
intellectuals from the discourses on the natural and human sciences and became a part of 
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the Taiwanese educational curricula as they did across the globe. I claimed that the 
authority of science endorsed the objective classification of human types in the 
categories of race, ethnicity and language and that these categories became naturally 
associated with specific nations through cultural re-education. Certain types were taught 
to be superior to others.  Whites and Han Chinese were depicted as being at the top of 
the hierarchy. There was deference to the logic of white supremacy with Han 
Chineseness aspiring to that topmost place.  
The association of nation-ness with a presumed homogeneous culture was an 
explicit and rigorously pursued educational process undertaken by the KMT over a fifty-
year period. This process was a blatant example of what had occurred, or was occurring 
across the globe. National culture was naturalized through discursive means with the 
school system playing a leading role in that process. The establishment of a Chinese 
consciousness also has the potential of legitimising the mainland’s claim that Taiwan 
become a province of greater China. The conflation of Chinese race, language and 
culture were conjoined to become a national norm overtly effacing difference, while 
those furthest removed from those norms struggled to compete from the margin.   
The enforced use of Mandarin as an official language was a major factor for the 
creation of a specific Chinese identity on the island. The teaching of Mandarin 
advantaged the mainlanders and established a common mode of communication that 
facilitated the hegemonic domination of the mainlanders over their Taiwanese 
compatriots who were deficient in that form of cultural capital. However, the close 
association of culture, language, and nation with the oppressive activities of the KMT 
turned them into symbols of the atrocities never forgotten by the families who suffered 
under them. The Taiwanese managed to raise themselves into a comparable socio-
economic position through private enterprise. When socio-political conditions became 
more democratic a complete political inversion became possible and the pro-Taiwanese 
DPP came to power. 
This political change has opened the debate on Taiwanese identity in a dramatic 
manner. On the one hand there is a trend that can be seen with indigenous people 
globally where the question of authentic Taiwaneseness has come to the fore. On the 
other hand global capitalism has added another layer of class differentiation upon that 
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already established between mainlanders and islanders. Taiwanese society as a whole 
has come under pressure and is in danger of becoming just another society of 
consumption with culture becoming just another commodity to be bought and sold. In 
the racial hierarchy the path to whiteness, as the constructed international racial summit, 
passes through what has been constructed as racial, ethnic, linguistic and national 
Chineseness and the cultural capital of the English language which is associated with 
that whiteness.  The responses from the interviews conducted with Taiwanese teachers 
indicate the unselfconscious association of the English language, whiteness, and 
Americanism as an unquestionable good to be attained in an international competitive 
environment.  
Nonetheless, English is able to open Taiwan up to alternative international 
discourses and cultural spaces that may facilitate the rejection of the corporate world-
view. Also, local Taiwanese languages, literature and theatre can possibly act as a 
cultural brake to the negative aspects of globalism by reorienting Taiwanese society to 
its local culture. However, as these languages are in decline, their future as a potential 
cultural force in Taiwan remains in question. 
Prescriptively, I believe educational policy should  not only attend to which 
languages are taught in Taiwan, but also to how equally instruction is distributed across 
the population.  This entails considering the social conditions that predispose those who 
already possess the most cultural and economic capital to be able to continue to remain 
in positions of domination over those who do not.  Instructional methods and policies 
should be adapted accordingly.  
The history of resistance to foreign invasion needs to be readapted to the neo-
colonial forms of intrusion the English language and capitalist exploitation represent.  
There needs to be a critical pedagogy that teaches Taiwanese students to look at the way 
language education has transformed the Taiwanese cultural landscape and continues to 
do so. Foreign teachers in Taiwan need to be more aware of their role in the 
reproduction of a global discourse of white supremacy. If they do teach in Taiwan they 
should attempt to give their students the means to critically engage contemporary and 
historical discourses that bear directly upon the question of Taiwanese identity and its 
relationship the racial differentiation adapted from the history of colonialism. They 
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should be given the opportunity to understand how whiteness in the form of Englishness 
and Americanism came to form the linguistic, racial and nationalist apex, and 
Chineseness and Mandarin came to represent the intermediate step.  
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I understand that participation in interviews with the researcher, Edmond G.Tetrault are 
entirely voluntary. 
 
I understand that information from the interviews will be used in the publication of the 
researcher's  thesis at the University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada and that it 
may  
be presented at public seminars or published as an article in academic journals. 
 
I understand that the content of this interview will be accessible only to the researcher, 
his supervisor and committee members before publication of the thesis. 
 
I understand that if I decide at any point before, during, or up to the point of the 
publication of the thesis that the information collected in the interview should not be 
used for research I may request that it be precluded from publication. 
 
I understand that the researcher will provide me with a transcript of the content of the 
interview upon my request and that I may have any or all of the content of the interview 
omitted from publication. 
 
I  understand that information pertaining to my identity including my name, address, 
place of work, or other information that might uniquely identify me as a subject in this 
research will not be published in the thesis or revealed by the researcher or supervisor.  
If there is any information in my statements which might personally identify me 
understand that I will be asked for my signature on a transcript release form 
acknowledging my permission to publish that information. 
 
I understand that the information collected in these interviews will be kept in a secure 
place and that information which might personally identify me as a participant or other 
information pertaining to my person will not be accessible to individuals other than the 
researcher and his supervisor before, during, or after the publication of the thesis. I 
understand that if there is a chance of identifying me as a interviewee that I will be 
given the opportunity to alter my response or have it deleted before publication of the 
information. 
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Description of Interview: 
  
 
The researcher, Gerry Tetrault, will ask you 25 questions about  language learning and 
identity in Taiwan.  If you are uncertain about the meaning of the question it can be 
repeated and/or you may read the script of the question. 
 
In his research the researcher will analyze different sources of information about 
language education and its relation to social, cultural and national identity in Taiwan. 
The title of the thesis is “The Question of Taiwanese Identity in the Context of 
Language Education”. The purpose of this study is to present various kinds discourse 
which justify specific language education policies in Taiwan including what languages 
are to be taught, how much time should each language be taught, and who should teach 
the language. The hypothesis in this research is that how people talk about language 
education and how they talk about their cultural, ethnic and national identity are related. 
The conclusions of this research will be to say what that relationship consists in. 
Furthermore, this research will try to determine how other factors related to social 
identity such as race, ethnicity, economic and social advantage and disadvantage are 
talked about when people talk language education policy in Taiwan.  
 
You will be given a copy of the final published version upon your request.  
 
If you have any questions about the goals of this research, the use that will be made of it 
or the security of the information from the interviews the researcher will answer them 
for you before, during or after the interview. 
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